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A STUDY OF THE LOCK-IN EFFECTS OF FEDERAL 
INCOME TAXATION OF CAPITAL GAINS ON 
SECURITIES OF INDIVIDUALS
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
The history of the federal income tax laws is re­
plete with controversy regarding the taxation of income 
derived from transactions involving capital assets. One 
area of controversy concerns arguments that the provisions 
of the income tax laws pertaining to capital gains and 
losses (referred to as the capital gains tax) create a 
situation referred to as "lock-in." The term "lock-in" is 
defined, for purposes of the study, as a situation which 
exists if a taxpayer is reluctant to dispose of a capital 
asset because of federal income tax consequences of the 
disposition. The basic problem considered in this study is 
a determination of the magnitude of the alleged lock-in 
effects of capital gains taxation on individual investors.
Areas of the Laws Allegedly 
Creating Investor Lock-In
Three aspects of the present federal income tax 
structure pertaining to capital gains and losses are said to 
create lock-in of investors. These are: (1) the imposition
of a tax on realization, (2) the treatment of transfers at 
death, and (3) the holding period distinction.
Imposition of a Tax on Realization
Capital gains and losses are recognized, for income 
tax purposes, when realization (generally sale or exchange 
of a capital asset) occurs. A taxpayer may defer payment of 
income taxes on capital gains by postponing realization of 
the gain. Thus, a taxpayer may be influenced to hold rather 
than sell an appreciated asset simply to postpone payment of 
income tax on the appreciation.
The imposition of a tax on realization creates a more 
complex situation when an investor is considering the sale of 
an appreciated capital asset and reinvestment of the proceeds. 
The income tax reduces the amount of proceeds from the sale 
available for reinvestment. Consequently, the differential 
in the expected return from an asset to be purchased over 
the expected return from an asset held must be sufficient to 
justify a transfer and to offset payment of income taxes on 
the transaction. The capital gains tax may thus create an 
impediment to the exchange of earning assets.
3Alleged investor lock-in, attributable to the impo­
sition of a tax on realization, is often referred to as 
lock-in from the "capital gains tax rate."
Treatment of Transfers at Death
A taxpayer may completely avoid payment of income 
taxes on appreciated capital assets included in his estate. 
For income tax purposes, such gains are not considered to 
be realized at the time of the taxpayer's death, and no 
income tax is imposed on the amount of appreciation up to 
that point. In addition, the tax basis for computing gain 
or loss on such assets, in the hands of a beneficiary, is 
the fair market value of the asset at date of death or 
alternative estate valuation date. Appreciation on a 
capital asset transferred through an estate is thus never 
subject to income tax. A taxpayer may be influenced to hold 
rather than sell an appreciated asset because the opportun­
ity to completely avoid payment of income taxes is avail­
able. Such influence is referred to as lock-in from 
"avoidance at death provisions" or "step-up in basis pro­
visions . "
Assets included in estates are subject to various 
taxes that must be paid on estates, but these taxes are 
imposed regardless of the form of assets in the estate. 
Therefore, they do not affect the validity of the state­
ment that income taxes may be completely avoided on ap­
preciated capital assets transferred through an estate, or
1+
allegations that the avoidance provisions create investor 
lock-in.
Holding Period Distinction
The income tax laws distinguish between gains from 
capital assets held more than six months (long-term capital 
gains) and gains from capital assets held six months or 
less (short-term capital gains). Short-term capital gains 
are taxed at basically the same rates as ordinary income, 
while long-term capital gains receive preferential treat­
ment. A taxpayer may be influenced to hold an appreciated 
capital asset for a period longer than six months before 
selling it, in order to reduce the income tax that must be 
paid on the sale of the asset. Such influence is referred 
to as "holding period lock-in."
Significance of the Alleged 
Lock-in Problem
It is claimed that capital gains taxation tends to 
lock-in investors owning appreciated capital assets, im­
peding the free flow of capital and creating serious eco­
nomic consequences. Among the undesirable effects attributed 
to investor lock-in are accentuation of fluctuations in the 
stock market and fluctuations in specific asset prices 
thereby distorting the process of resource allocation and 
reducing economic growth and efficiency.
As stated by Jonathan A. Brown, former director of 
the Research Department of the New York Stock Exchange,
5As of this moment, [195?] American investors are 
locked in with over $200 billion of unrealized capital 
gains. We know that, in stocks listed on the New 
York Stock Exchange alone, there is over $100 billion 
of unrealized appreciation just since 19^9- That these 
investors continue to be locked in by the restrictive 
effects of the capital-gains tax constitutes one of the 
country's most serious obstacles to economic growth.1
Neil Jacoby, in a report presented to the Committee 
on Ways and Means of the Congress, expressed a similar 
opinion.
The current treatment of capital gains does tend to 
"freeze" capital assets in the hands of investors who 
are reluctant to sell appreciated assets and pay up 
to 25 percent of their gain to the Federal Government. 
Thus, it does in some measure impede the mobility of 
investment funds, with adverse consequences for the 
productivity of capital.2
The significance of these arguments and the magnitude 
of economic consequences depend to a large degree on the 
strength of the alleged lock-in effects of capital gains 
taxation on investors, and there is considerable disagree­
ment on this point. The preceding quotations contain impli­
cations that capital gains taxation exerts a substantial 
lock-in influence on investors. Economist Walter Heller 
questioned the strength of investor lock-in.
1 Jonathan A. Brown, "The Locked-in Problem," Federal 
Tax Policv for Economic Growth and Stability. Papers sub­
mitted by panelists appearing before the Subcommittee on Tax 
Policy, Joint Committee on the Economic Report. 8^-th 
Congress, 1st Session, November 9, 1955 (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1955)? P* 367*
^Neil H. Jacoby, "Guidelines of Income Tax Reforms 
for the 1960's," Tax Revision Compendium. Compendium of 
papers on Broadening the Tax Base submitted to the Committee 
on Ways and Means (Washington, B.C.: U.S. Government Print­
ing Office, 1959), P« 165.
. . . how much scope is left for its [the capital 
gains tax] lock-in effect? Far less, certainly, than 
our worst fears (ably translated by the officials of 
the New York Stock Exchange) would suggest. . . .
The extent, severity, and economic impact of the 
lock-in effect have been seriously overrated.3
Professors Holt and Shelton expressed a similar view.
There is only the slightest empirical evidence 
relating to the lock-in effect, but what exists tends 
to support the conclusion derived from the theoretical 
analysis . . . that the lock-in effect of the capital 
gains tax is not great.^
There is little agreement among authorities concern­
ing the extent or significance of lock-in effects of capital 
gains taxation. Yet, there has been little empirical re­
search conducted to provide support for the various positions,
Hypothesis and Objectives
The central hypothesis of the study is that federal 
income tax implications influence investors to hold ap­
preciated securities that might otherwise be sold, and 
therefore, lock-in of investors exists.
A primary objective of the investigation was to ob­
tain evidence to-support or refute the hypothesis and to
^Walter ¥. Heller, "Investors' Decisions, Equity, 
and the Capital Gains Tax," Federal Tax Policv for Economic 
Growth and Stability. Papers submitted by panelists ap­
pearing before the Subcommittee on Tax Policy, Joint Com­
mittee on the Economic Report. 8^-th Congress, 1st Session, 
November 9, 1955 (Washington, B.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1955), PP* 386, 394.
L.
Charles C. Holt, and John P. Shelton, "The Lock-in 
Effect of the Capital Gains Tax," The National Tax Journal. 
Vol. XV (December, 1962), p. 351.
7provide an indication of the extent of investor lock-in 
created by capital gains taxation. This study of the 
lock-in effects of capital gains taxation also includes:
(1 ) an examination of the relevant provisions of 
the laws of federal income taxation and a delineation of 
those provisions that may create a lock-in situation for 
investors,
(2) a discussion of possible undesirable economic 
consequences resulting from alleged investor lock-in, and
(3) an evaluation of proposals for income tax re­
form designed to alleviate the alleged lock-in problem, and 
recommendations for reform based on information derived 
from the project.
A summary review of each of these areas is presented 
in order to provide the necessary background for a compre­
hensive investigation of the lock-in effects of capital gains 
taxation.
Approach Followed in the Studv
The research for the project was conducted in two 
separate phases. The first phase was a thorough review of 
literature concerning lock-in effects of capital gains tax­
ation. Such a review was necessary in order to determine 
that a controversial issue exists, to define the problem and 
areas of the federal income tax laws that may create in­
vestor lock-in, to delineate the study within relevant and 
practical limits, and to obtain information about previous
8research and analyses. This phase of the research provided 
the basis for much of the discussion which follows, par­
ticularly that concerning present federal income tax laws, 
economic consequences of investor lock-in, and proposals for 
alleviation of investor lock-in.
The second phase of the research consisted of col­
lecting and analyzing data gathered from a mail survey of a 
group of taxpayers. The primary purpose of the survey was 
to obtain information to be utilized in an evaluation of the 
existence and significance of lock-in effects on investor de­
cisions. A detailed discussion of the methodology, results, 
and conclusions of the survey is presented in subsequent 
chapters.
Scope of the Studv
Although lock-in has been defined as a situation 
which exists if a taxpayer is reluctant to dispose of a 
capital asset because of federal income tax consequences of 
the disposition, the terms "taxpayer" and "capital assets" 
refer to a large number of heterogeneous items. The scope 
of the study was restricted to exclude unnecessary complex­
ity from the presentation and to allow for development of 
meaningful conclusions. The investigation was, therefore, 
limited to lock-in effects of capital gains taxation on in­
dividual taxpayers and their investments in stocks and 
bonds.
9In addition, individuals in business or professional 
occupations were selected for the survey, and a dispropor­
tionately large number of high-income persons were included. 
Members of these groups were chosen because of the high 
degree of concentration of security ownership by such indi­
viduals. The responses of high-income business and profes­
sional people would represent opinions and attitudes of 
members of a significant group of investors. This conten­
tion obviously influenced the collection, presentation, and 
analysis of empirical data, and consequently, results and 
conclusions of the study. The validity of the conclusions, 
therefore, are dependent, to some extent, on the validity of 
this assumption. Appendix A contains a more detailed dis­
cussion of these restrictions on the scope of the study.
Significance of the Studv
The lack of empirical evidence on the subject of 
investor lock-in provided one justification for conducting 
this investigation. Data collected from the survey, com­
bined with results of previous research, were used to sup­
port or provide a basis for disagreement with currently held 
positions regarding the lock-in effects of capital gains 
taxation.
The response rate to the survey was relatively low, 
a common occurrence for mail questionnaires of this nature.
In spite of efforts to protect the research from bias or 
error, nonresponse could have affected the representativeness
10
of the data. Therefore, statistically verifiable statements 
could not be made about the population of high-income busi­
ness and professional investors or investors as a whole; 
although conclusions derived from the data may be completely 
valid and representative of either or both.
Also, at the time this study was initiated, the 91st 
Congress was considering a major reform of the federal in­
come tax laws, and The Tax Reform Act of 1969 was the 
product of their efforts. The act contained several modi­
fications of the income tax treatment of capital gains and 
losses, and additional modifications are currently being 
studied. As a result, an increasing amount of attention has 
been directed toward the whole area of income taxation, and 
the capital gains controversy has received new fuel. The 
significance of this project was partially attributable to 
its timeliness.
In summary, the project was initiated to provide 
original, meaningful, and timely information that might be 
utilized to reduce the controversy over lock-in effects of 
capital gains taxation.
Organization of the Study 
Chapter I contains an introduction to the subject 
of the lock-in effects of capital gains taxation. The hy­
pothesis, objectives, approach, and organization of the 
study are presented, and the significance of the alleged 
lock-in problem and the study is discussed. In addition.
11
the areas of the laws allegedly creating lock-in are de­
lineated, and the constraints on the scope of the study are 
explained.
Chapter II summarizes the major provisions of present 
income tax laws that are relevant to individual investors in 
securities. In addition, those provisions of the laws 
purportedly creating lock-in are isolated and discussed.
Chapter III discusses some of the economic aspects of 
federal taxation of capital gains. A review of arguments for 
and against preferential treatment and alleged economic 
consequences of lock-in are presented.
Chapter IV contains a detailed description of survey
methodology utilized to obtain information about investor 
lock-in and presents some of the pertinent findings.
Chapter V evaluates the degree of lock-in created by
various aspects of capital gains taxation based on informa­
tion obtained in this project and previous research.
Chapter VI examines some alternative methods of 
taxing capital gains that have been proposed to eliminate 
or alleviate the alleged lock-in problem. In addition, the 
effects of the 1969 income tax reform on provisions pertain­
ing to capital gains and losses and investor lock-in are 
discussed.
Chapter VII presents a recommendation, based on con­
clusions derived from the study, for income tax reform that 
would alleviate lock-in effects of capital gains taxation.
12
Chapter VIII provides a summary of major findings of 
the research and indicates some areas where additional re­
search might be beneficial.
CHAPTER II
SUMMARY OF THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE LAWS 
OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION PERTAINING TO 
CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES
A comprehensive investigation of the lock-in effects 
of capital gains taxation requires a basic understanding of 
the relevant provisions and subsequent amendments and in­
terpretations of the Internal Revenue Code of 195^*^ The 
purpose of this chapter is to provide a review of the pro­
visions of the laws of federal income taxation that are 
pertinent to the lock-in controversy. The provisions con­
cerning capital gains and losses are complex, and numerous 
technical aspects, not directly related to the subject of 
this project, are omitted. In accordance with limitations 
on the scope of the study, the review includes primarily 
those provisions affecting individual taxpayers and their 
transactions involving securities. The "temporary" income 
tax surcharge generally is ignored in the discussion, since
References to the Code and Regulations are taken 
from Internal Revenue Code of 1994 and Income Tax Regula­
tions . July, 1969^ Editions, published by Prentice-Hall, 
Inc.
13
1>+
it affects the magnitude of the current effective rates but 
not the basic structure of the federal income tax, allegedly 
creating investor lock-in. Also, federal income tax laws as 
they existed prior to the 1969 reform are the basis of the 
project and are the laws relevant to the study. Modifica­
tions of the provisions resulting from the reform are noted, 
and a discussion of the changes is presented in Chapter VI.
Definition of a Capital Asset
The exact nature of a capital asset is not specified 
in the Code; rather, the definition states that all property,
except items specifically excluded, are capital assets. The 
exclusions apply to a substantial group of assets. Spe­
cifically, the Code states:
. . . the term "capital asset" means property held 
by the taxpayer (whether or not connected with his 
trade or business), but does not include—
(1 ) stock in trade of the taxpayer or other property 
of a kind which would properly be included in the in­
ventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the
taxable year, or property held by the taxpayer
primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course 
of his trade or business;
(2) property, used in his trade or business, (of
a character) which is subject to the allowance for de­
preciation provided in section I67, or real property 
used in his trade or business;
(3 ) a copyright, a literary, musical, or artistic 
composition, or similar property, held by--
(A) a taxpayer whose personal efforts created 
such property, or
(B) a taxpayer in whose hands the basis of
such property is determined, for the purpose 
of determining gain from a sale or exchange, 
in whole or in part by reference to the 
basis of such property in the hands of the 
person whose personal efforts created such 
property;
15
(If) accounts or notes receivable acquired in the 
ordinary course of trade or business for services 
rendered or from the sale of property described in 
paragraph (1); or
(5) an obligation of the United States or any of 
its possessions, or of a State or Territory, or any 
political subdivision thereof, or of the District of 
Columbia, issued on or after March 1, 19^1, on a 
discount basis and payable without interest at a fixed 
maturity date not exceeding one year from the date of
issue.2
This definition of a capital asset includes a number 
of diverse types of assets. Securities held by a taxpayer 
who is not a dealer in securities are included, and these are 
the assets of particular interest in the study.
Gains on Capital Assets as Income
Accountants, economists, and tax experts have had 
very little success in formulating a universal definition 
for the word "income." The term "income" is not defined 
specifically in the Internal Revenue Code of 195^» The Code 
does, however, provide a basis for distinguishing between 
items considered income to a taxpayer and items not con­
sidered income. As stated in the Code, the term "gross 
income":
. . . means all income from whatever source de­
rived, including (but not limited to) the following 
items :
(1) Compensation for services, including fees, 
commissions, and similar items;
(2) Gross income derived from business;
(3) Gains derived from dealings in property;
((+) Interest;
(5) Rents;
2
Internal Revenue Code, Section 1221.
16
(6) Royalties;
(7 ) Dividends;
(8) Alimony and separate maintenance payments;
(9 ) Annuities;
(10) Income from life insurance and endowment con­
tracts :
(11) Pensions;
(12) Income from discharge of indebtedness;
(11) Distributive share of partnership gross income;
(14) Income in respect of a decedent; and
(15) Income from an interest in an estate or trust.3
The federal tax regulations interpreting this sec­
tion specify:
Gross income means all income from whatever source 
derived, unless excluded by law. Gross income in­
cludes income realized in any form, whether in money, 
property, or services. Income may be realized, there­
fore, in the form of services, meals, accommodations, 
stock, or other property, as well as in cash. . .
Thus, gross income is defined very broadly for 
income tax purposes. Realized "gains derived from dealings 
in property" (including capital assets) are included in the 
gross income of a taxpayer and are subject to the income 
tax.
Determination of Point of Recognition and 
Amount of Capital Gains and Losses
A capital gain or loss is recognized for tax pur­
poses when realization occurs (generally a sale or exchange 
of a capital asset). Realization is not deemed to have oc­
curred when a capital asset is transferred by gift or at 
death.
^Internal Revenue Code, Section 6l. 
^Regulations, I.6I-I (a).
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The determination of the amount of a realized gain 
or loss is provided for in the Code.
The gain from the sale or other disposition of
property shall be the excess of the amount realized
therefrom over the adjusted basis provided in section 
1011 for determining gain, and the loss shall be the 
excess of the adjusted basis provided in such section 
for determining loss over the amount realized.?
There are two terms, "amount realized" and "adjusted 
basis," that require clarification.
The amount realized from the sale or other dis­
position of property shall be the sum of any money 
received plus the fair market value of the property 
(other than money) received. . .
The rules for determination of "adjusted basis" are
complex and depend on the type and the method of acquisition
of property. Two situations are particularly important to 
this study; these are securities acquired by purchase or 
securities acquired from a decedent.
Securities Acquired by Purchase
The original basis of a security purchased by a 
taxpayer is the amount paid for the security, including 
brokerage fees, transfer taxes, and other acquisition 
costs.7
^Internal Revenue Code, Section 1001 (a).
^Internal Revenue Code, Section 1001 (b). 
7Internal Revenue Code, Section 1012.
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Securities Acquired from a Decedent
Securities may be acquired from a decedent, and, 
subject to a few minor exceptions,
. . . the basis of property in the hands of a 
person acquiring the property from a decedent or to 
whom the property passed from a decedent shall, if 
not sold, exchanged, or otherwise disposed of before 
the decedent's death by such person, be the fair 
market value of the property at the date of the 
decedent's death, or, in the case of an election 
under either section 2032 or section 8l1 (j) of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1939 where the decedent died 
after October 21, 19^2, its value at the applicable 
valuation date prescribed by those sections.o
The basis of securities acquired from a decedent 
is, therefore, the fair market value of the security at the
date of death, or, if estate valuation at an alternative 
date is elected, the fair market value at the valuation 
date.
Implications of the Sections for This Studv
The preceding provisions contain several aspects of 
the income tax laws of particular interest to a study of 
investor lock-in. These provisions are concerned with the 
point of recognition of capital gains and losses and the de­
termination of basis for computing gain or loss.
Major changes in the value of capital assets, such 
as securities and real estate, frequently occur over a 
period of years. In spite of this characteristic, no 
capital gain or loss is recognized for income tax purposes
O
Internal Revenue Code, Section 10l4 (a).
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•until realization occurs. Consequently, the taxpayer, by 
deciding the time of realization, determines the taxable 
year in which a capital gain or loss will be included in 
his income. As a result of the taxpayer's control over the 
timing of recognition of capital gains, he may postpone the 
payment of income taxes on a capital gain simply by con­
tinuing to hold the asset.
Also, realization is not considered to have oc­
curred, and, therefore, no capital gain or loss is recog­
nized on transfers of capital assets by gift or at death. 
The amount of gain is not recognized for income tax pur­
poses at the time of death or transfer to the heir. In 
addition, the basis of an asset in the hands of a person 
acquiring property from a decedent is the fair market 
value at the estate valuation date. Consequently, any 
amount of accrued appreciation to the date of estate valua­
tion is never subject to the income tax; such tax is com­
pletely avoided.
These factors prove to be significant considerations 
in later discussions of lock-in effects of capital gains 
taxes.
Distinction between Short-Term and Long-Term 
Capital Gains and Losses
The present law distinguishes between short-term 
and long-term capital transactions based on the length of 
time the asset has been held. A gain or loss resulting from
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the sale or exchange of a capital asset held for more than 
six months is referred to as a long-term capital gain or 
loss. A gain or loss resulting from the sale or exchange 
of a capital asset held for six months or less is referred 
to as a short-term capital gain or loss. The distinction 
between long-term and short-term gains is of utmost im­
portance, since the effective rate at which the gain will 
be taxed is determined by the classification of the gain.
Terminology Related to Short-Term and 
Long-Term Capital Gains and Losses
An understanding of the following terms should fa­
cilitate comprehension of the discussion concerning the 
treatment of short-term and long-term capital gains and 
losses that is presented in a subsequent section.
(1) Short-term capital gain.— The term "short­
term capital gain" means gain from the sale or 
exchange of a capital asset held for not more than 
six months, if and to the extent such gain is 
taken into account in computing gross income.
(2) Short-term capital loss.— The term "short­
term capital loss" means loss from the sale or 
exchange of a capital asset held for not more than 
six months, if and to the extent that such loss is 
taken into account in computing taxable income.
(3) Long-term capital gain.— The term "long­
term capital gain" means gain from the sale or 
exchange of a capital asset held for more than six 
months, if and to the extent such gain is taken 
into account in computing gross income.
(*+) Long-term capital loss.— The term "long­
term capital loss" means loss from the sale or 
exchange of a capital asset held for more than six 
months, if and to the extent that such loss is 
taken into account in computing taxable income.
(5) Net short-term capital gain.— The term "net 
short-term capital gain" means the excess of short­
term capital gains for the taxable year over the 
short-term capital losses for such year.
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(6) Net short-term capital loss.— The term "net 
short-term capital loss" means the excess of short­
term capital losses for the taxable year over the 
short-term capital gains for such year.
(7) Net long-term capital gain.— The term "net 
long-term capital gain" means the excess of long­
term capital gains for the taxable year over the 
long-term capital losses for such year.
(8) Net long-term capital loss.— The term "net 
long-term capital loss" means the excess of long­
term capital losses for the taxable year over the 
long-term capital gains for such year. . . .9
Short-Term Capital Gains
Net short-term capital gains are included in a tax­
payer's gross income and receive the same income tax treat­
ment as ordinary income. There are no special provisions
for realized gains from capital assets held six months or 
less. Consequently, such short-term capital gains may be 
taxed at ordinary income rates, ranging from 1W- to 70 per­
cent, depending on the total amount of the taxable income 
of the taxpayer.
Long-Term Capital Gains
The excess of net long-term capital gains over net 
short-term capital losses for a particular taxable year^^ is 
included in a taxpayer's gross income for that year, but two 
provisions afford preferential treatment for the excess of 
net long-term capital gains over net short-term capital 
losses.
^Internal Revenue Code, Section 1222.
®This excess is te 
the Tax Reform Act of 1969*
^^ rmed "net section 1201 gains" by
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First, an amount equal to 50 percent of the excess 
is deducted from gross income in computing "adjusted gross 
income" for the taxable year. As stated in the Code,
In the case of a taxpayer other than a corporation, 
if for any taxable year the net long-term capital gain 
exceeds the net short-term capital loss, 50 percent of 
the amount of such excess shall be a deduction from 
gross income. . . .^1
This provision has the effect of reducing effective 
tax rates applied to long-term capital gains by one-half, 
and such gains may be taxed at effective rates ranging from 
seven to 35 percent.
Secondly, an alternative computation of the income
tax is allowed, limiting to 2 5 percent the maximum income
1 2tax applicable to long-term capital gains. As stated in 
the Code,
If for any taxable year the net long-term 
capital gain of any taxpayer (other than a corpora­
tion) exceeds the net short-term capital loss, then 
in lieu of the tax imposed by sections 1 and 5^1, 
there is hereby imposed a tax (if such tax is less 
than the tax imposed by such sections) which shall 
consist of the sum of—
(1) a partial tax computed on the taxable income 
reduced by an amount equal to 50 percent of 
such excess, at the rate and in the manner 
as if this subsection had not been enacted, 
and
Internal Revenue Code, Section 1202.
1PThe alternative tax computation is modified by 
the Tax Reform Act of 1969- The maximum rate remains 25 
percent for up to $50,000 of long-term capital gains. The 
maximum rate applicable to such gains in excess of $50,000 
is raised to 29-5 percent in 1970, 32.5 percent in 1971? 
and, effectively, 35 percent thereafter.
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(2) an amount equal to 25 percent of the excess 
of the net long-term capital gain over the 
net short-term capital loss.13
As a result of these two provisions, effective in­
come tax rates on long-term capital gains of individuals 
are generally one-half the corresponding rates applicable 
to ordinary income and short-term capital gains, with a 
limit of a 25 percent maximum rate.
Table 1 compares effective rates applicable to 
ordinary income and net short-term capital gains with ef­
fective rates applicable to long-term capital gains.
TABLE 1
COMPARISON OF EFFECTIVE TAX RATES FOR A MARRIED
INDIVIDUAL FILING A JOINT TAX RETURN
Amount of Taxable Income
Marginal Tax Rate Applicable 
■CO an Additional Dollar of:
More But Less
Ordinary In­
come and 
Short-Term
Long-Term
Capital
Than Than Capital Gains Gains
$ 3,000 $ 4,000 17^ 8.5^
8,000 12,000 22 11 .0
16,000 20,000
24,000
28 14.0
20,000 32 16.0
2^,000 28,000 36 18.0
36,000 40,000 45 22.5
40,000 44,000 48 24.0
44,000 52,000 50 25.0
76,000 88,000 58 25.0
100,000 120,000 62 25.0
200,000 and over 70 25.0
^^Internal Revenue Code, Section 1201 (b).
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The preferential treatment afforded long-term 
capital gains thus comes from two provisions: (1) the
50 percent deduction, and (2) the alternate tax computation. 
It is apparent from Table 1 that effective rates on marginal 
income in the form of long-term capital gains are substan­
tially below effective rates applicable to ordinary income 
and short-term capital gains.
Capital Losses
Capital losses, like capital gains, receive special 
treatment under federal laws of income taxation. The provi­
sions concerning capital losses, unlike those applicable to
capital gains, are generally disadvantageous to the taxpayer.
The general treatment of losses is set forth in the 
Code, as follows,
(a) General Rule.--There shall be allowed as a 
deduction any loss sustained during the taxable year 
and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise.
(b) Amount of Deduction.— r'or purposes of sub­
section (a), the basis for determining the amount 
of the deduction for any loss shall be the adjusted 
basis provided in section 1011 for determining the 
loss from the sale or other disposition of property.
(c) Limitation on Losses of Individuals.--In 
the case of an individual, the déduction under sub­
section (a) shall be limited to--
(1) losses incurred in a trade or business;
(2) losses incurred in any transaction entered 
into for profit, though not connected with 
a trade or business; and
(3 ) losses of property not connected with a 
trade or business, if such losses arise 
from fire, storm, shipwreck, or other 
casualty, or from theft. . . .
^^Internal Revenue Code, Section 165 (a-c).
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In general then, losses are deductible in a taxable 
year, with certain limitations, if they arise from a busi­
ness, from transactions entered into for profit, or from 
theft or casualty. Purchases and sales of capital assets 
are transactions entered into for profit; therefore, losses 
from such transactions are deductible under this provision.
The amount of a capital loss, as mentioned pre­
viously, is the excess of adjusted basis over the value of 
cash and other property received. There are limitations, 
however, on the amount that may be deducted in a taxable 
year. According to the Code,
In the case of a taxpayer other than a corporation, 
losses from sales or exchanges of capital assets shall 
be allowed only to the extent of the gains from such 
sales or exchanges, plus the taxable income of the 
taxpayer or $1,000, whichever is smaller. . . .  ^5
Thus, capital losses are first offset in full 
against capital gains, and any excess is then deducted from 
other income,1G limited by the lesser of the amount of the tax­
able income or $1,000. Any amount of capital loss not used in 
a taxable year may be carried over to succeeding years.
In general.— If a taxpayer other than a corporation 
has a net capital loss for any taxable year beginning 
after December 31, 1963—
(A) the excess of the net short-term capital loss 
over the net long-term capital gain for such year
"'^Internal Revenue Code, Section 1211 (b).
^^As a result of the tax reform, only 50 percent of 
a long-term capital loss may be deducted from income: 
therefore, $2 of such losses are required to offset $1 of 
ordinary income. Long-term losses may still be offset in 
full against capital gains.
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shall be a short-term capital loss in the succeeding 
taxable year, and
(B) the excess of the net long-term capital loss 
over the net short-term capital gain for such year 
shall be a long-term capital loss in the succeeding 
taxable year. . . .17
The Code, therefore, provides for the carry-over of 
unused capital losses for an indefinite period of time, with 
retention of their original character.
Primary Areas of the Laws of Federal 
Income Taxation Allegedly Creating 
Investor Lock-in
The preceding sections have reviewed some of the 
relevant provisions of the federal income tax laws appli­
cable to investments in securities by individual taxpayers. 
There are three aspects of the laws concerning capital 
gains that allegedly provide the major sources of lock-in 
for investors.
Holding Period
As mentioned in the previous section, capital gains 
from assets held six months or less are referred to as 
short-term capital gains. Such gains are included in the 
gross income of a taxpayer, receive no preferential treat­
ment, and are subject to the same rates as ordinary income.
On the other hand, gains from the sale or exchange 
of capital assets held more than six months (referred to as 
long-term capital gains) are allowed preferential treatment,
l^lnternal Revenue Code, Section 1212 (b) (l).
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compared to ordinary income. A taxpayer is allowed to 
deduct 50 percent of the excess of net long-term capital 
gains over short-term capital losses from his gross income. 
As a result of this deduction, the effective tax rates ap­
plicable to such gains are 50 percent less than the rates 
applicable to ordinary income. In addition, the maximum 
tax rate on long-term capital gains is limited to 25 per­
cent as compared to a maximum tax rate of 70 percent for 
ordinary income and short-term capital gains.
In view of these provisions, a taxpayer may sub­
stantially reduce the amount of income taxes he would 
otherwise pay, by waiting until the six months holding 
period has elapsed before selling an appreciated capital 
asset. Many authorities have expressed the opinion that 
the significant tax savings obtainable by postponing re­
alization until the holding period has elapsed create a 
very significant lock-in effect on investors.
Imposition of a Tax on Realization 
Capital gains and losses are generally recognized 
for tax purposes when realization (sale or exchange) occurs. 
As long as an investor continues to hold an appreciated 
capital asset, no income is recognized, and no income tax 
on the gain must be paid. These criteria for recognition 
of capital gains allegedly create investor lock-in.
An investor may, by deferring payment of income tax 
on appreciation in capital assets, retain and earn a return
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on money that would otherwise be paid in income taxes. The 
tax deferral is in the nature of an interest-free loan from 
the federal government in the amount of postponed tax pay­
ments. Imposition of a tax on realization is especially 
important to an investor considering the sale of an earning 
asset and the purchase of another. An income tax on 
realized gains has the effect of a transfer tax on the ex­
change. The amount of tax that must be paid reduces the 
proceeds from the disposition available for reinvestment 
by the taxpayer. The differential in the return expected 
from an asset to be purchased, over the return expected from 
an asset held, must be sufficiently great to offset the 
amount of capital paid in tax and still induce an investor 
to make the exchange.
As a result of these considerations, many authorities 
feel that tax consequences may deter investors from making 
sales or exchanges they might otherwise transact.
Avoidance of the Capital Gains 
Tax at Death
The tax laws do not consider the transfer of an 
asset through an estate as a point of realization for 
capital gains. Therefore, such gains are not included in a 
decedent's final income tax return. In addition, the basis 
for gain or loss to a taxpayer who receives an asset from a 
decedent is the fair market value at the estate valuation 
date. As a consequence, appreciation on capital assets
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transferred through an estate is never subject to the 
income tax; such tax is completely avoided.
It seems likely that investors might be hesitant 
in selling appreciated capital assets and paying income 
taxes when an option to completely avoid the income tax is 
available. It is the opinion of many authorities that the 
ability to completely avoid the income tax by transfer at 
death exerts a substantial lock-in pressure on investors.
Siimmarv
This chapter has presented a brief review of the 
present income tax provisions that prescribe the general 
treatment for capital gains and losses. No attempt was 
made to include all the detailed exceptions and special 
provisions of this area of taxation, but rather the purpose 
was to provide sufficient background for an understanding 
of the current treatment and an appreciation of the rami­
fications of this treatment. In addition, those aspects of 
the federal income tax laws that allegedly create investor 
lock-in were isolated and discussed.
CHAPTER III
SOME ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF FEDERAL INCOME 
TAXATION OF CAPITAL GAINS
Federal laws of income taxation have provided some 
form of preferential treatment for capital gains since 1921. 
This chapter briefly explores some of the main arguments for
and against preferential treatment of capital gains, and the 
alleged economic consequences of investor lock-in created 
by capital gains taxation.
The Principles of Taxation 
Several "principles" reappear throughout the litera­
ture on taxation. These principles are not in the nature of 
scientific laws that can be precisely stated or proven. 
Rather, they represent opinions of authorities concerning 
desirable attributes of a tax system. In this regard,
Norman Tare recently testified.
There can be, of course, no scientific, defin­
itive delineation of the objectives or characteristics 
of a good tax system, since, like all social institu­
tions, the tax system is a reflection of preferences.
^Tax Reform. 1969. Hearings before the Committee on 
Ways and Means, House of Representatives, 91st Congress,
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The most frequently mentioned principles of taxation 
are (1) adequacy of revenue, (2) equity, (3) neutrality,
(^) simplicity of compliance and collection, and (5) pro­
motion of desirable economic goals. These principles are 
subject to varying interpretations and emphasis by dif­
ferent authorities and, in addition, often prove to be
p
interrelated and conflicting.
Adequacy of Revenue
One necessary characteristic of a good tax system 
is the generation of adequate revenues. In explaining this 
principle, Ture stated.
First a good tax structure should over a reasonable 
period of time generate the revenues required to defray 
any given proportion of Government outlays during that 
period without the necessity for frequent upward and 
downward revisions of tax rates.3
This principle requires only that a system of taxa­
tion produces sufficient revenues in a particular time 
period to finance desired government services. No criteria 
are provided concerning appropriate methods or structures 
to be utilized, except to note that frequent changes in the 
tax laws are undesirable.
1st Session, February 18-April 2>+, 1969 (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), part 12, p. ^2^5«
2
Dan Throop Smith provides one of the many excel­
lent discussions of objectives of taxation and the problems 
involved, in his book. Federal Tax Reform (New York: McGraw-
Hill Book Company, Inc., 1961), especially pages 9-32.
^Tax Reform. 1969. p. 4246.
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Equi ty
The equity principle is a vague concept, connoting 
that a good tax system should treat all taxpayers fairly. 
John Due, describing the equity principle, wrote.
The distribution of burden of the tax must con­
form with the pattern of income distribution regarded 
as the optimum by the consensus of opinion in con­
temporary society.^
The concept of equity contains horizontal and ver­
tical dimensions. Horizontal equity requires that tax­
payers in similar economic circumstances be taxed equally. 
As stated by Harvey E. Brazer,
. . . horizontal equity may be said to be achieved 
when the tax liabilities of all persons receiving 
any given amount of income are equal, after adjust­
ments have been made for number of dependents and 
other obligations which we choose to honor by per­
mitting their deduction from income for tax purposes.
Vertical equity concerns treatment of taxpayers in 
unequal circumstances and has been interpreted by Ture as 
follows :
. . .  a good tax system should conform with society's 
preferences about how tax liabilities should be dis­
tributed by level of income or wealth of the tax­
payer . 6
^John F. Due, Government Finance (Homewood, 
Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 195^)? P* 115»
c
^Harvey E. Brazer, A Program for Federal Tax Re­
vision (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Institute of Public Adminis­
tration, The University of Michigan, 1960), Michigan 
Pamphlets No. 28, p. 2.
^Tax Reform. 1969. p. 42^7.
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Under the concept of equity, two general approaches 
may be followed in determining the amount of tax a particular 
individual should pay.
Proponents of the benefits received approach would 
consider it equitable to tax an individual based on the 
benefits he derives from government. It is argued, however, 
that this basis is inappropriate, because it conflicts with 
our society's views on welfare and income redistribution.
The benefits approach is also generally conceded to be im­
practicable because of difficulties in precisely measuring 
benefits received.
Our income tax system is based on the concept of 
ability-to-pay, and it is assumed throughout this discussion
7
that ability-to-pay is an acceptable basis of taxation.'
As a corollary, the measure of ability-to-pay 
utilized by our income tax system, is the amount of income
received by a taxpayer in a specified period. This unit of
measurement is also considered valid. In addition, our
society has accepted progressive taxation as a means of ob­
taining vertical equity in the income tax. Progressive 
taxation is assumed to be in conformity with the principle 
of vertical equity in this presentation.
^See The Theorv of Public Finance by Richard A. 
Musgrave for an elaboration on the concepts of benefits 
received and ability-to-pay, pp. 61-115-
3^
Nevertheless, the concept of equity or fairness in
a tax system remains a vague and uncertain guide for tax
policy. Commenting on this, Dan Throop Smith wrote.
What may seem fair to one person will seem grossly 
unfair to another. The concept of "ability to pay" 
is widely used as setting a standard of fairness in 
taxation; actually it is little more than a phrase.
The concept has not been reduced to objective or 
scientific standards, and there does not seem to be 
any basis for so reducing it. Comparisons of rela­
tive "abilities" to pay taxes involve measurements of 
psychological units of pleasure and displeasure, and 
as yet, psychologists have not provided a standard or 
means for such calculations.°
Neutrality
In the opinion of some authorities, a tax system
should be neutral in its influence on taxpayer behavior.
Ture indicated that a good tax system,
. . . should aim at minimizing the impact of taxes on 
decisions by private businesses and households con­
cerning how income is to be earned or wealth is to be 
accumulated, and how income and wealth are to be 
used.9
Others feel neutrality is desirable but argue that 
the tax system may be used to encourage socially or eco­
nomically desirable behavior. In this regard, Brazer 
stated,
The rule of neutrality in taxation requires that 
our tax laws should be so drawn as to minimize the 
extent to which they influence choices in the private 
sector of the economy.
. . . There may, however, be circumstances under
which social or economic objectives of national
^Smith, Federal Tax Reform, p. 13. 
^Tax Reform. 1969. p . h 2 k 6 .
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policy are of such overriding importance as to re­
quire the use of every possible means of achieving 
them, including deliberately, unneutral tax meas­
ures. . . . 10
Simplicity of Compliance and Collection
Simplicity of compliance and collection is another
frequently expressed principle of taxation. John Due
explained the meaning of this principle as follows:
This rule requires that taxes be established in 
such a manner as to minimize the real costs of col­
lection, in terms of resources required to collect 
the taxes and to comply with the tax laws on the part 
of the taxpayers, as well as in terms of the direct 
inconvenience caused the taxpayers in the payment of 
the tax.11
Thus, a tax system should be as simple as possible, 
consistent with other objectives, for ease of administra­
tion, collection, enforcement, compliance, and convenience.
Promotion of Desirable Economic Goals 
The tax system is becoming an increasingly im­
portant means of attaining the economic environment desired 
by society. Among the economic goals often mentioned are
price stability, economic growth, full employment, economic
1 Pdevelopment, and wealth redistribution. Evaluating a 
particular system of taxation's effectiveness in performing
I^Brazer, Federal Tax Revision, p. 3.
11 Due, Government Finance, p. 115*
1 PRay M. Sommerfeld, Hershel M. Anderson, and 
Horace R. Brock, An Introduction to Taxation (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1969), pp. 11-15»
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this function is difficult, because desired objectives and 
the means of attaining them may change as social preferences 
and the economic climate change. A tax structure should, 
however, be flexible enough to allow for modifications re­
quired by changes in these conditions.
Exceptions to the Principles
The preceding discussion indicates the existence 
of differing interpretations and emphasis on the various 
principles of taxation. Exceptions to the general prin­
ciples are frequently found in the tax laws, as noted by 
Harold Groves:
Our tradition requires that the rules of taxation 
shall be general rules. It is true that there may be 
exceptions— indeed, it is often said that taxation is 
the classic example of a case where the exceptions are 
more important than the general rule. But the ex­
ceptions themselves must be general to a degree and 
moreover they must carry a positive burden of proof.
A tax exception is first cousin to a subsidy and even 
more suspect because it is less conspicuous and 
aboveboard.13
The dangers of such exceptions were also noted by
Brazer:
Extremely close scrutiny is required in the case 
of each feature of the tax system which, in favoring 
selected kinds of income or expenditure, tends, by 
slicing large pieces off the tax base, to make high
^Harold Groves, "Special Tax Provisions and the 
Economy," Federal Tax Policy for Economic Growth and Sta­
bility. Papers submitted by panelists appearing before 
the Subcommittee on Tax Policy, Joint Committee on the 
Economic Report. 8U-th Congress, 1st Session, November 9, 
1955 (Washington, B.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1955), p. 286.
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tax rates necessary, to distribute subsidies [through 
tax savings] outside the appropriation process, and to 
treat very differently taxpayers in essentially similar 
circumstances.  ^^
The provisions of the income tax laws pertaining 
to capital gains are often criticized on grounds that they 
do not conform to established principles of taxation. The 
primary argument is that capital gains represent income to 
a taxpayer, and thus, special provisions applicable to this 
form of income are in contradiction to the concept of hori­
zontal equity. It is also argued that preferential treat­
ment afforded such gains conflicts with the neutrality 
principle and that the complex provisions required do not 
comply with the simplicity principle.
The preceding quotations express the opinion that 
there must be convincing evidence to provide justification 
for exceptions to the principles. The purpose of the fol­
lowing section is to indicate circumstances that provide a 
basis for arguments for preferentialism in the treatment of 
capital gains.
Taxation of Income and Capital Gains
It has been noted that our tax system regards the 
amount of income received by a taxpayer as a measure of 
ability-to-pay and uses this amount as a basis for compu­
tation of income tax liability. Some authorities feel that
I^Brazer, Federal Tax Revision, pp. 3-4^
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the definition of income for tax purposes should coincide, 
as closely as possible, to concepts of income commonly held 
in other fields. As expressed by Robert M. Haig, in his
early work. The Federal Income Tax,
It goes without saying that taxable income under
an income tax law should approximate as nearly as
practicable the true net income as defined by the 
analysis of the economist and the accountant. How 
close an approximation is possible depends upon the 
perfection of the environment in which the tax must 
live.15
This criterion does not provide a very reliable 
guide; however, as economists, accountants, and other inter­
ested persons have found, the concept of income is nebulous
and difficult to define and quantify.
Generally, economists have adhered to an "accretion" 
concept of income similar to the following, provided by 
Henry Simons,
Personal income may be defined as the algebraic 
sum of (1) the market value of rights exercised in 
consumption and (2) the change in the value of the 
store of property rights between the beginning and 
end of the period in question. In other words, it is 
merely the result obtained by adding consumption 
during the period to "wealth" at the end of the 
period and then subtracting "wealth" at the begin­
ning . ^ 6
The accretion definition of income would include 
changes in the value of wealth and, as a result, would
 ^^ Robert Murray Haig, "The Concept of Income —  
Economic and Legal Aspects," The Federal Income Tax (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1921), p. 15*
^^Henry C. Simons, Personal Income Taxation (Chicago; 
The University of Chicago Press, 1938), p. 503
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include capital gains as they accrue. It has been argued, 
however, that capital gains are not income and that such 
gains should not be subject to a tax on income.
Capital Gains Considered as 
Additions to Capital
Some economists contend that capital gains represent 
capital not income to a taxpayer. Smith reiterated the 
analogy of the tree and the fruit to emphasize the differ­
ence between capital and income:
The analogy of the tree and the fruit is often 
used in distinguishing capital and income. The crop 
of apples is clearly income, but the growth in the 
size of the tree is not; it cannot be eaten or sold, 
nor can a branch be cut off to be eaten or sold, 
except as firewood. The growth of the tree does not 
seem to be income as it o c c u r s . ^7
If capital gains are regarded by an investor as ad­
ditions to capital, then a tax on capital gains would be 
considered by the taxpayer to be a capital levy rather than 
a tax on his income. Smith explained it in the following 
way.
As a matter of equity, a capital gains tax may be 
resented as a special form of capital levy. If one 
rejects the idea that appreciation in value itself 
constitutes income, one thinks of his capital as con­
sisting at any time of the total of his investments.
A tax which must be paid from capital, when an in­
vestment is switched, is a selective capital levy.
This is also a defensible reaction to capital gains 
taxation. It is widely held by investors and is not 
merely a rationalization against the capital gains 
tax. o
^7Smith, Federal Tax Reform, p. 122.
I8lbid.. pp. 122-123.
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Capital Gains Resulting from Changes 
in the Price Level
Another argument for preferential treatment of 
capital gains is that portions of such gains that accrue 
over a period of time result from changes in the price 
level. According to some authorities, such gains do not 
improve the real economic position of the taxpayer or repre­
sent real income to him. This situation was noted by 
Pigou,19 George 0. May,^® and others. George C. Williams 
expressed doubt that creators of the income tax laws could 
have intended to tax gains reflecting price level changes, 
when he wrote the following:
It is erroneous to assume that income in the 
true and substantial sense is received merely as 
the result of receiving a larger number of dollars 
as the selling price than the number of dollars 
paid as the purchase price, and ignoring the real 
value of the dollar at the dates of purchase and 
sale. It seems incredible that Congress intended to 
tax or that the sixteenth amendment permits taxation 
of a sale of an asset which clearly only returned 
the real capital cost and produced no gain, no 
profit, and hence no i n c o m e .21
^9a . C. Pigou, A Studv in Public Finance (London: 
Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1921), p p . 159-160.
^^George 0. May, "The Taxation of Capital Gains," 
Harvard Business Review, I (October, 1922), 11.
George C. Williams, "Are Capital Gains and Losses 
Largely Fictitious?", The Tax Magazine. XII (May, 193^)? 
23^.
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Shoup,^^ Vickrey,^3 and Smith recognized the prob­
lem of illusory gains, but conclude that they must be taxed. 
The following quotation by Smith is indicative of their 
reasoning.
It is often said that capital gains in many 
instances merely offset or partially offset the 
results of inflation. On equity grounds, it is then 
argued that a monetary gain which does not represent 
a gain in real value should not be taxed. This argu­
ment is appealing and, if inflation had no other 
effects, might be persuasive. But there are many 
other respects in which money measures and real 
values depart from each other because of inflation.
A general revision in the law to adjust for the ef­
fects of inflation would be impossibly complicated,
. . . Though inflation gives some additional justifi­
cation for special tax treatment of capital gains, 
it should not be relied on as a major reason in the 
absence of general adjustments throughout the law 
to offset the inequities of inflation.2^
Walter Heller argued that an individual, by hedging 
against price level changes through investment in capital 
assets, improves his relative economic position and should 
be taxed.
. . . the entire emphasis of modern income tax­
ation is, quite properly, on relative economic po­
sitions. The taxpayer who protects himself from in­
flation by holding common stocks or real estate is 
certainly better off than the one who holds fixed- 
income securities or no securities at all. To exempt 
inflationary gains would be to ignore significant 
changes in the relative taxpaying capacity of indi­
viduals .25
22carl S. Shoup, Federal Estate and Gift Taxes 
(Washington, B.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1966), p. +^88.
^^William Vickrey, Agenda for Progressive Taxation 
(New York: The Ronald Press^ 1 9^7), P • 1 '+9•
Smith, Federal Tax Reform, p. 123*
^^Heller, Federal Tax Policy, p. 393»
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Irving Goffman pointed out that the income tax is 
based on ability-to-pay determined by money rather than real 
income; and therefore, he believes arguments concerning il­
lusory gains are irrelevant.
The income tax is a tax on money income and not on 
real income, so the measure of ability to pay is based 
on the number of dollars received by the taxpayer.
The problem of changes in the value of money is an 
index number problem and not a tax p r o b l e m .26
Lawrence H. Seltzer questioned the validity of 
taxing illusory gains and indicated that preferential treat­
ment might be justified on these grounds.
Granting that it is not feasible to isolate 
spurious [illusory] from real capital gains and 
losses with anything like precision, the question 
remains whether even a crude and limited attempt to 
make special provisions for the former may not 
produce a net improvement in equity. Occasionally, 
when the value of a currency depreciates drastically, 
the resulting fictitious capital gains may be so 
tremendous as to dictate special provisions for ex­
cluding the increase in value between specified dates 
from income tax. . . . Even a gradual rise in the 
price level, if long continued, raises serious ques­
tions respecting both the equity and the practical 
effects of taxing all capital gains in full as 
ordinary income. In general it can be argued that 
the preferential tax treatment of capital gains and 
the limited allowances for capital losses in force 
in the United States since the 1920’s constitute one 
means, however crude, of recognizing the illusory 
character of many capital gains and l o s s e s .27
^^Irving J. Goffman, "The Taxation of Capital Gains: 
An Economic Analysis," The Canadian Journal of Economics and 
Political Science. XXVIÎÎ"liEÿ7^"962T7"2Wi
^"^Lawrence H. Seltzer, The Nature and Tax Treatment 
of Capital Gains and Losses (New York: National Bureau of
Economic Research, Inc., 195'')) pp. 102-103.
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Capital Gains Resulting from Changes in the 
Interest or Capitalization Rates
Capital gains may arise from changes in the market 
rate of interest. When this occurs the potential receipts 
from the asset do not change, and it is argued that gains 
resulting from interest rate changes do not represent in­
come to the investor. Pigou classified gains from changes 
in the market rate of interest as increments in value which 
are "apparent, not real."
The other class [in addition to gains reflect­
ing price level changes] of apparent increment 
arises when the general rate of money interest on 
long-period investments falls. This kind of change 
means that an investment yielding exactly the same 
annual return must rise in capital value. Such a 
rise is of no advantage to the owner of the in­
vestment- -unies s , indeed, he intends to turn the 
proceeds into consumable income--because, even if he 
sells it, he will not be able to invest the proceeds 
in anything that will yield, on equal security, a 
higher annual return than he was obtaining before.28
Franklin Cole viewed the taxation of such gains as 
an impairment of capital.
The income of an individual for any stated 
period of time is the value of that part of his 
gross income which can be used up— by taxing or other- 
wise--without impairing the prospects of equivalent 
gross receipts in any subsequent similar period.
Income being a flow from a fund of capital, it 
follows that capital gains are not income, and that 
capital gains and losses are additions to or sub­
tractions from capital.29
^^Pigou, A Studv in Public Finance, pp. I6O-I6I.
^^Franklin Cole, "What's Wrong with the Tax Law?—  
From the Viewpoint of Investors," New York Certified Public 
Accountant. XIX (January, 19^9)? 17-
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Seltzer expressed the argument that such gains are 
real, not illusory, because the relative economic position 
of the investor has been improved.
Capital gains and losses caused solely by changes 
in interest rates are not illusory in the same sense 
as those arising from changes in the general price 
level, it is argued. An investor who realizes a 
profit of $20,000 by selling his bonds after interest 
rates have fallen is in a position to command $20,000 
more of the world's real goods. Relative to other 
individuals, he has gained in net worth, even though 
his interest income may remain unchanged.30
It is also argued that gains resulting from changes
in the capitalization rate for securities are illusory, and
Henry C. Wallich commented on this situation as follows:
If the rate at which future corporate earnings are 
capitalized falls from 10 per cent to 5 per cent, the 
value of equities doubles. The current income of 
stockholders, in terms of earnings and dividends, 
does not change. Many stockholders will feel "richer," 
no doubt. But if more than a very small number of 
them try to consume the increment, its illusory char­
acter would quickly become apparent. . . .
As it happens, we have had, in the post-war 
period, a change of capitalization rates for the 
current earnings of common stocks, and in part perhaps 
also of real estate, from roughly 10 per cent to 
roughly 5 per cent.31
Nonrecurring Nature of Capital Gains
The unexpected, uncertain, or nonrecurring nature 
of capital gains is sometimes used as a basis for arguments
30lawrence H. Seltzer, "Capital Gains and the Income 
Tax," American Economic Review. Vol. XL (May, 1950)? 
pp. 375.
^^Henry C. Wallich, "Taxation of Capital Gains in 
the Light of Recent Economic Developments," National Tax 
Journal. XVIII (June, 1965), 138.
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for preferential treatment of such gains. Vickrey con­
sidered the primary characteristic of capital gains to be 
their unexpected or uncertain nature.
If one is looking for a criterion of what is or is not 
a capital gain that refers to the substance of the 
situation and not the mere form, I think about the 
only thing . . . that distinguishes a capital gain is 
that the recipient is more or less surprised to get it, 
or at least was uncertain in some greater or less 
degree as to whether it was going to eventuate or not. 
The capital gain is thus something to which there is 
attached an element of risk.32
Carl C. Plehn argued that true income has three 
characteristics: receipt, spendability, and recurrence.
It will, I think, be readily admitted that those 
particular gains and profits which are recurrent, 
expendable receipts are the ones about whose income 
character there is seldom any doubt. . . . But it is 
when gains and profits lack one or two of the three 
characteristics of income, or have them in less than 
complete form, that a question arises. The one that 
is most lacking is recurrence. Thus gains and profits 
from transactions outside of one's regular vocation or 
line of business, like the profit from the sale of a 
home, are of doubtful income character.33
Seltzer noted that the qualities of instability and 
nonrecurrence may reduce the usefulness of capital gains as 
a measure of taxable capacity.
. . . capital gains, unlike wages, interests, 
rents, or ordinary profits, lack a continuing source 
such as a job, a farm, or a business enterprise. 
Instead, they arise out of discrete transactions 
that may occur only a few times in an individual's
30
William Vickrey, a discussion in a symposium on 
Income Tax Differentials (Princeton: Tax Institute, Inc.,
1950), p. 17^.
Carl C. Plehn, "The Concept of Income, as Recur­
rent, Consumable Receipts," The American Economic Review. 
XIV (March, 192^), p. 10.
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life. Hence they lack the relative stability and re­
curring character of ordinary income. For these 
reasons many believe that a capital gain represents 
less taxpaying capacity than ordinary income.
For the same reasons capital gains are usually 
excluded from what we might term the prudent con­
sumption concept of income, a concept widely used to 
govern an individual's or a family's consumption ex­
penditures. It distinguishes between sporadic and 
regularly recurring receipts on the ground that only 
the latter may prudently be spent. Sporadic gains are 
often followed by sporadic losses. A prudent man con­
serves much or all of the former to meet the latter.
The implication is that he should not have to pay 
income taxes on receipts he cannot prudently spend.
. . .  An income tax that does not distinguish between 
recurring and nonrecurring types of income might be 
said to ignore the fact that a man's capacity to pay 
taxes depends not only upon his income in any single 
year but upon the average income he has been receiving 
and to which he may reasonably look forward.3^
He also noted that the qualities of instability and
nonrecurrence might lead to an argument that capital gains
should be subjected to heavier taxes than ordinary income.
The recipient of an unexpected gain can afford to 
pay more of it in taxes precisely because it is a 
windfall. He has not counted upon it for his ordinary 
expenditures. Since his gain was unsought, or at 
least was won without a commensurate service on his 
part, it is, a fitting object for especially heavy 
taxation.35
Reinvested Capital Gains 
The preceding arguments have been concerned with 
various aspects of capital gains that make them questionable 
components of income, regardless of their disposition. One 
additional position distinguishes between capital gains and
^^Seltzer, Tax Treatment, pp. 83-8^.
35lbid.. p. 8^.
income, based on whether the increment is reinvested or used 
for other purposes. Irving Fisher defined income in the 
following way,
Money income is all money received which is not 
obviously, and in the nature of the case, to be de­
voted to reinvestment— or, as the expression is, 
"earmarked" for reinvestment. In other words, all 
money received and readily available and intended 
to be used for spending is money income.3°
Smith made a similar distinction between the con­
cepts of capital and income.
A distinction should be drawn . . . between a 
capital gains tax on a shift in an investment port­
folio and a capital gains tax on realized gains which 
are used for consumption. In the first case the tax 
is regarded as a capital levy and is likely to have 
the effect of reducing a nation's supply of capital.
. . . By contrast, the capital gains tax on gains
which are realized to secure funds for consumption is 
much more likely to be regarded as a form of income 
tax, at a favorable rate on a special form of in­
come . 37
Goffman rejected this line of reasoning with the 
following comment.
What a recipient does with his income— whether 
he spends it or saves it--reflects a pattern of 
behavior and not a lack of taxpaying ability. A 
reduction in one's "capital" (that is savings) is 
not in conflict with a tax on i n c o m e .38
3^1rving Fisher, The Theory of Interest as De­
termined by Impatience to Spend Money and the Opportunitv 
to Invest It. Monograph (New York. 19^0). p p. 10. 25.
3?Dan Throop Smith, "Capital Formation and the Use 
of Capital," The American Economic Review. Bill (May, 
1963), 31^-322.
3®Goffman, "Taxation of Capital Gains," p. 240.
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Technical Problems in the Taxation 
of Capital Gains
The preceding discussions provide a brief review of 
major arguments concerning preferential treatment of capital 
gains on the grounds that they are not properly includable 
as elements of income. There are additional arguments for 
preferential treatment of capital gains that are based on 
technical problems involved in the taxation of such gains.
As previously mentioned, capital gains are not 
recognized as income, for tax purposes, until they are 
realized (generally the point of sale or exchange of the 
asset). This treatment is in accord with the accounting 
field's realization criteria. The precedent for this 
practice was set in several court cases early in the history 
of the income tax. In one of these cases, Eisner v. 
Macomber, the Supreme Court's decision was that funds to pay 
the tax and severance from capital came from realization, 
and both were essential elements in their interpretation of
the word "income." The Court declared,
. . . without selling, the shareholder, unless 
possessed of other resources, has not the where­
withal to pay on income tax. . . .
. . . secondly, and more important for present 
purposes, enrichment through increase in value of 
capital investment is not income in any proper 
meaning of the term.
The Court explained why it did not consider accrued
gains to be income. In their words, income derived from
property is:
^9
. . - not a gain accruing to capital, not a growth 
or increment of value in the investment; but a gain, 
a profit, something of exchangeable value proceeding 
from the property, severed from the capital however 
invested or employed, and coming in, being "derived," 
that is, received or drawn bv the recipient (the tax- 
payer) for his separate use, benefit and disposal;-- 
that is income derived from property.39
William H. Anderson expressed the opinion that 
realization strengthens the case for taxation of capital 
gains.
When capital gains are tested against the concept 
of income as an accretion of economic power, there is 
little doubt but that they can be classified as income 
even before they are realized. When we combine eco­
nomic power and realization, a very strong case can be 
made out for designating them as income for tax 
purposes. They clearly represent ability to pay 
taxes. . . . Our conclusion is that it is only logical 
and fair that capital gains when realized be dealt 
with as income.^0
This interpretation, for tax purposes, of the mean­
ing of the term "income" has been questioned. Speaking for 
the minority in another Supreme Court case, Mr. Justice 
Douglas stated.
The wealth of stockholders normally increases as 
a result of the earnings of the corporation in which 
they hold shares. I see no reason why Congress should 
not treat that increase in wealth as "income" to them.
. . . The notion that there can be no "income" to the
shareholders in such a case within the meaning of the 
Sixteenth Amendment unless the gain is "severed from" 
capital and made available to the recipient for his
^^Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, ^0 Sup. Ct. 
189 (1920).
^^illiam H. Anderson, Taxation and the American 
Economy (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951), P* 212.
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"separate use, benefit and disposal" . . . will not 
stand analysis. . .
The realization criteria for recognition of capital 
gains creates a situation referred to as "bunching" of 
income that many feel requires preferential treatment for 
these gains. Capital gains may accrue over a period of 
years, but the entire gain is recognized for tax purposes 
and is included in a taxpayer’s income in the year it is 
realized. This fact combined with progressive income tax 
rates can result in a greater tax burden on capital gains
)i o
than would be imposed on more stable forms of income.
Vickrey noted the inequitable nature of this treat­
ment of fluctuating income.
It is an obvious extension of the principle of tax­
ation according to ability to pay that no taxpayer 
should bear a heavier or lighter burden merely be­
cause certain items of his income happen to be earned 
or realized in one year or another, regardless of 
whether this be by chance or by design of the taxpayer 
and regardless of any fluctuations in the needs of the 
government for revenue or the rates of tax in effect 
at various times.^3
Dan Throop Smith saw the bunching problem as a pri­
mary reason for preferential treatment of capital gains.
^^Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371, 63 Sup. Ct. 
636 (19 3^ ).
hz
The following comments were made prior to the Tax 
Reform Act of 1969* Capital gains are now subject to income 
averaging provisions, as a result of the tax reform. The 
averaging provisions alleviate but do not completely elim­
inate the bunching problem, as discussed in Chapter VII.■
43
William Vickrey, "Averaging of Income for Income- 
Tax Purposes," TOie Journal of Political Economv. XLVII 
(June, 1939), 3^T3
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On grounds of fairness, a gain which has de­
veloped over many years, if taxed on realization, 
may put a taxpayer in a much higher bracket than he 
would have been in if he could have been taxed on 
the gains as they accrued. It is thus considered 
equitable to give a lower rate of tax on gains de­
veloping over long periods in order to avoid the 
effects of having income bunched in the single year 
of realization. This point of equity was probably the 
principal argument for the original differential 
taxation of capital gains in this country and is still 
regarded by many as the most significant one.^
He later pointed out, however, that the present 
treatment may provide a degree of relief not justified by 
the bunching problem.
. . .  if the purpose [of special treatment] is 
simply to give relief from undue progression through 
bunching of income in a single year, there is no 
reason to give a bottom rate of tax on capital gains 
lower than the bottom rate of the regular income tax.
If taxation at regular rates does not involve any 
progression, bunching cannot create any artificial 
increase in progression requiring relief. On this 
basis, the present method of including only half of 
net long-term gains at all income levels is not justi­
fied, . . .1+5
Smith and others also question the six months 
holding period as a criteria for determining gains that 
should be afforded relief from bunching.
To the extent that special treatment of capital 
gains is based on avoidance of unfair progression in 
the taxation of bunched income . . .  it should be 
applied only on gains which might be subject to unfair 
progression because of bunching. This means that a 
special tax rate should be applied only to gains on 
property held for more than a year. On property held 
up to a year, there is no artificial increase in 
progression and hence no equitable need for relief. The
Smith, Federal Tax Reform, p. 123. 
^ ^Ibid.. p. 124.
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present six months' holding period is too short by this 
standard, and the frequent proposals to reduce it are 
quite unjustified.
Reuben Clark mentioned other problems of providing
relief for the bunching effect.
However, the validity of this argument [bunching] 
in order to justify the preferential rate of tax for 
capital gains has long been open to doubt. Manifestly, 
there may be no relationship whatsoever between the 
time an asset is held and the time in which gain 
accrues; even assuming such correlation exists, there 
may be no relationship between the tax paid under the 
preferential rate and the total tax that would have 
been paid if such gains had been paid as they had 
previously accrued; and, in any event, extension of a 
preferential rate of tax to capital gains as an averag­
ing device ignores the plain fact that the taxpayer, who 
allegedly suffers because gains accruing over many 
years are lumped into one year, has had the use of his 
tax money through all the previous years.^7
The concensus seems to be that the bunching effect 
does require some form of relief in the income tax laws, but 
the appropriateness of the present provisions for this 
purpose is often questioned.
Economic Grounds for Preferential Treatment
Many authorities contend that, regardless of the 
conclusions derived from the foregoing arguments, prefer­
ential treatment of capital gains is warranted because of
^^Ibid.. pp. 123-2 -^.
^"^Reuben Clark, "The Paradox of Capital Gains: 
Taxable Income That Ought Not to be Currently Taxed," Tax 
Revision Compendium. Compendium of Papers on Broadening the 
Tax Base Submitted to the Committee on Ways and Means 
(Washington, B.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1959),
Vol. II, pp. 12hh-12^5.
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the adverse economic consequences that would result from 
taxing capital gains as ordinary income.
Goffman considered capital gains a taxable form of 
income but recognized their possible economic significance.
The method of taxing these [capital] gains presents 
economic problems which may far outweigh in importance 
the arguments presented above [that capital gains are 
income]. In fact among professional economists, most 
of the controversy over capital gains deals with the 
immediate consequences of taxing these and not with 
the problem of whether or not they are income. The 
latter question is usually answered rather quickly 
(and often inadequately) in the affirmative.^o
Goode expressed a similar regard for the importance 
of economic consequences of taxing capital gains.
However strong the case in equity for taxing 
capital gains at the same rates as other income, this 
will not be acceptable if there is reason to believe 
that the economic consequences would be nighly detri­
mental .^9
Accentuation of Stock Market Fluctuations
One alleged economic effect is that capital gains 
taxation tends to accentuate fluctuations in the stock 
market. Harold Somers provided one of the early investiga­
tions on the subject^O and based his conclusions on an 
analysis of supply and demand for securities. His analysis 
begins with (Figure 1) a positively sloping supply curve
^^Goffman, "Taxation of Capital Gains," pp. 2U-1-2^ -2.
^^Richard Goode, The Individual Income Tax (Wash­
ington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 196^), p. 204.
^^Harold M. Somers, "An Economic Analysis of the 
Capital Gains Tax," National Tax Journal, I (September, 
1948), 226-232.
5^
(88) and a negatively sloping demand curve (DD) for a par­
ticular asset, assuming no capital gains tax. The impo­
sition of a capital gains tax on sales would shift the supply 
curve upward (8'8*) by the amount of the "weighted average 
of the tax" (QR) of the prospective sellers. They would 
require a higher price to offset the income tax to be paid 
on the sale.
The prospect of having to pay a tax on an expected 
gain may also reduce, to some extent, the demand for an 
asset, shifting the demand curve downward to D'D*.
These shifts in the supply and demand curves would 
reduce the volume of sales (from OM to ON), but the effect 
on price would depend on the relative size of the shifts. 
Somers reasoned that the tax liability of the seller is "real, 
definite, and calculable," while the prospective tax on the 
buyers is "something very vague and indefinite." He con­
cluded that the shift in the supply curve will be greater 
than the shift in the demand curve, in a period of rising 
prices when profit-taking is predominant, and that the price 
of the asset would rise from OP to OQ.
The ability of taxpayers to offset losses against 
gains and income would tend to have an opposite effect. In 
this analysis (Figure 2), the tax savings from such loss 
offsets would shift the supply curve downward (8'8'). The 
new demand curve (D'D') is not significantly different from 
the old; because, in Somers'words,
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Fig. 1.--Shifting of capital gains tax when profit- 
taking predominates.
Source: Somers, Ibid.. p. 22.'].
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Fig. 2.— Shifting of capital gains tax when loss- 
taking predominates.
Source: Somers, Ibid.. p. 228.
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The tax-saving effect on the demand curve is 
probably slight if it exists at all. Since people 
seldom, if ever, buy with the expectation of a 
loss, the prospect of tax-saving must be very small 
and its influence on the demand curve may be con­
sidered negligible.51
In a period of falling prices, where loss-taking pre­
dominates, Somers concluded the capital gains tax would in­
fluence the price to fall (from OP to OQ). As a result of 
the preceding analyses, Somers stated.
The general conclusion to be derived from the 
tax shifting analysis . . .  is that the capital gains 
tax aggravates price rises and price falls.52
In a later article, Robert F. Gemmill questioned
part of Somers’ analysis but reached similar conclusions.
Concerning the general level of asset prices, he stated.
If the tax prevents an investor from selling one 
asset and buying another, it has reduced the supply 
of the first asset and the demand for the second.
These shifts may affect the relative prices of the 
assets, but they could be expected to offset each 
other in their effect on the overall level of 
asset prices.53
Gemmill, in his analysis, assumed (1) that the in­
vestor is unable to reduce or avoid the tax liability at 
death, and (2) that there is a single tax rate with no hold­
ing period. Gemmill first questioned the size of the shift 
of the supply curve, calculated by Somers, and concluded.
51 Ibid.. p. 228.
5^lbid.. p. 230.
^^Robert F. Gemmill, "The Effect of the Capital 
Gains Tax on Asset Prices," National Tax Journal. IX 
(December, 1956), 292.
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. . .  at any given time there may be relatively 
few investors who have increased their reservation 
prices by more than enough to cover their tax li­
abilities, and the average increase could be signif­
icantly less than this amount.5^
The modification does not refute the position of Somers,
that the capital gains tax accentuates price fluctuations;
however, it would imply a smaller "price effect."
Gemmill also recognized a "capital effect" of the 
capital gains tax. The capital effect results from the loss 
of capital paid in tax on realization of a gain or the ad­
dition to capital from tax saving on realization of a loss. 
He argued that, in a time of rising prices,
. . . a reduction in the investor's capital will act 
to restrict the rise, if the investor had intended to 
purchase other assets with the proceeds from the sale.
Conversely, an increase in the investor's capital 
(from loss offsets) in a period in which prices are 
falling will enable him to provide more support to the 
market, and will lead to greater price stability.
In general, therefore, we might expect that the 
capital effect would contribute to price stability.77
In spite of his arguments of a smaller price effect 
and the possible stabilizing influence of the capital effect 
on the general level of prices, Gemmill concluded;
The capital gains tax does tend to increase fluc­
tuations in the general level of asset prices, as has 
often been charged. . . .
The adverse effects of the capital gains tax upon 
the general level of asset prices . . . appear to be 
overstated in Professor Somers' analysis, . . . 56
^ Ibid.. p. 297.
55lbid.. p. 298. 
5*Ibid.. p. 299.
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Walter Heller questioned the degree of influence of 
capital gains tax on investor decisions and the emphasis of 
Somers' analysis. In his words,
First, in focusing on the incentives to enter or 
leave the market rather than the flow of funds within 
the market, it seems to lose sight of the "Say's law 
of the stock market": Especially in a rising market,
supply largely creates its own demand in that most of 
the proceeds of security sales reenter the market as 
demand for other securities.57
He pointed out that " . . .  the gains tax drives a 
sizeable wedge between the amounts realized on the sale of 
appreciated assets and the amounts that go back into the 
market as a demand factor.
He concluded that " . . .  the tax on capital gains 
exerts opposing influences —  some bullish, others bearish 
. . ."^ 9 but that the influence of the tax on market insta­
bility has probably been overstated.
Somers attempted to answer some of these criticisms
in his article, "Reconsideration of the Capital Gains Tax."
He noted that Gemmill assumed away two of the principal
reasons for investor lock-in (avoidance at death and the
holding period).
Even if we grant the full validity of his [Gemmill's] 
argument and ignore the unreal assumptions mentioned 
above, we are left with some degree of accentuation 
of price increases. . . . the dampening effect on
5^Heller, Federal Tax Policy, p. 387*
58,
59.
5%Ibid.. p. 387.
I b i d . . p . 388.
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price increases of the considerations advanced by 
Gemmill is not so great as might at first appear.
In any case, the direction of change is as indicated 
in the basic supply-and-demand analysis.&0
Somers disagreed with Heller's implications that 
tax consequences are insignificant to the rational investor. 
In answer to Heller's position based on "Say's law of the 
stock market," Somers conceded the net effect of the capital 
gains tax would be nil on persons who are on both the supply 
and the demand side to an equal extent in a time period. In 
a shorter period, however, a seller is on the supply side 
and at the time of sale may become a purchaser. He concluded 
that.
Since prices do fluctuate, however, there must be 
those who are suppliers but not demanders at a given 
price level, and vice versa. It is these who determine 
price fluctuations and the price consequences of the 
capital gains tax.°^
The same basic argument is used as a basis of attacking the
"capital effect" of Gemmill.
An additional discussion of the accentuation of 
stock market prices by the capital gains tax is contained in 
a doctoral dissertation by Robert C. Vowels. Using a supply 
and demand analysis, he attempted to explain the effect on 
prices of the three primary areas of lock-in compared to a 
zero tax rate. Vowels concluded that each area would con­
tribute to higher asset prices than would occur if there
^*^Harold M. Somers, "Reconsideration of the Capital 
Gains Tax," National Tax Journal. XIII (December, 1960), 296.
^hbid.. p. 298.
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were no tax. In relative amounts, the avoidance at death 
provisions would produce the greatest increase. The hold­
ing period would produce a smaller increase, and the 
capital gains tax rate would produce the smallest increase. 
Although the capital effect and the circular flow of funds 
tend to offset the amount of accentuation, his conclusion 
was,
. . . that the capital gains tax provisions ac­
centuate prices by delaying sales in a rising
market.62
Other authorities have agreed that capital gains 
taxation does accentuate stock market fluctuations to some 
extent. Elmer Fagan commented,
. . . it is reasonable to argue that the capital 
gains tax will, if levied on a realization basis, 
cause an increase in the reservation prices of some 
types of capital assets. And in a rising market, 
this will cause a greater increase in stock prices 
than would otherwise have taken place, unless, of 
course, the tax also causes an offsetting decrease 
in the demand for stocks. . . . It is the writer's 
opinion, however, that the capital gains tax even 
when levied on a realization basis, is a factor of 
minor importance in stock market fluctuations.63
Jonathan A. Brown, formerly Director of the New York 
Stock Exchange Research Department, considered the capital 
gains tax a significant influence in the bull market of the 
mid-1950's.
Robert C. Vowels, An Evaluation of Equity and 
Economic Effects in Capital Gains Taxation. Unpublished 
doctoral dissertation, p. 50.
^^Elmer D. Fagan, "The Economics of Capital Gains 
Taxation," Proceedings of the Thirty-Second Annual Confer­
ence on Taxation. National Tax Association. 1940. pp. 119-120
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From September 1, 1953? to September 1, 1955? 
the market value of all stocks listed on the New York 
Stock Exchange increased from $111 billion to $198 
billion. There were many reasons for this increase 
of $87 billion.
Certainly one of the most important was the re­
luctance of thousands of investors to add to the supply 
of stock because it did not make sense— it was not 
economically justified--to sell and pay the present 
capital-gains-tax penalty.6^
The study of investors, published by the Harvard 
Business School, found empirical support for the argument 
that capital gains taxation accentuates fluctuations in the 
stock market.
The evidence from our field interviews is con­
sistent with the charge that the capital gains tax 
tends to accentuate the severity of fluctuations in 
the security markets, especially on the up side; in 
fact, it indicates that tax effects may have been a 
fairly significant influence in this respect.85
A summary conclusion might be that the present 
capital gains tax accentuates stock market fluctuations, but 
the capital effect and the circular flow of funds reduce the 
extent of the magnitude of such accentuations. The strength 
of the lock-in effects of the capital gains tax is of major 
importance to the validity of this conclusion.
Resource Allocation and Efficiency
Our economic system depends, to a large degree, on 
capital markets to determine the proper allocation of
G^Brown, Federal Tax Policv. pp. 369-370.
Keith Butters, Lawrence E. Thompson, and 
Lynn L. Bollinger, Effects of Taxation; Investments bv 
Individuals (Boston: Harvard University, Graduate School of
Business Administration, Division of Research, 1953), P* ^5*
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productive resources. This process is achieved by directing 
funds to more profitable businesses and away from less 
profitable businesses. Irwin Friend described the system 
as follows;
Allocational efficiency, which may be regarded 
as the most important economic service provided by 
the capital markets, relates to the ability of 
these markets to maintain equivalent rates of return 
or costs of financing on comparable investments.
This quality of the market would ensure that funds 
are channeled from savers to those users who will 
apply them most profitably and that portfolio shifts 
can be made to the mutual advantage of different 
investors. Comparable investment opportunities would 
find equal access to new funds at comparable costs, 
and the most profitable investments would be able 
to bid funds away from investments offering lower 
rates of return. The efficiency of this allocation 
process can be measured, at least in theory, by the 
extent to which variations in return on various 
types of assets can be explained by differentials 
in risks, and whether these differentials in turn 
seem reasonable in the light of experience.66
One factor that may distort the flow of funds and, 
consequently, the efficiency of the economic system is the 
system of taxation. As stated by Earl R. Rolph,
Of the various differences which taxes may make 
in the operation of an economic system, there is 
the obvious one that a tax, by imposing an obstacle 
to some course of action, induces a different course 
of action. . . . Taxation may by virtue of such 
effect induce a better or worse pattern of resource 
allocation, judged from the point of view of some norm 
of ideal allocation. This is one efficiency test of 
a tax system. 67
^^Irwin Friend, "Economic Function of Capital Mar­
kets," Conference on Securities Regulation held at Duke 
University School of Law (Chicago, Illinois: Robert H.
Mundheim (ed) Commerce Clearing House, Inc., 1965)? P* 120.
^^Earl R. Rolph, "Equity Versus Efficiency in Federal 
Tax Policy," American Economic Review. XL (May, 1950), 391*
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A tax on realized gains may inhibit the sale of ap­
preciated assets and thereby affect the value of specific 
securities. Arguments concerning the lock-in effects of 
capital gains taxation on relative security prices are 
similar to arguments concerning overall market fluctuations, 
that is, the tax may increase the reservation price of 
holders of appreciated securities and inhibit the sale of 
such securities. If this is the case, the supply of these 
securities will be reduced, and their market price will be 
higher than if no tax were imposed. But, the circular flow 
of funds effect and the capital effect do not produce any 
offsetting influences in the case of a specific security. 
Therefore, a stronger case can be made that the capital gains 
tax affects the price of individual securities in contrast 
to overall market prices.
If lock-in does occur, the investor's free choice of 
investment would be impaired and a less than optimal alloca­
tion of resources would result. The lock-in effect con­
tributes to a higher or lower price of a specific security 
than would otherwise prevail. Accentuation of the price of 
a specific security affects the cost of purchasing, the 
proceeds from selling, and the rate of return from the se­
curity. The tax may thus impair the functioning of the 
capital market and affect the allocation of resources.
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Other Alleged Economic Effects 
The preceding alleged economic effects of the capital 
gains tax are attributable, in part, to the existence of a 
lock-in situation. There are many additional arguments 
concerning economic advantages and disadvantages of ex­
tending preferential treatment to capital gains. Such argu­
ments are concerned with various methods of taxing capital 
gains and the resulting influences of each on accumulation 
and supply of capital, rate of economic growth, risk-taking, 
new ventures, small businesses, earnings retention, and 
other economic matters. The controversy in these areas 
centers on the desirability and effects of special treatment 
of income from capital assets, rather than economic aspects 
of investor lock-in, and is not a logical consideration for 
the project. It must be noted, however, that conclusions 
concerning these questions are of utmost importance for eco­
nomic and political policies regarding taxation of income 
from capital assets and should be considered in any proposed 
solution to the alleged lock-in problem.
Summary
This chapter provides a summary review of the prin­
ciples of taxation and notes that special treatment of 
capital gains and losses is in conflict with several of the 
principles. Arguments for and against preferential treat­
ment of capital gains are presented. The arguments that 
taxation of capital gains results in undesirable economic
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consequences are discussed. Conclusions of the presentation 
are that if investor lock-in exists, it would accentuate 
stock market fluctuations and distort the process of re­
source allocation.
CHAPTER IV
SURVEY METHODOLOGY AND RESPONDENTS
One of the primary objectives of this project was to 
obtain empirical evidence regarding the significance of the 
lock-in effects of capital gains taxation on individual in­
vestors. The purpose of this chapter is to explain the
methodology utilized in obtaining this evidence. Included 
are descriptions of the survey, the sample selection proc­
ess, and a brief discussion of the types of responses re­
ceived .
Description of the Survev 
The scope of this investigation was limited to the 
lock-in effects of capital gains taxation on individual in­
vestors in securities, as stated in Chapter 1. In order to 
derive as meaningful conclusions as possible, it was felt 
that information should be obtained from a nationwide survey 
of investors. Temporal and financial limitations made a 
mail questionnaire the most feasible approach. Additional 
constraints, also stated in Chapter 1, were that the persons 
surveyed were to be business and professional people and 
that a disproportionately large number of high-income
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individuals should be included. In spite of these re­
strictions on the population to be studied, finding a 
satisfactory mailing list presented a substantial obstacle. 
Such a list was obtained, however, from a commercial re­
search company.
Description of the Primary List 
The primary list contained the names and addresses 
of some 360,000 individuals in the 50 states and the 
District of Columbia. The persons included on the list are 
or have been employed in business or professional occupa­
tions with average incomes of $25,000 or more. Utilization 
of this mailing list, therefore, provided a means of con­
tacting business and professional people across the nation, 
including a large number of high-income individuals.
The primary list is divided into five main geo­
graphical regions. Table 2 indicates the number of persons 
in each of these regions, by state.
The 360,000 individuals in the primary list were 
considered to be the population of interest in this investi­
gation. If responses from the survey were indicative of the 
opinions of persons in this population, they might also be 
reasonably representative of the opinions of all such 
persons across the nation.
68
TABLE 2
GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONS IN 
THE PRIMARY LIST
West Southeast
Alaska 1+00 Alabama 3,000
Arizona 2,900 Florida 10,600
California 45,200 Georgia 4,800
Colorado 3,300 Kentucky 3,800
Hawai i 1 ,400 Mississippi 1,300
Idaho 700 North Carolina 4,800
Montana Boo South Carolina 2,000
Nevada Boo Tennessee 4,500
New Mexico 1 ,400 Virginia 6,000
Oregon 3,500 40,800
Utah 1 ,200
Washington 5,000 Northeast
Wyoming 500
67,100 Connecticut 9,100
Delaware 1,300
North Central Illinois 27,700
Indiana 6,800
Iowa 4,000 Maine 700
Kansas 3,900 Maryland 7,200
Minnesota 5,300 Massachusetts 11,400
Missouri 7,800 Michigan 14,700
Nebraska 1 ,800 New Hampshire 900
North Dakota 400 New Jersey 16,900
South Dakota 500 New York 51,900
Wisconsin 6.800 Ohio 18,600
30,500 Pennsylvania 20,100
Rhode Island 1 ,400
South Central Vermont 4oo
Washington, D.C. 2 ,500
Arkansas 1 ,400 West Virginia 1 .700
Louisiana 4,900 193,300
Oklahoma 3,900
Texas 18.100
28,300 TOTAL 360,000
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Selection of the Sample 
The names and addresses of a total of 2,122 persons 
to be contacted were selected from the 360,000 persons in 
the population. The list was stratified into the five geo­
graphical regions. The percentage of persons included in 
the sample from a region was approximately the same as the 
percentage of the population in the region. Table 3 com­
pares the geographical distribution of the persons in the 
population and the sample. The persons to be surveyed were 
chosen randomly (selection at fixed intervals) from states 
located in each region.
Questionnaire Design and Testing 
The questionnaire used in this survey was two pages 
in length and contained 18 basic questions. Copies of the 
questionnaire and accompanying cover letter used in the 
survey are included in Appendix B. The questionnaire was 
designed to obtain information about some general character­
istics of the respondent, his security holdings, income, in­
vestment knowledge, awareness of taxes, and attitudes toward 
various aspects of the capital gains tax.
One hundred preliminary questionnaires were mailed 
to selected persons in Norman, Oklahoma. Based on the re­
sults of this test mailing, a final revision of the question­
naire was made. The final revision was reproduced and mailed 
to the 2,122 persons in the sample on October 31? 1969*
TABLE 3
COMPARISON OF THE GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTIONS 
OF THE SAMPLE TO THE POPULATION
Region
' Number of 
Persons in 
Population
Percent 
of Total
Number of Persons 
Included in 
Sample
Percent 
of Total
West 67,100 19 1+27 20
North Central 30,500 8 210 10
South Central 28,300 8 210 10
Southeast 40,800 11 216 10
Northeast 193,300 54 1,059 50
TOTALS 360,000 100 2,122 100
-c
o
71
Survey Response 
The persons in the survey were allowed two months 
to receive, complete, and return the questionnaire. The 
cut-off date was December 31? 19&9, although no question­
naires were returned between December 23? and December 31*
Of the 2,122 questionnaires mailed, >+9 (approximately 
two percent) were returned with incorrect addresses and were 
not forwardable. Of the remaining 2,073? a total of 310 
(approximately 15 percent) were returned with varying 
amounts of information.
The regional distribution of the mail-out and the 
response is presented in Table if. As indicated in the table, 
the geographical distribution of the responses did not differ 
greatly from the distribution of questionnaires mailed. A 
total of 23 were returned without postmarks, and the point 
of origin of these could not be determined.
Of the 310 questionnaires received, 19 were re­
turned with answers to few or no questions and contained no 
information useful to the project. Of the remaining 291? a 
total of 2lf2 indicated they (or their immediate families) 
currently owned securities, while 1+9 indicated they did not 
own any securities. The majority of the questions on the 
questionnaire were concerned with securities and security 
holders' attitudes, and it is likely that many persons who 
owned no securities, having little useful information to
TABLE 4-
COMPARISON OF THE GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION
OF SURVEY MAIL-OUT AND RESPONSE
Region
Original
Mailing
Percent 
of Total
Incorrect
Address Responses
Percent of 
Total 
Responses 
by Region
West 427 20 12 74 26
North Central 210 10 3 29 10
South Central 210 10 7 26 9
Southeast 216 10 7 22 8
Northeast 1,059 50 20 136 47
Location not 
Determinable ------- —  — —  — 23
TOTALS 2,122 100 ^9 310 100
-orvj
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provide, simply did not respond. A breakdown of the re­
sponses is presented in Table 5*
TABLE 5 
CLASSIFICATION OF RESPONSES
With
Useful
Informa­
tion
No
Useful
Informa­
tion Total
Respondent-Owned Securities 229 13 2^ -2
Respondent-Owned No Securities 18 31 >+9
Respondent-No Indication 0 19 19
2^7 63 310
Characteristics of the Respondents 
Personal Characteristics 
Of the 2^ -7 respondents providing useful information, 
2h^ were married, and 222 had at least one child. The ma­
jority (59 percent) of those who were parents had either 
two or three children. The persons surveyed were or had 
been employed in a business or professional occupation. A 
total of 2^ -1 of the respondents were male, three were fe­
male, and three did not indicate their sex. The average 
and median age of the respondents were ^6; the range was 
from 23 to 85 years of age.
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Income
The questionnaire asked for the amount of the re­
spondent's 1968 adjusted gross income and requested the in­
formation he obtained from his 1968 federal income tax 
return. A total of 204 (83 percent of the respondents) 
provided this information. Of the 204 who responded to the 
question, 139 (68 percent) indicated that the information 
had been obtained from their tax return, and 65 had esti­
mated the amount.
Table 6 presents the income distribution of the 
respondents. The average income, of the respondents to the 
question concerning Income, was approximately $24,000, and 
the median income was approximately $19,000. The range was 
from $0 (because of extraordinary tax losses) to $91,780.
Security Holdings
As mentioned previously, 242 of the respondents, or 
members of their immediate families, owned securities at the 
time the survey was taken. Thirteen of the security owners 
provided no other information and were not included in the 
tabulation of responses. Table 7 presents the distribution 
of the amounts of securities owned by the respondents. The 
average amount of securities owned by the respondents and 
their families was approximately $73,000, and the median 
amount was approximately $20,000. The amount of securities 
owned ranged from $75 to $1,150,000.
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TABLE 6
DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONDENTS BY ADJUSTED 
GROSS INCOME CLASS
Obtained from 
Adjusted Gross 1968 Income 
Income Tax Return Estimated Total
$0 but less than
$10,000 Ik- 9 23
$10,000 but less
than $20,000 60 26 86
$20,000 but less
than $30,000 24 15 39
$30,000 but less
than $40,000 17 9 26
$40,000 but less
than $ 50,000 11 2 13
$50,000 and over 13 4 17
139 65 204
No Response to Income 
Question 43
Total Respondents 247
TABLE 7 
DISTRIBUTION OF THE AMOUNTS OF SECURITIES
OWNED BY RESPONDENTS
Current Market Value of Securities Number Percent
$1 but less than $10,000 78 34
$10,000 but less than $25,000 47 21
$25,000 but less than $50,000 29 13
$50,000 but less than $100,000 27 12
$100,000 but less than $200,000 24 10
$200,000 and over 22 10
Total Estimating Market Value 227 99*
No Response to Amount 2 1
Total Security Owners 229 100
'Detail does not add to total because of rounding.
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Management of Securities 
Each respondent was asked to indicate the percent of 
his portfolio that he managed personally. Of the 229 
persons owning securities, 173 made all the decisions con­
cerning their portfolios. Investors owning large amounts of 
securities appeared to delegate fewer portfolio decisions 
than investors owning smaller amounts of securities. A 
total of 84 percent of the respondents owning $50,000 or 
more of securities made all their portfolio decisions, while 
73 percent of the respondents owning less than $25,000 of 
securities made all their own decisions. Only four percent 
of those respondents with $50,000 or more worth of securities 
managed less than 25 percent of their portfolios, while l4 
percent of the group owning less than $25,000 managed less 
than 25 percent. Other recent studies have indicated that 
high-income persons delegate very little authority over 
their investment decisions.^
Relationship Between Income and Amount 
of Securities Owned
As indicated in Appendix A, most studies concerning
the financial characteristics of individuals have found a
direct relationship between the income of an individual and
the amount of securities owned by the individual. A strong
^Robin Barlow, Harvey E. Brazer, and James N. Morgan, 
Economic Behavior of the Affluent (Washington, B.C.: The
Brookings Institution. 1966), pp. 25-28; and George Katona 
and John B. Lansing, "The Wealth of the Wealthy," Review of 
Economics and Statistics (February, 1964), pp. 1-13*
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relationship between income and security ownership was also 
noted in the survey. This relationship is presented in 
Table 8 .
Table 8 indicates that large holdings were concen­
trated in the upper income classes. Approximately 35 per­
cent of the persons in the $25,000 to $^9,999 income class 
and 53 percent of those in the $ 50,000 and over income 
classes owned securities worth $100,000 or more. On the 
other hand, 87 percent of the persons in the $0 to $10,000 
income class compared to only 12 percent of those in the 
$ 50,000 to $99,999 income class owned less than $10,000 
worth of securities.
TABLE 8
AMOUNT OF SECURITIES OWNED BY INCOME CLASS
Value of 
Securities 
Owned
Percent of Persons in Income Class
$0-
$9,999
$10,000-
$24,999
$25,000-
$49,999
$ 50,000
$99,999
None 35 8 3
$1-$9,999 52 42 10 12
$10,000-$2^,999 22 18 16
$2 000-$^-9,999 If 13 18 6
$50,000-$99,999 9 13 13
$100,000-$199;999 3 22 24
$200,000 and over If 3 13 29
No response 2
TOTALS* 100 100 100 100
^Details may not add to totals because of rounding.
78
Several respondents in the high-income classes, who 
held a relatively small amount of securities, commented on 
their greater interest and holdings of other types of in­
vestment assets, such as real estate. However, the ques­
tionnaire referred only to investments in securities because 
of the previously discussed limitation on the scope of the 
s tudy.
The information in Table 9 provides another indi­
cation of the concentration of large security holdings in 
the high-income classes.
The total value of securities owned by the 185 re­
spondents to questions concerning income and investment was 
estimated to be approximately $12,000,000. Of this amount, 
persons in the $25,000 and over income classes (approxi­
mately )+0 percent of the individuals) held some 77 percent 
of the total value of securities. Persons in the $50,000 
to $99,999 income class (approximately 9 percent of the in­
dividuals) held approximately 3^ percent of the securities 
owned by the respondents.
Environmental Climate of the Survev
During the time the survey was taken two unrelated 
events were occurring that may have affected the results of 
the study. These events were a decline of the stock market 
and the passage of federal income tax reforms.
TABLE 9
ANALYSIS OF SECURITY HOLDINGS BY INCOME CLASS
Income
Class
Number of 
Respondents
Percent
of
Total
Total 
Amount of 
Securities
Percent
of
Total
Average 
Amount of 
Securities
$ 0- 
9,999 15 8 $ 73,100 1 $ 4,806
$10,000-
24,999 96 52 2,762,391 22 28,774
$25,000-
49,999 57 31 5,360,800 43 94,049
$50,000-
99,999 17 9 4,148,500 34 244,029
TOTALS 185 100 $12,344,791 100
No response 
on Income 42 4,286,575 102,061
TOTALS 227 $16,631,366
-o
\o
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The Decline of the Stock Market 
The survey was conducted during November and De­
cember, 1969) while the stock market was in the midst of a 
rather substantial decline. In December, 1968, the market, 
as measured by the Dow-Jones Industrial Index, reached a 
high of near 990, and thereafter fell rather steadily. By 
December, 1969, the market reached a low near 760, repre­
senting a decrease of over 20 percent in the value of 
stocks. In early November, 1969) the market completed a 
temporary rally, reaching the 860-870 range, and then 
steadily declined to the 760-770 range in late December.
This situation almost certainly had an influence on 
the value of stocks held by many stockholders and the re­
spondents to the survey. Of the 229 persons owning 
securities, a total of 60 (about 26 percent of the group) 
indicated that they owned no securities which were worth 
"considerably more" than when they acquired them. In addi­
tion, several respondents commented that they had substan­
tially reduced their holdings of stocks, either in anticipa­
tion of or during the decline. Thus, it is likely that the 
market decline had an yifluence on the value of securities 
reported by the respondents.
The decline may also have affected the results of 
the survey in less obvious ways. It is possible that some 
of the respondents had "paper profits" that had declined by 
a substantial amount, thereby reducing the income tax that
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would have to he paid on the sale of the securities. The 
income tax, perhaps once considered very important, might 
seem less important and be less influential on a smaller 
gain. There might also be a reduction in the importance and 
influence of capital gains taxes as an investor accumulates 
losses in a market decline. Income taxes are not paid on 
capital gains that are offset by capital losses. The tax 
effect of realizing capital gains is negligible if there are 
capital losses to be absorbed. Both of these possibilities 
are speculations, but if correct, either would have an in­
fluence on the results of the survey.
Tax Reform Legislation
There was considerable discussion of federal income 
taxes during 1968 and 1969. In 1968, a 10 percent income 
tax surcharge was enacted. In 1969, tax inequities became 
a main topic of conversation, and there was much talk of a 
major tax reform. Throughout the year, various committees 
of Congress proposed and discussed new tax legislation. In 
late December, 1969, a tax reform bill was passed by the 
Congress and was signed into law by the President.
The effect, if any, of these events on the results 
of the survey is not known. It is possible that the well- 
publicized statements about income taxes made people in 
general, and the respondents in particular, more aware of 
income taxes. However, there is some evidence, although not
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conclusive, that public discussions of taxes have little,
p
or no effect on most persons' awareness of taxes.
SiiTnmarv
This chapter explained, in some detail, the 
methodology used in obtaining empirical evidence for this 
investigation. In addition, there is a brief analysis of 
some of the responses to the survey and of factors having a 
possible effect on the results of the survey.
^Norbert Lloyd Enrick, "A Further Study of Income 
Tax Consciousness," National Tax Journal, XVII (Seutember,
19640, 3 1 9.
CHAPTER V
EVALUATION OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE LOCK-IN 
EFFECTS OF THE CAPITAL GAINS TAX
This chapter provides an evaluation of the signif­
icance of the lock-in effects of capital gains taxation. In 
accordance with limitations on the scope of the study, the 
investigation is directed toward lock-in effects on indi­
vidual taxpayers investing in stocks and bonds. The chapter 
examines the three primary areas of federal income tax laws 
that allegedly create lock-in--the holding period, the 
avoidance of tax at death provisions, and the imposition of 
a tax on realizations of capital gains. Analyses and con­
clusions of previous research are discussed, and evidence 
obtained from the survey conducted for this project is pre­
sented. ^ From this, conclusions are made regarding the
In presenting information concerning the influence 
of the capital gains tax on respondents to the survey, only 
those investors having appreciated securities were con­
sidered. The capital gains tax could be expected to have 
little or no lock-in effect on investors who do not own 
appreciated securities, or persons with no investment in 
securities. In addition, the survey was conducted prior to 
the 1969 tax reform; consequently, the evaluation of lock- 
in effects is based on the laws as they existed prior to 
the reform.
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significance of the three separate areas, and the combined 
effects of the capital gains tax are evaluated.
Holding Period Lock-in 
Short-term capital gains are treated as ordinary 
income for income tax purposes. Such gains are subject to 
tax rates ranging from to 70 percent, depending on the 
amount of the taxpayer's other taxable income.
Long-term capital gains receive preferential treat­
ment as compared to that afforded short-term gains and 
ordinary income. The effect of this preferentialism is to 
reduce the effective tax rate applicable to long-term 
capital gains by one-half, with a maximum rate of 25 per­
cent. The effective rates on long-term capital gains thus 
range from seven to 25 percent.
Because of the preferential treatment afforded long­
term capital gains, a taxpayer may reduce the income tax 
that must be paid upon realization of an appreciated capital 
asset by a minimum of 50 percent and a maximum of 62 per­
cent, by postponing realization of the gain until the six 
months holding period has elapsed. At least four observa­
tions might be made concerning the holding period distinc­
tion between short-term and long-term capital gains.
First, it seems likely that the ability to reduce 
the tax liability by such a substantial percentage would 
strongly influence many investors to wait until six months 
had elapsed before selling or exchanging an appreciated
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capital asset. If this is correct, then lock-in, defined 
as reluctance to dispose of an asset because of tax conse­
quences, does exist.
Secondly, higher income taxpayers may be influenced 
to a greater degree than lower income taxpayers as a result 
of two factors. Higher income persons, generally being 
subject to higher marginal tax rates, would have a larger 
amount of tax savings (by postponing realization) on each 
dollar of gain than persons with a lower income. Also, 
persons in tax brackets greater than 50 percent may reduce 
the potential tax liability by more than one-half. Higher 
income persons thus have an opportunity to save more tax 
dollars and therefore might have a greater incentive, than 
persons with lower incomes, to defer sales until the holding 
period has elapsed.
Thirdly, the strength of lock-in from the holding 
period might be expected to vary indirectly with the length 
of time that must expire before the gain reaches long-term 
status. That is, if an asset had been held for a period of 
time and the six months requirement would soon be met, the 
influence of holding period lock-in might be considerably 
stronger than if the asset were recently acquired.
The last observation about holding period lock-in 
is the obvious fact that, regardless of its effects during 
the first six months of ownership, it has no influence
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after that period of time. Thus, it can only result in a 
temporary lock-in situation for any specific security.
Results of Previous Research
The evidence compiled by previous investigators 
tends to support the above observations. In fact, most 
authorities agree that the holding period does create a 
significant lock-in effect on investors who have not held 
their appreciated securities for six months.
Walter Heller, who argues that the significance of 
lock-in from the capital gains tax is generally over­
estimated, concedes the effects of the holding period,
. . . it is abundantly clear that such a large 
tax differential--whether it occurs after 6 months,
3 months, or 2 years— will have a significant effect 
on the timing of investment t r a n s a c t i o n s .2
Professor John P. Shelton, using a mathematical ap­
proach, concluded that a very significant lock-in effect is 
created by the holding period. He analyzed the situation of 
an investor with a short-term capital gain who expects the 
price of the asset to decline before the end of the six 
months period. Shelton computed the percent of a short­
term gain a taxpayer may lose awaiting long-term status, 
and still be no worse off financially, than if he had paid 
taxes on the gain at short-term rates. The percentages 
varied, of course, with the taxpayer's marginal tax rate 
but were substantial enough that Shelton concluded:
^Heller, Federal Tax Policy, p. 382.
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. . . there is strong reason to be locked-in 
to securities with a short-term profit until the 
six months holding period has passed. Most in­
vestors cannot predict changes in stock prices over 
a short period of time; and so it would take a clear 
presumption of a price slump to justify the expecta­
tion of a 2 0 % or 30^ shrinkage in gain over a few 
months.3
The Harvard Business School study of investors pro­
vided some empirical evidence of holding period lock-in.
In the study, approximately 21 percent of the 7^6 investors 
surveyed and ^1 percent of those in the $100,000 or more 
income category indicated that the six months requirement 
had affected the timing of their investment transactions. 
The researchers in the study considered this a minimum 
estimate, and " . . .  the frequency of timing effects for
individuals in the top income and wealth groups probably
q.
was greater . . . "  than indicated.
By postponing realization of a capital gain for 
more than six months, a taxpayer subjects the gain to a 
lower effective rate. Seltzer concluded that higher income 
taxpayers are more responsive to differentials in tax rates 
than taxpayers with lower incomes.
The disposition of the top income groups to 
realize or to defer taking capital gains has been 
clearly and markedly sensitive to the tax treatment.
The degree of responsiveness of the middle and 
lower income groups is less clearly revealed by the
^John P. Shelton, "Influence of the Six-Month 
Capital Gains Rule on Short Term Transactions," Financial 
Analysts Journal. XVIII (September-October, 1962), 100.
h
Butters, Thompson, and Bollinger, Effects of 
Taxation, p. 339*
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figures . . . [but] . . . the responsiveness of the 
lower and middle income groups seems to have been 
less than that of the top income groups.5
Harley H. Hinrichs explained, by income classes, the 
data for short-term and long-term sales of capital assets in 
1959. Regarding investors' practice of deferring sales to 
have gains taxed at lower, long-term rates, he stated:
Short-term realizations of capital gains as a 
percentage of total realized security gains are in­
versely related to tax rate differentials: investors
appear responsive to differences in tax rates . . .
[and] . . . elasticities of investor reaction to 
capital gain tax rate differentials tend to rise with 
income.0
The Brookings Institution study. Economic Behavior
of the Affluent, reported evidence of investor reaction to
the holding period. In analyzing answers to a question
concerning the length of time the most recently sold capital
asset had been held, the researchers stated:
The relative number of replies indicating short-term 
capital gains differed radically among income groups.
It was more than three times as common at income 
levels below $75jOOO as above, . . . Moreover, the 
frequency with which the latest capital gain had 
been realized on an asset held between six months 
and one year was 50 percent higher at incomes over 
$75,000 than it was in the $10 ,000-$75,000 range.
At least at the margin, therefore, it appears that 
the timing of the realization of capital gains is 
influenced by tax considerations.7
^Seltzer, Tax Treatment, p. 179*
^Harley H. Hinrichs, "An Empirical Measure of In­
vestors' Responsiveness to Differentials in Capital Gains 
Tax Rates Among Income Groups," National Tax Journal, XVI 
(September, 1963), 227.
^Barlow, Brazer, and Morgan, Economic Behavior 
of the Affluent, p. 123.
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In another study^ of the effect of the six months 
holding period, the most recent data on sales of capital 
assets were examined. The researchers analyzed, by months, 
the value of corporate stocks sold at a gain and held for 
one year or less.
The analysis showed that a large dollar amount of the 
sales in the first year of ownership occurred within the 
first month after purchase. The amounts sold in the second 
through the sixth months were considerably lower. In the 
seventh month, amounts sold increased substantially.
Sales in the eighth through the twelfth months were lower 
than the seventh; however, they remained above the levels 
for the second through the sixth months.
Each adjusted gross income class exhibited a similar 
pattern, although ”. . .  taxpayers in higher tax brackets 
postpone their gain beyond the sixth month to a much greater 
extent than taxpayers in lower b r a c k e t s . F r o m  their 
analysis, the researchers concluded,
. . . the monthly distribution of gains suggests 
that investors respond to the difference in marginal 
tax rates between short and long term capital gains.
We conclude that a six month locked-in effect for 
corporate stock transactions does exist, and that this 
lock-in is stronger for higher income taxpayers.^0
^J. Eric Fredland, John A. Gray, and Emil M.
Sunley, Jr., "The Six Month Holding Period for Capital Gains: 
An Empirical Analysis of Its Effect on the Timing of Gains," 
National Tax Journal. XXI (December, 1968), ^67-^78.
9lbid.. p. 470.
lOlbid.. p. >+70.
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Results of the Survey 
Several questions in the survey were concerned with 
holding period lock-in.
The first of these questions asked the investor if 
he generally tries to hold securities at least six months. 
Approximately 95 percent of the respondents answered in the 
affirmative. This large percentage could be expected, be­
cause there are probably numerous factors influencing in­
vestors to hold securities longer than six months.
The second question asked the investor to estimate 
the degree of influence of the capital gains tax on his 
desire to hold securities at least six months. Almost 80 
percent of all respondents were influenced by tax considera­
tions to some extent. About 32 percent of the respondents 
indicated that influence of the capital gains tax on their
short-term decisions was significant, and another 27 per­
cent stated that the tax was a dominant factor. A total of 
20 percent said that the capital gains tax exerted little 
influence, and 16 percent felt no influence from tax con­
siderations. The remaining five percent of the respondents 
did not answer the question.
When the data were analyzed by income class, the 
holding period requirement appeared to have a greater effect 
on investors with higher incomes than those with lower in­
comes. Seventy-one percent of those with incomes of $60,000
and over indicated that the capital gains tax was a dominant
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influence. All respondents in this group indicated the tax 
had influenced, to some extent, their decisions to hold 
appreciated securities for six months. The amount of in­
fluence on the lower and middle income groups was mixed, 
but a progression in the degree of the influence of the 
holding period requirement was noted, beginning at the 
$10,000 income class.
Another question isolated investors indicating that 
tax considerations had influenced their decisions to hold 
their currently owned appreciated securities. These persons 
were asked which aspects of federal taxes had influenced 
them. Often, more than one aspect was mentioned, but some 
12 percent indicated their decisions had been influenced by 
the fact that the security had not been held for six months. 
As a measure of the number of persons affected by the holding 
period requirement, the 12 percent is a minimum. It repre­
sents only the respondents whose portfolio decisions were 
affected by the holding period at the time of the survey.
Any persons who had held their appreciated securities for 
more than six months at the time of the survey would not be 
affected by the holding period requirement.
Summary of Research Concerning 
Holding Period Lock-in
As a summarization of this section on the signif­
icance of investor lock-in from the holding period require­
ment, the following conclusions seem appropriate.
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It would appear logical that the ability to achieve 
rather substantial tax savings by deferring a sale until the 
six months period had elapsed, would make many investors 
hesitant to sell a capital asset at a gain until the holding 
period requirement had been met. Most authorities agree 
that the holding period does create a significant lock-in 
effect. The evidence obtained from the survey in this in­
vestigation would seem to support the same position.
Lock-in from Avoidance bv Transfer at Death
As explained in Chapter II, the federal income tax 
laws do not recognize any gain or loss on capital assets 
transferred to a beneficiary through an estate. Gains ac­
cumulated on capital assets included in an estate are not 
reported in the decedent's final income tax return. In ad­
dition, the basis for computation of gain or loss, to the 
person acquiring the asset from a decedent, is the fair 
market value at the valuation date of the estate. Therefore, 
accumulated gains on capital assets at the valuation date are 
never subjected to income tax. This provides a taxpayer 
owning an appreciated capital asset the opportunity of hold­
ing the asset until death and completely avoiding income tax 
on the gain.
Two observations can be made concerning the ability 
to avoid the capital gains tax by a transfer at death.
First, a substantial income tax savings may be achieved, 
since the transfer at death reduces the marginal income tax ■
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rate applicable to a long-term capital gain from a maximum 
of 25 percent to zero. Secondly, this ability to avoid the 
income tax completely might be expected to become more im­
portant and exert greater influence as an investor grows 
older.
Results of Previous Research 
As in the case regarding holding period lock-in, 
most authorities are in agreement that significant investor 
lock-in results from the ability of the taxpayer to avoid the 
capital gains tax completely, by a transfer at death. As a 
result of the agreement, very little has been written, and 
almost no empirical evidence has been accumulated, regarding 
this area of investor lock-in. In general, the feeling is 
that the lock-in effect is extremely influential on elderly 
investors but of little consequence to younger investors. A 
comment by economist Henry Wallich typifies the attitude of 
authorities when he stated: "That the lock-in increases in­
versely with life expectancy is obvious.
The authors of Economic Behavior of the Affluent in­
dicated that as long as the avoidance option exists, efforts 
to unlock investors may be unsuccessful.
It may be the ultimate availability of a zero tax rate 
that matters • . . It is therefore questionable that 
even a substantial reduction in the capital gains tax
 ^^ Wallich, "Taxation of Capital Gains," p.
9^
rate would make much difference in asset mobility, as 
long as the tax-free alternative remained.12
The Standard and Poor's publication, Outlook, noted 
that the wealthy are generally older persons and that these 
people often cannot afford to sell appreciated securities, 
subjecting the gain to the capital gains tax, when pro­
visions allowing avoidance are available.
The age of wealthy investors ranges principally 
from 50 to 75 years. Selling advices to such clients 
must give full consideration to the tax factor. The 
combination of a 25^ capital gains tax liability and 
an ultimate estate tax liability is too great a 
penalty on profit-taking, as viewed by most well-to- 
do investors.13
William Vickrey has criticized the avoidance pro­
visions and conceded their effects on taxpayers as follows :
This disappearance [through avoidance] of capital 
gains in probate is one of the most clearly illogical 
of all our income tax provisions. Moreover, it has 
fairly serious effects. In the hope of taking ad­
vantage of this loophole, taxpayers tend to hold on 
to appreciated stocks and other assets when they might 
otherwise shift their funds . . .1^
Robert Vowels concluded that the avoidance provision 
probably creates a greater lock-in effect than any other 
aspect of the capital gains tax.
The holding period and the step-up-in basis pro­
vision probably encourage investors to hold assets.
. . . the step-up-in basis at death provision causes a
1 2Barlow, Brazer, and Morgan, Economic Behavior of 
the Affluent, p. 120.
 ^^ Outlook. Standard and Poor's Corporation, XXVII, 
No. 3 (January 17, 1955)? 18O.
11+Vickrey, Agenda for Progressive Taxation, p. 139-
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decrease in the willingness to sell present assets 
relative to the short- and long-term situation, and 
consequently also to the other situations.15
Dan Throop Smith stated that the avoidance pro­
visions increase the lock-in effect of the capital gains tax,
and " . . .  will influence investment decisions for many
1 A
years before one expects to die."
Holt and Shelton have attempted to quantify de­
cisions involving the avoidance at death o p t i o n . T h e y  as­
sume that an investor desires to maximize his income and 
estate value and that he is concerned with his heirs. They 
also assume an investor will be willing to switch invest­
ments only if the exchange will maintain or increase his 
current income and restore the market value of the estate 
lost in payment of capital gains tax. In their computa­
tions, the authors used mortality tables to determine the 
probability that the income tax would be avoided by death. 
From this, they computed the additional return required from 
a prospective investment in order to offset the probable 
avoidance opportunity.
The size of the differential and the implied strength 
of investor lock-in depend on the taxpayer‘s-marginal tax
l5vowels, "An Evaluation," pp. *+0,
^^Smith, Federal Tax Reform, p. l48.
I^Holt and Shelton, "The Lock-in Effect," pp. 337- 
352; and Charles C. Holt and John P. Shelton, "The Impli­
cations of the Capital Gains Tax for Investment Decisions," 
Journal of Finance. XVI (December, 1961), 559-80.
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rate, the amount of the gain, the expected future yield of 
the security owned, the age of the investor, the estate 
motivation of the investor, and the length of time he 
normally holds securities.
As a result of their computations. Holt and Shelton 
conclude that the magnitude of the lock-in effect is not 
great for most investors, except the elderly. They recog­
nize, however, that their assumptions of rational behavior 
and optimization on the part of the investor may not be 
realistic. In addition, they make no attempt to allow for 
uncertainty in estimating future yields of securities. They 
admit the shortcomings of this omission and concede that 
"when other factors seem imponderable and difficult to fore­
cast" the certainty of payment of the capital gains tax
1 ficould dominate the decision and prevent a sale.
In the final analysis of lock-in from the avoidance
option. Holt and Shelton concluded.
By granting the additional (a.i.) privilege of 
completely forgiving this tax at death, the taxpayer 
is encouraged by the government to postpone still 
further the realization of his capital gains. Thus 
the tax operates as if the government were trying to 
encourage investors who own securities with capital 
gains to hold them instead of selling them. . . .
The result is to produce large (a.i.) lock-in dif­
ferentials for aged investors in high tax brackets who 
have large capital gains and are interested in their 
heirs.19
I^Holt and Shelton, "The Lock-in Effect," pp. 337-
3^2.
I^lbid.. p. 352.
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Results of the Survey
The survey conducted in this project contained 
several questions related to the avoidance provisions and 
their effects on investor decisions to hold or sell assets. 
The first question asked the investor if he was aware of the 
provisions allowing complete avoidance of the income tax at 
death. A total of 63 percent indicated they were aware of 
the provisions.
The number of persons aware of the option varied con­
siderably between age groups. Only percent of the persons 
less than 35 years of age were aware of the option, while 
7*+ percent of those individuals 55 or over were aware of it.
A second question asked the respondent if the ability 
to avoid the tax at death had affected any of his decisions 
to hold rather than sell an appreciated security. A total 
of 31 percent of the investors who were aware of the al­
ternative (representing almost 20 percent of all respondents) 
indicated that it had affected their decisions.
The frequency of influence increased with the age 
group considered. Only 11 percent of those persons under 
50 years of age indicated that the option had affected their 
decisions. This, is compared with 30 percent of the 50 to 6*+ 
age group and M-1 percent of the 65 and over age group.
A third question asked the respondent the degree of 
influence the avoidance provisions had exerted on his in­
vestment decisions. Of the persons whose decisions had been
98
affected, 61 percent indicated the influence had been a sig­
nificant influence, and another 18 percent said it had been 
a dominant influence on their decisions. The remaining 21 
percent were aware of the provisions but had felt little in­
fluence from them.
In answer to the question asking the respondent 
which aspects of federal income taxes had affected his de­
cisions to hold rather than sell his currently appreciated 
securities, some 16 percent mentioned the desire to com­
pletely avoid the tax on the appreciation by including the 
security in his estate at death. About +^1 percent of the 
respondents 65 years of age or over mentioned the desire to 
avoid the tax. Again, this was a minimum estimate, repre­
senting only the influence of the avoidance provisions on 
current holdings.
Summary of the Research on Lock-in from 
Avoidance by Transfer at Death
Authorities are in substantial agreement that the 
ability to avoid the capital gains tax at death exerts con­
siderable influence on elderly investors and little influence 
on younger investors. The results of the survey appear to 
support these opinions. Almost 63 percent of the respond­
ents were aware of the provisions for avoidance by transfer 
at death, and, as might be expected, older persons exhibited 
a greater frequency of awareness than younger persons. Some 
20 percent of all respondents owning appreciated securities
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indicated the avoidance at death provisions had, at some 
time, influenced their decisions to hold appreciated secur­
ities. Almost 16 percent of all respondents, and M-1 percent 
of those 65 and over, mentioned it as a reason for holding 
rather than selling their currently appreciated securities. 
About 25 percent of the persons who were aware of the avoid­
ance provisions felt that it had exerted a significant or 
dominant influence on their decisions.
These results would tend to support the arguments 
that lock-in influence from the avoidance provisions varies 
inversely with the age of the investor and that it has a
substantial lock-in effect on a large percentage of the
20elderly investors.
Lock-in from the Imposition of a Tax 
on Realization
As explained in Chapter II, capital gains and losses
are generally recognized for tax purposes when realization
occurs. A taxpayer may indefinitely postpone recognition
of a capital gain and, thus, payment of the income tax, by
delaying the time of realization. This ability to defer the
tax has the effect of an interest-free loan from the
20Research on national wealth, discussed in Ap­
pendix A and included in the bibliography, indicates that 
older persons are a significant group of investors. There 
is considerable evidence of concentration of ownership of 
securities by this group. The findings of the survey pro­
vided another indication of this concentration. The 55 and 
over age group, representing about 28 percent of the security 
owners, held nearly 65 percent of the dollar amount of se­
curities owned by all respondents.
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government in the amount of income tax not paid and may make 
investors reluctant to sell their appreciated assets. Also 
the amount of income tax that must be paid at the point of 
realization reduces the amount of the proceeds from the dis­
position available for use by a taxpayer. This factor be­
comes extremely important in the transfer of capital from 
one earning asset to another. For an exchange to occur, the 
differential in returns must be great enough to offset the 
amount of taxes paid and still induce the taxpayer to make 
the exchange. It is possible, therefore, that the imposition 
of a tax on realization causes investors to be reluctant to 
make sales they might otherwise transact because of the tax 
consequences involved. The strength and significance of 
lock-in from this aspect of the income tax laws, referred to 
as lock-in from the capital gains tax rate, are difficult to 
isolate and are the subject of considerable controversy.
Differential Returns
Previous research on 
differential returns
A number of authorities have attempted quantitative 
analyses of investor lock-in from the capital gains tax rate. 
A primary objective of these analyses has been to determine 
the necessary differential between the expected returns of a 
prospective investment and a presently held appreciated in­
vestment to justify an exchange. The significance of the 
income tax on the exchange is inferred from the size of the
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differential. Many of these analyses have been subject to 
rather severe, and sometimes unstated, restrictions and as­
sumptions that simplify the computations, but reduce the 
realism of the situations. Among these assumptions are a 
one-year investment horizon, no reinvestment of returns, 
expected returns in only one form (dividends, interest, or 
appreciation, but not a combination), certainty of returns, 
and no portfolio complications. One of the most compre­
hensive analyses, that of William F. Beazer, is presented as 
an illustration.
Beazer allows for an investment time horizon of more 
than one year and reinvestment of returns from the investment. 
He first considers the case where all returns are expected to 
be in the form of appreciation, and the taxpayer does not 
expect to avoid the capital gains tax by dying. The following 
table was extracted from Beazer’s article.
To illustrate the interpretation of this table, con­
sider an investor in the 25 percent tax bracket owning a 
stock on which 70 percent of the current market value is ap­
preciation. The value of the stock is expected to increase 
at the rate of 10 percent a year for 10 years. From the 
table, the annual expected rate of gain on the prospective 
investment must be 13*5 percent greater than that of the old 
investment or 11.35 percent per year. The differential re­
quired is relatively small for most of the situations con­
tained in the table, and from this Beazer concludes the
102
lock-in effect is not significant. In regard to more gen­
eral situations, he explained,
For shorter holding periods and lower expected annual 
rates of gain on the old asset the required ratio be­
tween annual rates of gain on the new and old secur­
ities is greater. For longer periods and higher rates, 
the ratio is smaller.21
TABLE 10
RATIOS BETWEEN RETURNS ON A NEW INVESTMENT 
AND AN OLD INVESTMENT REQUIRED TO MAKE 
A SWITCH ADVANTAGEOUS
Marginal Tax Gain on Old Asset as a Fraction
Rate on of Its Market Value
oap-L Udi. UcLXIib
(Percent) 1/10 3/10 5/10 7/10 9/10
10 1.006 1 .021 1.035 1.050 1.065
25 1.017 1 .054 1.095 1.135 1.182
35 1 .025 1 .076 1.135 1 .201 1.275
50 1.035 1.11^ 1.206 1.319 1 .^57
The amounts are the ratio between annual rates of
return if the expected holding period is 10 years and
V-] = 10^. The required ratio between annual rates of return
varies with the actual level of the rates.
Source: William F. Beazer, "Expected Income Changes and the
Lock-in Effect of the Capital Gains Tax," National 
Tax Journal. XIX (September, 1966), 310»
Beazer also notes that if returns expected from the 
investments are dividends, and if these are reinvested in 
the assets, then the same calculations would be appropriate.
William F. Beazer, "Expected Income Changes and the 
Lock-in Effect of the Capital Gains Tax," National Tax 
Journal, XIX (September, 1966), p. 310.
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However, if the dividends are assumed to be invested in the 
highest yielding investment (probably a more realistic as­
sumption) , the calculations would be more complex and the 
required differential would be greater.
When both dividends and appreciation are expected 
from an investment, a more complicated decision confronts 
the investor. According to Beazer,
A much more complicated situation arises when the 
old and the new securities have both capital gains 
potential and a dividend yield. . . .
Just about the only generalizations that can be 
made in this situation are (1) that for any given 
expected dividend and gain combination on an old se­
curity there could be an infinity of combinations on 
the new security that would make it equivalent to the 
old and (2) that capital gains will weigh more heavily 
in the trade-off— particularly at higher tax rates.-2
Other authors also have concluded that only a rela­
tively small differential is generally necessary to offset 
the tax paid on an exchange.
Heller concluded from his calculations, that,
. . . it is apparent that only where the accrued 
gain is large and the expected differentials in yields 
or price movements are small does the tax on long-term 
capital gains make switching financially unattractive.23
Holt and Shelton agreed that, mathematically, the 
required differential is relatively small; however, they 
noted,
. . . one must be cautious when assuming that 
rational behavior as indicated by an optimizing
22ibid., p. 311.
^^Heller, Federal Tax Policv. p. 385*
1Q)+
analysis will be approximated in actual decision 
practice. . . . [and] . . .  if investors generally 
feel that any forecasts about the future yields of 
securities are quite uncertain, then the definite 
certainty or loss arising from a sale which incurs a 
capital gains tax may be a significant deterrent to
switching.24
Regarding investor uncertainty and frequency of ex­
change of earning assets, Wallich argued,
. . .  I question whether the rational investor 
ordinarily has much reason to believe that he can 
improve his investment results either by switching or 
by trying to sell at peaks and buy at bottoms. . . .
Under these conditions rational investor behavior 
would seem to be to switch only when a particular 
holding has become demonstrably unsuitable for his 
purposes . . . The only sure thing he ordinarily 
knows is that if his chances of improving his position 
by selling or switching are even, taxes and com­
missions make them less than even. . . . This view 
argues for a generally strong lock-in e f f e c t .25
Along these lines, Sprinkel and West felt that,
. . . investors frequently overestimate the 
extent of the "lock-in" effect. . . . The impact of 
capital gains taxes on investment decisions has been 
exaggerated in the minds of many i n v e s t o r s .26
Results of the survey concerning 
differential returns
A hypothetical problem, using the figures in the 
example explaining the Beazer table, was included in the 
survey to obtain an indication of the respondents' ability
351.
^ ^ olt and Shelton, "The Lock-in Effect," pp. 350-
^^Wallich, "Taxation of Capital Gains," pp. 145-1^6.
^^Beryl W. Sprinkel and B. Kenneth West, "Effects 
of Capital Gains Taxes on Investment Decisions," Journal of 
Business. XXXV (April, 1962), 133-134.
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to calculate the required differential. The question in­
volved a simple stock exchange situation with no dividends 
or uncertainty. In addition, the after-tax proceeds of the 
sale were given, so no estimate of the marginal tax rate, 
or computation of the amount of the income tax on the sale 
was required. As explained earlier, the minimum required 
annual appreciation on the security to be purchased is 11.35 
percent. The answers to the hypothetical problem were ex­
pressed in whole numbers, and 12 percent was the proper 
response. A respondent could overestimate the required per­
centage by over one-half percent, and still be considered 
correct.
The responses of persons not owning securities were 
not tabulated, and some 15 percent of the security holders 
did not respond to the question. The following table pre­
sents the distribution of answers provided by the security 
holders responding to the question.
Only 17 percent of responding security holders 
answered the question correctly, while 23 percent indicated 
that they were unable to compute the answer. A total of 50 
percent of those responding answered the question, but over­
estimated the required rate. The mean response was 14 per­
cent.
Many respondents had difficulty deriving the correct 
answer to the hypothetical security exchange problem. Al­
though the evidence was not conclusive, almost 75 percent of
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TABLE 1 1
RESPONSES TO THE HYPOTHETICAL INVESTMENT PROBLEM
Answer
Percent of 
Respondents
Cumulative
Percent
10 percent 2 2
11 percent 5 7
12 percent 17 2 -^
13 percent 20 hk
l4 percent 5
15 percent 10 59
16 percent 1 60
17 percent 0 60
18 percent 4 6^
19 percent 1 65
20 percent 9 71+
Unable to compute 23 97
Other 3
100
100
the respondents were either unable to compute the answer, or 
overstated the effect of the capital gains tax on the trans­
fer. Certainly a real portfolio decision would be viewed 
more seriously and carefully and this may explain some of 
the inaccuracy. However, this is partially offset by the 
simplicity of the situation in the hypothetical problem.
The results seem to support the allegation that investors 
tend to exaggerate the effect of the capital gains tax on 
security exchange decisions.
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"Anti-Lock-In" Effects
Previous research on "anti­
lock-in" effects
Beazer, in addition to his analysis of required dif­
ferentials, theorized that the capital gains tax may produce 
"anti-lock-in" effects. Anti-lock-in might affect an in­
vestor who (1) owns an appreciated asset, (2) is subject to 
less than the maximum 25 percent capital gains tax rate,
(3) does not expect to escape the tax by dying, and (4) ex­
pects an increase in his marginal capital gains tax rate in 
the future. Such an investor might be induced by the 
capital gains tax to sell rather than hold an appreciated 
asset. If he sells, the gain would be taxed at the present 
tax rate, and only future appreciation would be taxed at the 
expected higher rates (assuming he does not expect to offset 
the gain with losses). The investor might even find it 
profitable to sell and reinvest in the same asset. The rele­
vant factors are the expected return from the asset held, and 
current and expected future capital gains tax rates.
Again, "for simplicity," Beazer assumed expected 
returns in the form of capital appreciation, in computing 
Table 12.
The values in the table are the minimum expected 
amounts of appreciation, for various current and anticipated 
capital gains tax rates, that are necessary to warrant hold­
ing an appreciated asset. If the expected amount of appre­
ciation is less than the value in the table, the investor
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should realize his gain and reinvest in the best available 
investment. The expected increase in taxpayer's marginal 
tax rate offsets the value of postponing payment of taxes.
TABLE 12
MINIMUM AMOUNT OF APPRECIATION REQUIRED TO WARRANT 
HOLDING AN APPRECIATED ASSET
Difference 
Between 
Current & 
Expected 
Capital 
Gains Tax 
Rate
Current Tax Rate on Capital (lains
.07 .10 .15 .20 .25 .35 .50 .60
-.015 .23 .17 .12 .10 .09 .07 . 06 . 06
-.03 .^7 .3^ .22 .19 .17 .14 .13 .14
-.05 .81 .59 .If 2 .33 .29 .24 .22 .24
-.10 1 .72 1.25 .88 .71 . 6l .52 .50 . 56
-.15 2.7^ 2.00 1 .If 3 1.15 1 .00 .86 .86 1 .00
Source: Beazer, "Income Changes and Lock-■in Effect," p. 312.
As an example, an investor in a 10 percent capital 
gains tax bracket, expecting to move into a 15 percent 
bracket would profit by selling and reinvesting, unless he 
expects 59 percent or more appreciation in the currently 
held asset. The appreciation may accrue over a period of 
years.
The results of the preceding analysis are reversed 
if the investor expects his marginal capital gains tax rate 
to decrease. Obviously, an investor who expects such a 
decrease may save taxes by holding the asset until the lower 
rate prevails. This would increase the required differential
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in returns expected from prospective and currently held 
assets to offset the tax paid on an exchange.
Beazer interprets the results of his analysis as
follows,
It is clear that under current tax law there is 
very little incentive for a person to feel locked 
into his portfolios by capital gains if he expects 
to eventually pay taxes on them and if he also ex­
pects to move into higher tax brackets as income 
rises over time. In fact, at the lower income and 
tax levels, there is a very real incentive to realize 
gains in order to avoid paying a higher tax on them 
later. The incentive to feel locked-in is consider­
able, however, if the individual expects to face 
lower tax rates as income falls, particularly if the 
expected tax rate difference is large and the change 
imminent, such as might be the case if the investor 
were near retirement.27
After considering the general upward trend of income 
in the United States and the large percentage of capital 
gains realized by persons, not in the maximum capital gains 
tax bracket or near retirement, Beazer stated,
. . .  it seems fair to conclude that a size­
able proportion of capital gains do accrue to 
people who have virtually no basis for being 
locked-in by unrealized gains and, in fact, might 
even deem it expedient to realize them.
The analysis tends to reinforce the contention 
that the lock-in effect should be a relatively 
weak influence on investor decisions, except as the 
investor approaches retirement and old ag e .28
27lbid., pp. 31^-315* 
28lbid.. p. 317.
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Results of the survey concern­
ing "anti-lock-in" effects
A series of questions was included in the question­
naire to obtain an indication of the respondents' reactions 
to expected changes in their marginal income tax rates and 
to evaluate the significance of Beazer's arguments.
Table 13 present^ an analysis of the replies.
There were 169 responses to the series of questions 
relating to respondents' reactions to expected changes in 
their marginal tax rates. A total of 136 of the respondents 
either expected no change in income or had not been in­
fluenced by the expected change. An insignificant number of 
persons did not respond to each question, and these are ig­
nored in the percentage calculations.
A brief review of the responses reveals that 111 
(66 percent of all the respondents) expected a change in 
income that would affect their tax rate. A substantial per­
centage (approximately 80 percent) of persons in the 25 to 
3^ and the 55 to 6>+ age groups expected such a change. 
Generally, the younger persons would be expecting an in­
crease and the older persons, nearing retirement, would be 
expecting a decrease.
About 28 percent of those expecting a change indi­
cated that it had affected a portfolio decision. The per­
centage influenced by the expected change rose rather 
steadily from 22 percent of the 25 to 3^ age group to ^1 
percent of the 55 to 6U- age group. Of those who had been
TABLE 1 3
ANALYSIS OF RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING EFFECTS OF ANTICIPATED 
CHANGES IN THE RATE OF TAX ON PORTFOLIO DECISIONS
169 Respondents
Do you expect a change in your income which will affect the rate at which your income 
will be taxed?
No: 57— 3^^ Yes: 111— 66#
If a change is anticipated, has this expected change affected any of your portfolio 
decisions?
No: 79"72# Yes: 31 —
If the anticipated change has affected your decisions, what kind of change do you 
expect?
Increase: 12— )+0#
This increase has influenced you to: 
(Number of persons)
Decrease; 18--
This decrease has influenced you to: 
(Number of persons)
9 1 1 1 0 16 2 0 0 0
Hold an Sell an Hold an Sell an
Hold Sell asset asset Hold Sell asset asset
an an that has that has an an that has that has
appre­ appre­ de­ de­ appre­ appre­ de­ de­
ciated ciated creased creased ciated ciated creased creased
asset asset in price in price Other asset asset in price in price Other
re­ re­ re­ re­ re­ re­ re­ re­ re­ re­
action action action action action action action action action action
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X
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influenced by the expected change +^0 percent were an­
ticipating an increase in their income, and 60 percent were 
anticipating a decrease.
As indicated in Table 13, there were five possible
answers to the final question, and each might have been se­
lected by a person expecting an increase or a decrease in 
his income. Thus, there were ten possible reactions to an 
expected change in income.
Beazer's anti-lock-in effect is reaction II, a 
person expecting an increase in his income being influenced 
to sell an appreciated asset. As shown in Table 13, only
one of the 169 respondents to the series of questions indi­
cated this reaction.
Beazer also noted that expectation of a decrease in 
income and in the rate of tax would exert additional pres­
sure on a person to hold an appreciated asset, reaction VI. 
As shown in Table 13, 16 of the 18 persons influenced by an 
anticipated decrease in income, indicated this reaction. As 
might be expected, the majority of these responses were 
given by older persons, nearing or in retirement. Fifteen 
of the 16 were ^5 years of age or over, and 12 were 55 or 
over.
About 22 percent of all the respondents who were 55 
years of age or over indicated they had been influenced to 
hold an appreciated security by an expected decrease in
113
their tax rate. This compares with slightly over nine per­
cent of all the respondents.
Other logical reactions would appear to be: (1 ) to
hold an asset which had decreased in price, if an increase 
in the tax rate is expected (reaction III), and (2) to sell 
an asset which had decreased in price if a decrease in the 
tax rate is expected (reaction IX). Only one person re­
ported either of these reactions.
However, based on Beazer's line of reasoning, re­
actions I, IV, VII, and VIII would appear to be illogical. 
In spite of this, nine of the 30 persons influenced indi­
cated reaction I. Reaction I, to anticipate an increase in 
the rate of tax and to be influenced to hold an appreciated 
asset because of this expectation, does not conform to the 
analysis. Whether these replies were the result of a lack 
of understanding of the question or of factors not included 
in the analysis could not be determined.
The results of the survey concerning investor re­
actions to expected changes in their incomes and tax rates 
were not entirely conclusive. A relatively small number 
(31 of 169 respondents) indicated that an anticipated 
change in their tax rate had influenced their portfolio de­
cisions. Of these, 25 indicated that they had been in­
fluenced to hold, rather than sell an appreciated asset.
The answers of only one respondent indicated any anti-lock- 
in effects from an expected increase in income and marginal
1 ^ h
tax rates. On the other hand, considerable lock-in effects 
of an expected decrease in the tax rate were noted. A 
total of 16 of the 18 respondents, affected by an expected 
decrease in their tax rate, had been influenced to hold an 
appreciated asset. This effect appeared particularly im­
portant to those nearing or in retirement (12 of the 16 
were 55 years of age, or over). The conclusions from the 
results of the survey indicate that the respondents were 
generally unresponsive to expectations of future changes in 
marginal tax rates, with the exception of older persons who 
indicated a significant lock-in influence from an anticipated 
decrease in their marginal tax rates.
Research on Other Effects of 
a Tax on Realization
The survey provided additional information concern­
ing the effect of the realization criteria on taxpayers' 
investment decisions. One question asked the respondents 
which aspects of taxes had affected their decisions to hold 
their currently appreciated securities. By far the most 
frequently mentioned aspect was the desire to postpone the 
tax that would have to be paid when the security was sold. 
This answer was given by 62 percent of those indicating their 
decisions to hold securities had been influenced by taxes. 
This represented about 52 percent of all respondents owning 
appreciated securities. These large percentages tend to
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support the argument that the capital gains tax rate does 
produce a lock-in effect on many investors.
Authorities have expressed differing opinions con­
cerning lock-in from the capital gains tax rate. Smith 
views lock-in as a justification for reduction in income 
tax rates.
. . .  it [the present capital gains tax rate] 
does discourage the sale of property on which a large 
gain has developed. . . . The principal reason for a 
reduction in the tax rate would be to thaw frozen in­
vestments . . .29
The authors of Effects of Taxation: Investments bv
Individuals emphasized the avoidable and objectionable na­
ture of a tax levied on the sale of a capital asset as 
follows :
. . . there are reinforcing emotional considera­
tions which are likely to deter investors from selling 
capital assets on which gains have accumulated. By 
selling, the investor brings on himself an otherwise 
avoidable tax--a tax which many investors view as a 
highly objectionable form of capital levy. . . .
Given these alternatives, the choice of taking posi­
tive action which will precipitate a distasteful tax 
in return for a dubious future benefit may well be 
resolved by a decision to do nothing. At any rate, 
the sale is much less likely to be made under these 
circumstances than if no tax were levied on the 
gain.30
However, they found the capital gains tax rate less 
important than the holding period in influencing the timing 
of investment decisions.
^^Smith, Federal Tax Reform, p. l46.
^^Butters, Thompson, and Bollinger, Effects of 
Taxation, pp. 33^-335*
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Our data indicate that the timing of investment trans­
actions was definitely influenced by the capital gains 
tax for a sizeable fraction— between a quarter and a 
half— of the individuals in the active investor sample 
in all except the lowest income and wealth groups. 
Generally speaking, transactions appear to have been 
affected by the six months' holding period to a much 
greater degree than by the long-term rate of 25^. The 
tendency to defer the realization of gains has been 
stronger than that to accelerate the realization of 
losses.31
A study for the New York Stock Exchange by Louis 
Harris and Associates implied a strong lock-in effect from 
the capital gains tax rate. According to their conclusions, 
reductions in the capital gains tax rate would increase 
realizations enough to substantially increase tax 
revenues.3^
The authors of Economic Behavior of the Affluent
expressed skepticism of the Harris' findings. They were;
. . . not convinced by the finding of two Harris polls 
for the New York Stock Exchange that substantial 
numbers say they would sell assets if the capital gains 
tax were lower. The responses to such "iffy" questions 
are generally not good predictors of behavior.33
Seltzer noted that the 12 1/2 percent tax rate, 
effective in 1928 and 1929, was charged with creating in­
vestor lock-in. Referring to this, he stated.
But for the many investors who lacked strong 
opinions respecting the probable trend of prices
31 Ibid.. p. 1+5.
3^Effects of a Reduced Canital Gains Tax on Locked- 
in Capital and Federal Revenue (New York: New York Stock
Exchange, Department of Research and Statistics, 1961),
pp. 3-5.
^^Barlow, Brazer, and Morgan, Economic Behavior of 
the Affluent, p. 120.
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for one or more of their assets, even a moderate tax 
on capital gains could doubtless deter liquidation.
Such an investor had to consider that if he sold, he 
not only gave up the chance of benefiting from a 
possible rise in the value of the asset but faced a 
certain loss of capital resources and earning power 
through paying the tax. If he contemplated shifting 
his funds to what seemed a more attractive investment, 
the tax on his accrued gains would rationally deter 
him unless the contemplated new commitment seemed suf­
ficiently more attractive than the old to offset the 
certain (a.i.) loss of capital funds entailed by the 
transfer.3^
Walter Heller, who is, in general, dubious of the
extent of lock-in from the capital gains tax, said.
But can we dismiss it as insignificant? In the ab­
sence of more adequate and decisive facts, the answer 
is "no," for three main reasons: (1) After all the
screening, there remain rational investors at or near 
the margin of selling whose decisions are affected by 
the tax, i.e., whose reservation price is higher than 
it would be without the tax; (2) in the face of un­
certainty, many investors will not trade the likelihood 
of a more-than-compensating improvement in yield or 
capital appreciation on a new security (or drop in 
price of the old) for the certainty of an immediate 
diminution of capital via the gains tax; and (3) in 
the light of frequent investor inertia and irrational­
ity, the tax nay exert a psychological effect not 
limited to its actual cost . . .35
Summary of the Research on Lock-in 
Resulting from the Imposition 
of a Tax on Realization
Many authorities have engaged in mathematical analy­
ses that, subject to artificial constraints, generally show 
only a relatively small differential in returns is neces­
sary to offset the payment of income tax on an exchange of
^^Seltzer, Tax Treatment, p. 166. 
^^Heller, Federal Tax Policy, p. 386.
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earning assets. From this, they infer that the lock-in 
effect from the capital gains rate should not be a major 
deterrent to an investor contemplating an exchange. Many 
note, however, that there may be intangible factors, such 
as uncertainty or investor inertia, that would modify this 
conclusion. Others argue that the effect of the tax is 
exaggerated by investors or that the certainty of paying 
tax on the sale may be a dominant factor when considering 
uncertain returns. Respondents to the survey had diffi­
culty determining the required return in a relatively 
simple, hypothetical problem. In addition, the majority of 
respondents overstated the effect of the tax on the transfer. 
This evidence tends to support the view that tax considera­
tions are exaggerated in the minds of investors.
Beazer theorized that many investors, expecting to 
move into higher tax brackets, should be induced by the 
capital gains tax rates to sell rather than hold appre­
ciated assets. A majority of the respondents to the survey 
anticipated a change in their tax rates, but less than 30 
percent were influenced by the expectation. Only one person 
indicated an "anti-lock-in" effect from the expected change. 
On the other hand, a large majority of those affected by an 
expected change in their tax rate were influenced to hold 
appreciated securities. This was primarily true of older 
investors, expecting a decrease in their tax rate because
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of retirement. It appeared that the situation produced sig­
nificant lock-in effects for the elderly investors.
A majority of the respondents owning appreciated 
securities indicated that the desire to postpone payment of 
the tax had influenced their decisions to hold rather than 
sell their appreciated securities. This would tend to sup­
port arguments that the capital gains tax rate exerts 
lock-in pressure on a large number of investors.
The overall conclusion from the research was there­
fore, that the imposition of a tax on realization of capital
gains does influence many investors to hold rather than 
sell their appreciated securities. A significant lock-in 
effect results from this area of the capital gains tax.
The Combined Lock-in Effect of 
the Capital Gains Tax
The preceding sections have presented the results of
research on each of the three areas of the capital gains tax
allegedly creating lock-in. An overall evaluation of the 
combined lock-in effects of these areas may now be made.
A total of 8*+ percent of the respondents indicated 
that the capital gains tax had influenced their investment 
decisions to some extent, and a substantial number con­
sidered the influence to be significant.
In identifying the aspects of the capital gains tax 
which had influenced their decisions to hold their cur­
rently appreciated securities, 62 percent of the persons
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responding mentioned the desire to postpone the tax; 16 per­
cent mentioned the desire to avoid the tax at death; 12 per­
cent indicated the six months holding period had not 
elapsed. A small number of respondents indicated such 
aspects as the loss of capital involved in payment of the 
tax and the desire to offset gains with losses. About 20 
percent did not identify any specific area.
Regarding the degree of influence the capital gains 
tax exerted on their decisions to hold rather than sell 
their currently appreciated securities, well over 50 percent 
indicated that the influence had been significant or dom­
inant. About 3^ percent said that tax considerations had 
exerted little influence on their decisions. Less than 16 
percent felt no influence from the capital gains tax.
In answering the question asking for the investor’s 
primary reasons for holding rather than selling his cur­
rently appreciated securities, many of the respondents pro­
vided more than one answer. Some 36 percent indicated tax 
considerations as a primary reason for not selling their 
appreciated securities. It should be noted that, although 
this answer may not have been applicable to all appreciated 
securities in each person’s investment portfolio, a very 
substantial percentage of the respondents did feel that 
taxes were a primary influence on their decisions. It 
should also be noted that the 36 percent is a minimum esti­
mate, since the question referred only to current holdings.
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A majority of persons in the highest income class 
reported tax considerations as a primary reason for holding 
their appreciated securities. A total of 53 percent of the 
persons in the $50,000 and over income class, so reported, 
compared to slightly over 35 percent for the other income 
classes. Tax considerations thus seemed to be more im­
portant to decisions of investors with higher incomes than 
those with lower incomes.
The last question in the survey concerned the com­
bined effects of the capital gains tax. It asked, "Do you 
presently own any security which you would sell if there 
were no capital gains tax?" A total of 17 percent of the 
respondents owning appreciated securities answered in the 
affirmative. This number appears to be significant, in 
view of the fact that these people felt the capital gains 
tax was actually preventing them from selling an appreciated 
security. Also, it represented only a minimum estimate, 
referring to current holdings.
Summary and Conclusions
The preceding discussion notes several degrees of 
influence exerted by capital gains tax on investor decisions 
to hold rather than sell appreciated securities.
Jonathan A. Brown saw the lock-in effect of the 
capital gains tax as a restricting, rather than a dominat­
ing force.
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Although the term "locked in" suggests a specific 
limit to action established by a physical barrier, 
the actual effect is more analogous to the hobbling 
of an animal, or the attractive force of an electro­
magnet rather than a locked door. For the effect of 
a hobble or a magnet will vary widely depending on the 
relative sizes and weights, the strength and makeup of 
the materials involved, and about as many other factors 
as are involved in getting an investor to transfer his 
capital funds from one asset into a n o t h e r . 36
The varying degrees of influence noted in responses 
in the survey would tend to support Brown's view. Eighty- 
four percent indicated that tax considerations had exerted 
some influence on their decisions, and 36 percent considered 
it a primary reason for not selling their appreciated se­
curities. A total of 17 percent indicated they were prevented 
from selling currently appreciated securities by the capital 
gains tax. This variation is not surprising in view of the 
many factors that may affect each investment decision. Tax 
consequences are important and should be considered by an 
investor; however, there are other variables involved in 
investment decisions.
Several conclusions may be summarized from the re­
sults of the survey with regard to the lock-in effect of 
the capital gains tax.
(1) Each of the three primary areas of the capital 
gains tax considered, created some degree of lock-in for 
the respondents, and the combined effects were substantial.
^^Brown, Federal Tax Policv. p. 368.
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(2) The majority of respondents considered the tax 
aspects of their investment decisions and were influenced 
by tax considerations.
(3 ) Tax considerations were generally more influ­
ential on respondents with higher incomes than those with 
lower incomes.
(4-) Older investors were subject to particularly 
strong lock-in effects from the tax on capital gains.
These observations support the central hypothesis of 
the study that federal income tax implications do influence 
investors to hold appreciated securities that might other­
wise be sold. The conclusion derived from the survey re­
garding the hypothesis is that, for a substantial number of 
the respondents, a lock-in effect is created by the capital 
gains tax, and that the lock-in influence is significant.
CHAPTER VI
ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS FOR ALLEVIATION OF 
THE LOCK-IN EFFECTS OF THE TAXATION 
OF CAPITAL GAINS
A number of recommendations have been proposed to 
alleviate or eliminate the lock-in effects allegedly created 
by provisions of federal income taxation relating to capital 
gains. Some of the more important proposals are examined 
briefly in this chapter in order to evaluate their effective­
ness in reducing investor lock-in.
This investigation of lock-in has been based pri­
marily on the laws of federal income taxation as they
existed prior to the 1969 tax reform. The Tax Reform Act of
1969 produced some changes in the treatment of capital gains
and losses. An explanation of the modifications contained 
in the tax reform and an evaluation of their effects on 
investor lock-in are also presented in this chapter.
The Accrual Proposal
According to the accretion concept of income, 
changes in the value of capital assets, whether unrealized 
or realized, represent income to the taxpayer. Based on
12^
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this concept, proponents of accrual taxation contend that 
changes in the value of capital assets should be included in 
income and taxed as they occur.
One proposed method of taxing capital gains and 
losses on an accrual basis involves an annual valuation of 
assets and computation of income, a final valuation of 
assets and computation of income at the time of death of a 
taxpayer, and full taxation of changes in capital asset 
values as ordinary income. This method would represent a 
departure from the present realization criteria; however, 
one result would be the elimination of the main areas of 
investor lock-in. There would be no need for a holding 
period, since ordinary income and capital gains would re­
ceive equal treatment, and holding period lock-in would be 
eliminated. All capital gains and losses, realized and un­
realized, would be included in income annually, so there 
would be no tax advantage or disadvantage to be derived from 
holding or selling a capital asset. Thus, tax considera­
tions would no longer provide an impediment to transfers of 
capital assets. A final computation of income would be made 
at the time of a taxpayer's death, and any appreciation 
since the last annual reporting of income would be taxed.
The elderly investor would not be encouraged, by tax con­
siderations, to hold his appreciated assets, since the tax 
could not be avoided at death. Consequently, the accrual 
proposal would eliminate all major lock-in effects of the
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present capital gains tax and would allow greater mobility 
of capital.
A major disadvantage of the accrual proposal is that 
annual valuation of assets would be required. Valuation 
would produce compliance and enforcement problems, par­
ticularly for unlisted securities, real estate, small 
businesses, and other assets requiring appraisals or esti­
mates of value.
Another disadvantage of accrual taxation would be 
the problem of liquidity. Some taxpayers, lacking cash to 
pay taxes on their accrued gains, might be forced to liqui­
date holdings of assets in order to pay the income taxes.^
The Rollover Proposal
Another recommended alternative for reducing the 
lock-in effects of capital gains taxation is based on the 
"rollover" concept. The proposal is basically a modifica­
tion of the realization criteria. Rollover treatment is 
currently provided for certain transactions involving a
p
taxpayer’s personal residence.
Under the rollover proposal, capital gains would be 
included in taxable income, if proceeds from the sale of a 
capital asset were not reinvested in other capital assets.
^One formal proposal for taxation of capital gains 
and losses on an accrual basis was presented by Martin David 
in Tax Reform 1969.
^Internal Revenue Code, Section 103^*
127
If the proceeds were reinvested, any gain from the sale of 
a capital asset would not be recognized for tax purposes 
but would reduce the basis of the asset obtained. In this 
manner, recognition of a capital gain for tax purposes would 
be postponed until the sale of an appreciated asset occurred, 
without reinvestment of the proceeds. The postponement 
would be similar to an interest-free loan from the federal 
government in the amount of the deferred tax.
The primary difference between the present tax struc­
ture and the rollover proposal is the treatment of exchanges 
involving capital assets. The rollover concept provides no 
criteria for taxation at death, although most proposals for 
rollover include recognition of any unrealized appreciation 
at the time of death. If such unrealized gains were not 
taxed at death, the tax could be postponed for an indefinite 
period of time through succeeding generations of taxpayers, 
and it is likely that only a small percentage of total 
capital appreciation would ever be taxed. If constructive 
realization were adopted with rollover provisions, lock-in 
from the avoidance at death provisions would be eliminated.
Another aspect of investor lock-in that would be af­
fected by the rollover proposal is the influence of a tax 
on realization. An investor would be influenced not to 
realize gains on appreciated assets if he did not expect to 
reinvest the proceeds. Such gains would be recognized and 
taxed. Rollover would, however, allow a taxpayer to ignore
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the income tax on realization of gains in his investment 
decisions involving the sale of a capital asset and rein­
vestment of the proceeds. Rollover would, consequently, 
reduce the lock-in effects of the tax on those persons de­
siring to switch capital assets and would increase the 
mobility of capital in this r e s p e c t .3
Modifications of the Holding 
Period Requirement
Most authorities agree that the present tax struc­
ture influences many investors to postpone realization of 
gain on their appreciated capital assets, until the six
months holding period has elapsed. As a result, many people 
have suggested reduction or elimination of the six months 
holding period.
Elimination or Reduction in the Length of 
the Holding Period Requirement
Obviously, if the holding period requirements did 
not exist, lock-in effects of the holding period would be 
eliminated. A primary purpose of the six months holding 
period is to distinguish between investment activity and 
speculative activity. Regardless of the effectiveness of 
this rather crude method of distinction, many persons feel 
it would be unacceptable to eliminate the holding period re­
quirement. Securities that are purchased and sold for
detailed rollover proposal may be found in Clark, 
Tax Revision Compendium, pp. 12U-3-56.
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short-term profits are similar to items of inventory that 
are specifically excluded from the definition of a capital 
asset.
Reducing the length of the holding period require­
ment, to three months for example, would probably exert op­
posing forces on the significance of holding period lock-in. 
Long-term capital gain status would be reached sooner, re­
ducing the number of investors affected at any point in 
time and the length of time that any particular investment 
would be affected. On the other hand, the strength of lock- 
in on an investor with a potential short-term capital gain 
would probably be greater because the waiting period neces­
sary to attain long-term status would be shorter. In addi­
tion, some persons who would not be willing to wait six 
months might be willing to postpone a sale for the shorter 
period to achieve tax savings.
Thus, it is likely that reducing the length of the 
holding period requirement would decrease the overall effects 
of holding period lock-in, but the strength of the inducement 
to wait until the holding period had elapsed to realize a 
capital gain probably would be increased.
Multiple Holding Periods
Another alternative proposal, incorporating a system 
of several holding periods, probably would reduce the 
severity of holding period lock-in. Under the present law, 
a taxpayer may exclude 50 percent of a gain realized on a
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capital asset held for more than six months. Therefore, he 
may reduce his tax bill on such gains by 50 percent or more, 
by postponing realization until the six months holding 
period has elapsed. One purpose of multiple holding periods 
is to reduce the intra-period differentials in effective tax 
rates on capital gains. The proposal would be designed so 
the amount of gain deductible from income would vary with 
the length of time an asset had been held. The actual per­
centage deduction would be determined by normal legislative 
process; however, the percent of gain that could be excluded 
from tax would increase with time.
For example, a taxpayer might be allowed to deduct 10 
percent of a capital gain for each six month period of time 
the asset had been held, up to a maximum of 50 percent. If a 
taxpayer has a potential tax bill of #5,000 on a short-term 
capital gain under the present law, he may reduce this to 
#2,500 by postponing realization until six months have 
elapsed. This allows a substantial tax savings and provides 
a strong incentive to postpone the sale.
With the multiple holding period structure, the 
taxpayer could save only $500 by holding the asset an ad­
ditional six months. He would have to hold an asset for two 
and one-half years to achieve the maximum 50 percent de­
duction.
The proposal would exert opposing forces on in­
vestors. The incentive to postpone realization for an
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additional period would probably be reduced because of the 
smaller savings that would result. Nevertheless, even the 
smaller savings might encourage some people to continue to 
hold their appreciated assets. In addition, any degree of 
lock-in that existed would affect a taxpayer for a longer 
period of time. Presently, a taxpayer may be locked-in for 
a maximum of six months; however, in the example two and 
one-half years would be required for the taxpayer to com­
pletely escape the holding period lock-in. In summary, the 
expected result of multiple holding periods would be a re­
duction in the strength of holding period lock-in on an 
investor, but an increase in the duration of the influence.^
Modifications of Provisions Concerning 
Transfers at Death
The provisions allowing complete avoidance at death 
of income tax on capital appreciation are considered by au­
thorities to produce the strongest lock-in effect of any 
aspect of the capital gains tax. Complete avoidance is 
possible because unrealized appreciation is not recognized 
at the time of a taxpayer's death, and a step-up in basis, 
to the fair market value at the time of death or alternative 
estate valuation date, is provided for a person acquiring a 
capital asset from a decedent.
Federal income tax laws contained multiple hold­
ing period provisions from 193*+ to 1942; however, differences 
in the length of periods and the rates make comparison dif­
ficult.
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Constructive Realization 
One proposed solution to the lock-in problem 
resulting from the avoidance at death provisions is the 
taxation of any unrealized gains at the time of a taxpayer's 
death. This is referred to as presumptive or constructive 
realization. Unlike present provisions, constructive 
realization would insure that all capital gains on assets 
held by a taxpayer and not transferred by inter vivos gift 
would be taxed during, or at the end of his life. Payment 
of taxes could be deferred but only for a taxpayer's life­
time. Tax deferral would be similar to an interest-free 
loan in the amount of the tax. Nevertheless, the possibility 
of complete avoidance and the resulting investor lock-in 
would be eliminated.
Carryover of Basis 
Provision for carryover of basis is an alternative 
proposal for reducing lock-in from the avoidance of income 
taxation at death option. This alternative would provide 
similar treatment of assets transferred by bequest, as is 
presently afforded transfers by gift. A person acquiring 
an asset from a decedent would use the decedent's basis to 
determine the amount of gain or loss from the sale of the 
asset. The step-up in basis provisions of the current law 
would be eliminated, although realization and payment of 
income taxes could be postponed indefinitely. An elderly
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taxpayer might also experience some additional lock-in from 
the proposal, if he were in a higher tax bracket than the 
person expected to receive the asset when the taxpayer died. 
Some tax advantage could be gained by holding the asset 
until death and allowing the heir to realize the gain at 
his lower marginal tax rates.
Reductions in the Effective Capital 
Gains Tax Rates
The magnitude of the effective rates applicable to 
capital gains affects the degree of lock-in created by the 
capital gains tax. Obviously, if a gain from realization of 
a capital asset were not taxed, there would be no lock-in 
effect. Most authorities agree that complete exclusion of 
capital gains from income taxation is unacceptable because 
of the resulting inequities among taxpayers.
Reductions in income tax rates applicable to capital 
gains could be achieved by increasing the deduction for 
long-term capital gains or lowering the rates applicable to 
such gains. Other proposals for reducing the effective 
progressivity of the present income tax rates involve aver­
aging or proration devices. Regardless of the method used, 
reducing the effective income tax rates applicable to capital 
gains would probably decrease the strength of investor 
lock-in. As previously noted, the results of the Harris' 
poll of investors indicated that substantial increases in
13^
realizations of capital gains would result from relatively 
small reductions in the tax rate.^
The Tax Reform Act of 1969&
The tax reforms enacted in 1969 represented a very 
broad revision of the federal income tax laws. The reforms 
were not specifically designed to influence the lock-in 
effects of capital gains taxation, and, in fact, included 
very few modifications of the provisions pertaining to 
capital gains and losses. The reforms are discussed in this 
chapter for the purpose of reviewing the changes in tax­
ation of capital gains and losses and evaluating the effects 
of the changes on investor lock-in.
The Alternative Tax Computation 
The alternative tax computation was modified for tax­
able years beginning after 1969. An individual may still 
deduct one-half of the excess of his net long-term capital 
gains over his net short-term capital losses in computing 
adjusted gross income. (The Tax Reform Act refers to the 
excess as "net section 1201 gains.") The old law, however, 
limited the tax on the excess of net long-term capital gains 
over net short-term capital losses to a maximum of 25 per­
cent of the realized gain. The general effect of the new
^Effects of Reduced Capital Gains. Tax, pp. 3-5*
^The explanations of the 1969 Tax Reform were based 
on Tax Reform Act of 1969 (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 
Inc.), 1970.
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alternative computation is to limit the tax to 25 percent 
on $ 50,000 only ($25,000 for a married taxpayer filing a 
separate return) of net section 1201 gains. The maximum 
effective tax rate applicable to net section 1201 gains in 
excess of $50,000 a year is raised 29-5 percent for taxable 
years beginning in 1970 and 32.5 percent for taxable years 
beginning in 1971* Thereafter, net section 1201 gains in 
excess of $50,000 will be taxed at one-half the taxpayer’s 
marginal tax rate for ordinary income (a maximum of 35 per­
cent ).
Several observations may be made about the new 
alternative tax computation.
(1) The old and new alternative tax computations 
are generally not relevant to taxpayers in 
tax brackets of 50 percent or less, so the 
revision affects primarily high-income tax­
payers (over $44,000, if married and filing a 
joint return).
(2) The maximum tax on $50,000 or less of net 
section 1201 gains remains at 25 percent of the 
gain. Thus, the revised alternate tax compu­
tation would affect only persons with more than 
$50,000 of such gains in a taxable year.
(3 ) The maximum tax on any net section 1201 gains 
in excess of $ 50,000 is increased to 29.5 per­
cent in 1970, 32.5 percent in 1971, and
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35 percent thereafter. The maximum increase 
in effective rates is 10 percent.
The revision will affect a relatively small fraction 
of all taxpayers (those with high incomes) reporting capital 
gains or losses. The latest year for which detailed in­
formation on sales of capital assets is available is 1962.
In that year only about 89,000 of the nearly six million 
individual taxpayers reporting a gain or loss on capital 
assets found the alternative tax computation (limiting the 
tax to 25 percent of the gain) advantageous.^
The revised alternative tax computation would allow 
persons in tax brackets greater than 50 percent to minimize 
their taxes by limiting realization of net section 1201 
gains to $50,000 annually. The possible tax savings could 
range up to a maximum of 10 percent of the gain after 1971* 
As an example of the maximum savings, consider a 
married taxpayer, with $200,000 of taxable income each year. 
In 1972, he considers the sale of stock that has appreciated 
$100,000 since acquisition in 1970.
^U.S. Treasury Department, Sales of Capital Assets 
Reported on Individual Income Tax Returns— 1962 
(Washington, B.C.; U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962),
p. 6.
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If the taxpayer realized the entire gain in 
one year, his income taxes would he:
1972 1973 Total
$140,980 $110,980 $251,960
If the taxpayer realizes one-half the gain 
in each of two years, his income taxes 
would be:
1 972 1 973
$123,486 $123,486 246,960
Tax savings from postponing $50,000
of the gain: $ 5,000
Tax savings for other amounts of income and capital gains 
would vary with the particular amounts involved; however, 
the savings would range from zero to 10 percent.
Any comparison of changes in the degree of lock-in
from the old and new laws is applicable only to the high- 
income taxpayer and to his net section 1201 gains in excess 
of $50,000. This income would be subject to the increased 
effective tax rates. The increased effective rates would 
provide a greater incentive for a taxpayer to postpone 
realization of capital gains. The revision of the alterna­
tive tax computation will have no effect on lock-in for a 
large number of investors with appreciated capital assets. 
It will also have no direct affect on holding period lock- 
in or lock-in from avoidance at death provisions.
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The Minimum Tax 
The 1969 tax reform provided for a new method of 
taxing, the minimum tax, that is imposed on certain items 
receiving some form of preferential treatment under the 
income tax laws. Capital gains, specifically the 50 percent 
of net section 1201 gains that may be deducted from income, 
are among the preference items. Others include stock op­
tions, accelerated depreciation, and depletion.
The effect of the minimum tax is to impose, subject 
to certain limitations, an additional 10 percent tax on 
preference items. The tax is applied to the total of the 
preference items, less the total of (1) a $30,000 exemption 
($15,000 for a married taxpayer filing a separate return) 
and (2) the amount of income taxes imposed for the year.
The minimum tax, like the new alternative tax 
computation, will probably be a consideration for only a 
few investors. A taxpayer, with no other preference items, 
could realize $60,000 worth of net section 1201 gains an­
nually, plus an amount equal to his income tax for the year 
without being subject to the provision. For taxpayers 
subject to the minimum tax, the effect is to increase the 
effective rate applicable to net section 1201 gains by five 
percent. The minimum tax, by raising the effective tax 
rates for certain taxpayers, provides an additional incen­
tive for these investors to postpone realization of capital 
gains.
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Income Averaging
Under the old laws, capital gains were not subject 
to the income averaging provisions. The reform act modifies 
the income averaging provisions and allows a taxpayer to 
include his net section 1201 gains in his averageable income. 
Income averaging allows a taxpayer with "bunched income" to 
obtain relief. As previously mentioned, the progressive 
rates of the income tax may place a heavier tax burden on 
fluctuating or bunched incomes than steady incomes.
An individual may qualify to use the averaging pro­
visions, if his taxable income for the current year exceeds 
his "nonaverageable income" (120 percent of his average 
taxable income for the four preceding years plus $3,000).
For example, the average taxable income of a tax­
payer with adjusted taxable incomes of $12,000, $9,000, 
$11,000, and $8,000 in the four preceding years would be 
$10,000. His nonaverageable income for the current year 
would be 120 percent of this ($12,000) plus $3,000, or 
$15,000.
The excess of taxable income in a year over the 
nonaverageable income is the taxpayer’s "averageable income." 
The averaging period is five years, and the averageable in­
come is taxed as if it had been received in equal amounts 
over the five-year period. The amount of income tax li­
ability is the tax on the nonaverageable income plus five 
times the tax applicable to one-fifth of the averageable
lU-0
income. The result of income averaging is a reduction of 
the progressivity of effective tax rates and thus a reduc­
tion in the amount of taxes that must be paid on bunched 
income. If income averaging is elected, however, the al­
ternative tax computation is not allowed.
The overall effect on investor lock-in of includ­
ing net section 1201 gains in the averaging computations is 
difficult to predict. Certainly the provision will allow 
some taxpayers to realize rather substantial capital gains 
and pay less tax than they would have paid under the old 
provisions. This would tend to lessen lock-in effects due 
to the capital gains tax rate. Nevertheless, each indi­
vidual situation must be evaluated, and the advantages of 
averaging are especially clear for medium-sized gains of 
low and middle income taxpayers. Perhaps many taxpayers, 
with only small amounts of gain to be realized, would not 
have enough bunched income to qualify for income averaging. 
Also, the implications of the revised alternative tax com­
putations and the minimum tax must be considered by tax­
payers contemplating very large realizations.
In the final analysis, the revised income averaging 
provisions will probably reduce the income taxes that must 
be paid on realization of some capital gains and reduce the 
lock-in effects of the capital gains tax for some taxpayers. 
Generalizations are difficult, however, because of the
1^ -1
importance of the specific circumstances of each individual 
taxpayer.
Capital Loss Offsets
The provisions for capital losses, discussed in 
Chapter II, were modified by the 1969 tax reform. The 
change of primary interest provides more parallel treatment 
for capital gains and losses than the old provisions. Under 
the old laws any excess of capital losses over capital gains 
for a year was used to reduce other taxable income, up to a 
maximum of $1 ,000, for individuals. Under the new law, 
long-term capital losses may still be offset in full against 
capital gains, but only half of any excess may be deducted 
from ordinary income. The maximum amount of reduction in 
ordinary income by capital loss deductions remains $1,000; 
however, $2,000 of long-term capital losses would be required 
to achieve this reduction.
In effect, long-term capital losses will be more 
valuable to a taxpayer, if offset against capital gains, 
than if used to reduce ordinary income. A taxpayer will 
probably consider this when he is contemplating realization 
of a long-term capital loss. If he does not expect to have 
any capital gains in the taxable year, he may benefit by 
postponing realization of a long-term capital loss until a 
later year when capital gains are expected. The reform will 
probably increase the lock-in of taxpayers who were
^k2
considering the sale of a capital asset at a loss and who 
expect to have no capital gains in a given tax year.
If the taxpayer did not desire to, or could not 
postpone the realization of the long-term capital loss, then 
he might be influenced to realize a capital gain to obtain 
the full value of the loss offset. Therefore, the modi­
fication of the treatment of long-term capital losses might 
result in some minor "anti-lock-in" effects.
Summary of the Effects of the Tax Reform
The sections of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 that con­
cern capital gains are likely to produce little change in 
investor lock-in from the capital gains tax. Since the 
holding period requirement and the treatment of transfers 
at death are not changed, the tax reform will not directly 
affect investor lock-in from these areas. The effects of 
the reform on lock-in from the capital gains tax rate are 
uncertain. The minimum tax and the alternative tax compu­
tation, by increasing the effective rate on long-term 
capital gains of certain high-income taxpayers, should in­
crease lock-in from the capital gains tax rate on these 
persons.
The reforms complicate the calculation of tax con­
sequences from a sale of an appreciated capital asset, 
particularly for high-income individuals. The changes in 
the procedure for capital loss offsets will probably in­
crease lock-in for taxpayers with unrealized capital
1^3
losses, who do not expect to have capital gains in a taxable 
year. The modification of the averaging provisions should, 
by reducing the effective progressivity of tax rates for 
some taxpayers, reduce the lock-in effects of the capital 
gains tax rate on these persons.
The evaluation of the effects of the tax reform on 
investor lock-in must be regarded as speculation about how 
a "rational" investor may react to the revisions. The pro­
visions of the tax reform will probably result in only 
moderate changes in effective rates of a few taxpayers. It 
is not certain that investors react to moderate changes in • 
tax rates.
Included in this chapter are brief evaluations of 
the effectiveness of various tax reform proposals in al­
leviating or eliminating the lock-in effects of the capital 
gains tax. An explanation of the major changes in the 
treatment of capital gains and losses caused by the Tax 
Reform Act of 1969 and its probable effects of investor 
lock-in is also presented.
CHAPTER VII 
PROPOSED RECOMMENDATIONS FOR TAX REFORM
This chapter contains recommendations for reform of 
the federal income tax laws concerning capital gains and 
losses. As discussed in previous sections, there is dis­
agreement among authorities concerning the principles of 
taxation, the nature of capital gains and losses, and the 
significance of the lock-in effects of capital gains tax­
ation. Because of this disagreement, it is unlikely that 
any proposal for revision of the capital gains tax will re­
ceive complete acceptance or agreement. Each proposal 
probably reflects the opinions and biases of its advocate, 
and the proposal contained in this chapter may be subject 
to the same criticism.
Assumptions
The basis of our present system of federal income 
taxation is retained in the structure of the proposed re­
form. Among the tenets of the present system of income 
taxation included in the proposal are that:
(1) ability-to-pay is an acceptable basis for 
taxation,
14^-
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(2) income of a taxpayer is a proper measure of his 
ability-to-pay,
(3) present, progressive income tax rates are in 
conformity with society's concept of vertical 
equity,
(•+) realization of income creates taxpaying ability; 
therefore, income should be recognized, for tax 
purposes, at the point of realization, and
(5) realized capital gains do create taxpaying 
ability.
It is possible that these concepts cannot be combined 
to create an optimal tax system for capital gains and losses 
or that other concepts may produce a more satisfactory 
system. The assumptions have, however, provided the founda­
tion for our system of federal income taxation for many years, 
and on this basis they may be said to be acceptable to our 
society.
The following proposal is structured to conform to 
the principles of taxation, to be practicable, and to allow 
for politically and socially acceptable modifications. The 
basic proposal includes one major deviation from our cur­
rent system. In the proposal, capital gains and losses are 
considered income to the taxpayer and are taxed in the same 
manner as ordinary income. Full taxation of capital gains 
and losses is not an essential element of the recommended 
reform, and a provision for possible modification of the
1^6
treatment is presented in the section containing a modified 
proposal.
Basic Proposal
The recommended method for taxation of income, in­
cluding full taxation of capital gains and losses, is based 
on a cumulative averaging technique developed by William 
Vickrey over thirty years ago. A detailed description of 
the technique may be found in Vickrey's book. Agenda for 
Progressive Taxation, and in an article by him in the June, 
1939, Journal of Political Economv. Much of the following 
discussion of the cumulative averaging technique is taken 
from these sources.
Vickrey felt that preferential treatment for capital
gains was provided to relieve the bunching of income problem
and to compromise with those who argue that capital gains are
not income. Nevertheless, in his opinion,
. . . the relief thus granted is capricious in its 
incidence, probably excessive in most cases, and 
opens considerable loopholes for tax avoidance."'
Vickrey noted the many opportunities for manipulation 
of income and avoidance of income taxes created by the arbi­
trary realization criteria. Various provisions of the laws 
designed to prevent this manipulation and avoidance add con­
siderable complexity to the tax laws and, in his opinion, are 
largely ineffective.
^William Vickrey, "Averaging of Income," p. 380.
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The realization criteria may conflict with the 
equity principle of ability-to-pay, and as expressed by 
Vickrey,
It is an obvious extension of the principle of 
taxation according to ability to pay that no taxpayer 
should bear a heavier or lighter burden merely because 
certain items of his income happen to be earned or 
realized in one year or another, regardless of whether 
this be by chance or by design of the taxpayer and 
regardless of any fluctuations in the needs of the 
government for revenue or the rates of tax in effect 
at various times.2
According to Vickrey, a system of income taxation 
should conform to this principle and, in order to be prac­
ticable and equitable, should meet the following criteria:
1. The discounted value of the series of tax pay­
ments made by any taxpayer should be independent 
of the way in which his income is allocated to 
the various income years.
2. The revenue for any given year should be capable 
of being raised or lowered by suitable modifica­
tions of the rates without too long notice.
3. If the taxpayer leaves the jurisdiction at any 
time, there should be no accumulations of un­
taxed income left behind and no tax due except 
possibly the regular tax for the last year. . . .
Any given tax payment should not be too large in 
relation to the income of the period immediately 
preceding.
5- Transition to and from other methods of assess­
ing income tax should be simple.
6. The method of computing the tax should not be 
beyond the ordinary taxpayer's capacity.
7. The administrative burden should not be exces­
sive.3
Vickrey discussed an advantage of postponing tax 
payments and proposed an imputation of interest to eliminate
^Ibid., p. 381. 
3lbid., p. 382.
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the value of tax deferral. He assumes two taxpayers, A and
B, in the same tax status, with equal capital and rates of
return, and identical earnings for a taxable period. Their
expenditures are identical, except that A pays taxes on his
income during the period, and B postpones payment of taxes
until the end of the period. Vickrey explained,
B's total income for the period will then exceed A's 
total income by the compound interest on the amounts 
which A paid as installments on his income tax but 
which B avoided paying and so was able to invest.
If, then, to A's total income is added the compound
interest on the taxes which A has paid from the time 
they were paid to the end of the period, an amount 
which will be called the "adjusted total income" is 
obtained which is the income A would have had if he 
had paid no taxes during the period. It may readily 
be seen that this adjusted total income will remain 
the same for any given taxpayer, regardless of any 
changes that may occur in the allocation of the 
realization of his income to the various years within 
the averaging period.^
The adjusted total income may be accumulated for a 
taxpayer's income-producing lifetime (perhaps from age 21 to 
death), and this would be the basis for computing the tax 
liability. Algebraically, the adjusted total income would 
be:
ïn = ïn-1 + r (Y^.,) + 
where:
= annual income for year n 
Tn(Yn) = the tax function for the cumulative income in 
year n
^ I b i d . . pp . 382-383.
1^9
r = the rate of return available to a taxpayer and 
the imputed interest rate.^
The tax liability on this cumulative, adjusted total 
income should be determined so that the present value of 
tax payments is the same regardless of the pattern of 
realization of income. The tax liability is computed as if 
the accumulated adjusted total income had been received in 
equal amounts annually, thereby averaging the income. The 
taxpayer is credited with the amount of taxes previously 
paid and the imputed interest that could have been earned 
on the amount if it had not been paid. Algebraically, the 
"adjusted tax payments" (T*) would be:
T* = (1 + r) Tn_i (Ya_i)
The "taxes due" are equal to the amount of the income tax 
liability computed for adjusted total income less the ad­
justed tax payments. Algebraically, the taxes due (t^ )^ are:
tn = Tn ' T*
Computational Simplicity of the Proposal 
Although the cumulative averaging technique is 
rather complicated to explain, one of its advantages is 
simplicity of computation and administration. The present 
averaging technique requires information from tax returns
^The formulas describing the cumulative averaging 
technique are found in Martin David, Alternative Approaches 
to Capital Gains Taxation (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1968), p. 186.
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of the four preceding years, knowledge of a number of 
specific rules for determination of qualification for aver­
aging, and the completion of a separate, rather complicated 
form. In the words of Martin David, "The present averaging 
form is incomprehensible to most taxpayers."^
On the other hand, calculation of tax liability 
using a cumulative averaging technique is relatively simple, 
Many of the computations may be built into tax tables 
similar to those presently used. One possible form, sug­
gested by Vickrey, would require only seven lines for 
computation of the tax liability. A taxpayer would need 
to refer only to his previous year's tax return for two 
items of information. As stated by Vickrey,
At first sight this method of determining the 
annual payments to be made by the taxpayer may seem 
hopelessly complex; it is possible, however, by con­
structing special tables and carrying figures forward 
from previous returns, so to arrange the computation 
that the actual work required of the taxpayer will be 
considerably less than that at present required of 
taxpayers having capital gains and losses.7
A different tax table would be required for each 
additional year of a taxpayer's productive life. The 
Treasury Department could easily provide the appropriate 
table with a taxpayer's Form lOU-O each year. An example of 
the computation of a tax table was included in Vickrey's 
article.
^Ibid.. p. 165.
^Vickrey, "Averaging of Income," p. 38^.
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The following is a sample of such a table for 
taxpayers averaging over two years. The rates taken 
are the surtax rates of the revenue act of 1936 for 
both years, with interest at 5 percent.
Adjusted 
Total 
Income 
(Dollars)
Total 
Present Value 
of Tax 
(Dollars)
Rate of Tax 
on Excess 
within Next 
Bracket'"(Per Cent)
0 0 0.0000
8,000 0 4.0959
12,004 164 5.1186
16,009 369 6.1408
20,015 615 7.1625
24,022 902 8.1836
28,030 1,230 9.2043
32,039 1,599 11.2441
36,050 2,050 13.2818
40,063 2,583 15.3176
• • • • • •
The figures given in the table are computed as 
follows: A taxpayer with a steady annual income
(after exemptions) of $12,000 pays a surtax each 
year, under the present law, of $440. Interest on 
the first year's tax at 5 per cent is $22. This 
$22, added to the total income for the two-year 
period of $2^+,000, gives the adjusted total income 
of $2l+,022 given in the first column. The total 
present value of the tax is $*+lfO + $440 + $22 =
$902. The next higher level of income in the 
present tables is $14,000, giving similarly an 
adjusted total income of $28,030 and a total present 
value of tax of $1,230; thus, the size of the total 
adjusted income bracket is $4,008, and the tax on 
this bracket is $1,230 - $902, or $328. The rate of 
tax on this bracket is therefore $328 + $4,008, or 
8.1836 per cent.°
8I b i d . . pp. 3 8 4 -3 8 5 *
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Using such a table furnished by the Treasury De­
partment, the computation of taxes might be accomplished as 
follows :
The required computations might be set as follows 
on the income-tax return.
1. Net income this year (after exemptions)..$1 8,500.00
2 . Adjusted total income as of previous 
year (copied from item 5 of previous
year’s return)............................  9 ,200.00
3. Total value of income taxes paid as of 
previous year (copied from item 6 of
previous year’s return)..................  252.00
If. Interest for past year on taxes paid
(5 per cent of item 3 ).................... 12.60
(The rate of interest may be varied 
from year to year by the Treasury in 
accordance with current economic 
conditions. The rate of interest must, 
of course, be the same as that used in 
the computation of the surtax tables.)
5- Adjusted total income (sum of items 1,
2, and 4).................................. 27,712.60
6 . Present value of tax on item 5
(computed from surtax table).............  1,20^.02
7. Present value of past income taxes
paid (sum of items 3 and ^)..............  264^60
8 . Tax due (item 6 minus item 7)............  939*^2
The figures given are for the 1938 return of a 
taxpayer who is averaging over the two years 1937- 
38, having a net income, after exemptions, of 
#9,200 in 1937 and $18,500 in 1938. For the first 
year, items 2 , 3 , and 4 are zero, so that item 5 
for the first year is simply the income of that 
year, and so appears unaltered in item 2 above.
Item 6 is calculated as follows : The largest
amount in the first column of the surtax table not 
greater than item 5 is $24,022.00, the excess 
being $3,690.60. The tax on the first $24,022.00 
is given in the second column, $902.00; the tax 
on the excess at the rate given in the third 
column, 8.1836 per cent, is $302.02, a total of 
$1,204.02. Except for the unrounded figures, this 
computation is precisely the same as that now 
required in computing surtax.9
^Ibid.. pp. 385-386.
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Reduction of Timing Advantages 
and Disadvantages
This method of tax imposition and computation con­
tains other distinct advantages over the present system.
The adjusted total income and the amount of taxes paid by
taxpayers with equal earning assets will be the same, re­
gardless of the timing of recognition of income. The 
technique allows retention of the realization criteria but 
negates tax advantages or disadvantages that may result from 
differences in the timing of receipt of income or recogni­
tion of gains or losses. As stated by Shoup,
The greatest advantage of this cumulative aver­
aging system is that it would make it a matter of
indifference to the taxpayer whether he reported
any particular item of income in an earlier year or 
a later year. He would gain nothing by delaying the 
realization of income, and would lose nothing by 
reporting it earlier . . .10
In effect, the cumulative averaging system charges 
interest on money retained by a taxpayer through deferral of 
tax payments. Martin David suggested that the rate of 
interest imputation should be the market rate for prime 
commercial paper or broker's loans.  ^^ The value of tax de­
ferral is eliminated, if the imputed rate of interest is 
equal to the earnings rate of a taxpayer's investments. If 
the earnings rate of a taxpayer's investments is greater 
than the interest rate, the effect is similar to a loan in
1QTax Reform. 1969. pp. ^266-67.
1 1David, Alternative Approaches, p. 187*
15^
the amount of the deferred taxes. Interest is imputed at 
the lower interest rate, and the investment earns at the 
higher earnings rate. Consequently, a taxpayer may still 
profit by deferring tax payments, if the earnings rate of 
his investments is greater than the interest rate; however, 
the advantage is greatly reduced compared to present tax de­
ferral advantages. On the other hand, a taxpayer with in­
vestments earning at a rate lower than the interest rate 
would pay more for the use of deferred tax money than he 
would earn on it. If a purpose of our capital market 
system is to direct funds to enterprises with higher earn­
ings rates and away from enterprises with lower earnings 
rates, these results would be desirable.
Constructive Realization at Death 
Averaging periods may be any length, but it might be 
logical to extend the averaging period from age 21 until the 
taxpayer's death. Constructive realization at death of 
capital gains and losses would be appropriate to provide a 
final accounting of all income and to prevent the shifting 
of income outside the averaging period. Constructive reali­
zation would create no great valuation problems for many 
estates, since valuation of assets is now required for 
estate taxation. Under constructive realization, valuation 
of assets would also be required of some smaller estates, 
not presently subject to estate taxes.
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There is no present provision for taxation of un­
realized capital gains at death, and the constitutionality 
of such a deviation from the realization criteria has been 
questioned. A number of authorities have concluded, how­
ever, that taxation of unrealized capital gains at death
1 2would be constitutional. Under constructive realization, 
any unrealized gain would be included in a decedent's final 
income tax return and taxed at the death of the taxpayer.
The basis for gain or loss to a person acquiring an asset 
from a decedent would be the fair market value used in the 
final tax return of the deceased.
It has also been argued that constructive realization 
of capital gains would produce liquidity problems for many 
estates. The liquidity problems could be alleviated by 
allowing payment of taxes on unrealized capital gains any 
time within a given time period, for example five years, 
and charging interest on tax payments that are postponed.
Constructive Realization at Time 
of Transfer by Gift
It would probably be desirable to eliminate a major 
area of possible tax avoidance that would remain in the 
cumulative averaging proposal. As is presently the case, 
a taxpayer would be able to shift income and unrealized 
capital gains to another taxpayer by inter vivos gift of
^^Tax Reform. 1969. pp. 4307-^309.
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the asset. A ntimber of authorities contend that this avenue 
for avoidance should be eliminated by integration of the 
gift and estate taxes. Specifically, in this proposal, 
unrealized capital gains and losses on assets transferred by 
gift would be subject to the income tax. A detailed dis­
cussion of the problems of estate and gift taxation is 
beyond the scope of this study;however, taxation of un­
realized capital gains transferred by gift would be a de­
sirable feature of the cumulative averaging proposal.
Definition of a Taxable Entity 
Definition of the appropriate taxable entity and 
changing taxpayer status are related problems that require 
solution before the proposal could be adopted.
It would be possible to tax each individual sep­
arately on his personal income, thereby eliminating problems 
created by marriage, divorce, or other change in taxpayer 
status. Separate return status of all taxpayers would, 
however, involve many opportunities for income manipula­
tions (through inter-family transfers) that would need to 
be eliminated.
Vickrey considered the taxation of an entire family 
as a taxable unit, to be a radical but satisfactory method. 
The income of a family would be apportioned to family members 
"according to proportions fixed by statute," and each member
1 i-*A detailed discussion of estate and gift taxes may 
be found in Carl Shoup, Federal Estate and Gift Taxes.
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would be taxed separately. This method would reduce inter­
family transfer problems and would modify the tax burden of 
a family unit according to its size.”*^
David suggests valuation of assets and constructive 
realization of gains and losses at the time of marriage, 
separation, or divorce. Some adjustments in the tax tables 
would be required to alleviate inequities; however, he con­
cedes, . . i t  would not be possible to make the inter­
ruption [change in status] a matter of indifference in all 
cases. 5
The present averaging provisions contain adjustments
for changes in taxpayer status during the averaging period. 
The rules are rather arbitrary; however, it might be rela­
tively easy to convert them for use in a cumulative averag­
ing system.
Full Taxation of Capital Gains 
As previously discussed, many authorities contend 
that capital gains should not be taxed in the same manner as 
ordinary income. The following is a brief outline of the 
rationale which, if accepted, calls for equal treatment of 
capital gains and losses and ordinary income.
(1) According to the accretion concept of income, 
accepted by many authorities, capital gains are income; and
1 Vickrey, "Averaging of Income," p. 392. 
^^David, Alternative Approaches, p. 189-
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with the addition of the realization criteria, capital 
gains are income, recognized by the accounting profession 
and the present tax system.
(2) Real capital gains improve the real economic 
position of the taxpayer and, when realized, represent tax- 
paying ability.
(3) Illusory capital gains (resulting from changes 
in the price level, market interest rate, or capitaliza­
tion rate) improve the relative economic position of the 
taxpayer. The present federal laws of income taxation are 
concerned with relative economic positions of taxpayers, as 
measured by money rather than real income. In addition, 
there are no special provisions for other problems created 
by price level, interest, or capitalization rate changes.
()+) Capital gains are uncertain in nature; however, 
many elements of ordinary income are also uncertain in vary­
ing degrees. At any rate, once a capital gain has been 
realized, the uncertainty is eliminated and may then be 
taxed.
(5) The disposition of an item should not be a 
criterion for purposes of classifying income elements. An 
item of income should be taxed as income, regardless of 
whether it is consumed or reinvested.
(6) The realization criteria and full taxation of 
capital gains and losses would create a number of problems
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in income taxation; however, the proposal is designed to 
eliminate or alleviate many of these problems.
(7) Various aspects of existing provisions of fed­
eral income tax laws create a lock-in effect on investors. 
Full taxation of capital gains and losses would probably 
increase investor lock-in in the present system; however, 
the proposal is designed to minimize the lock-in effects of 
the capital gains tax.
(8 ) The full taxation of capital gains and losses 
would allow tremendous simplification of the federal income 
tax laws. In addition, it would eliminate much of the time 
and effort spent by taxpayers in avoiding income taxes 
through the capital gains loophole and by the government in 
administrating and enforcing the income tax laws. This con­
sideration has not been discussed in the preceding sections 
and requires additional expansion.
Simplification of the Federal 
Income Tax Laws
The federal laws of income taxation are extremely 
technical and complicated and provisions pertaining to 
capital gains and losses create much of the complexity.
As stated by Stanley S. Surrey,
The income tax provisions of the 195^ Internal 
Revenue Code (most of which are still in effect) 
represent probably the most complex revenue law 
ever enacted in the fiscal history of any country.
The subject singly responsible for the largest
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amount of complexity is the treatment of capital 
gains and losses.16
The proposal presented in this chapter recommends
equal treatment of income from capital assets and ordinary
income. The numerous provisions necessary to define capital
assets, to specify treatment of income from capital assets,
to enumerate exceptions and provide special treatment for
similar items of favored income may be eliminated. Carl S.
Shoup has estimated that 60 to 70 percent of the pages in
the Internal Revenue Code could be eliminated if a proposal
similar to the one recommended in this chapter were
1 7adopted. ’
Martin David has estimated that "compliance costs"
(efforts of accountants, lawyers, taxpayers, and government
enforcement agencies) regarding the capital gains loophole
1 8may be as high as one billion dollars a year. The income 
tax laws would be greatly simplified; and the costs of com­
pliance with, and administration of, these laws should be 
greatly reduced with elimination of special treatment for 
capital gains and losses.
^^Stanley S. Surrey, "Definitional Problems in 
Capital Gains Taxation," Tax Revision Compendium. Compendium 
of Papers on Broadening the Tax Base Submitted to the Com­
mittee on Ways and Means (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1959), p. 1203.
^^Shoup, Tax Reform. 1969. pp. 4266-6?.
^^Martin David, "Economic Effects of the Capital 
Gains Tax," American Economic Review Proceedings. Vol. LIV 
(May, 1964), 208-299.
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Modified Proposal
The preceding recommendation provides for full tax­
ation of capital gains and losses, although our present 
income tax system has afforded special treatment to such 
gains and losses for many years. Our society has accepted 
preferential treatment for capital gains in the income tax 
laws; however, it has not been proven that this preferen- 
tialism provides any greater benefits to the economy than 
full taxation of capital gains. Nevertheless, if preferen­
tial treatment of these gains is desired, the cumulative 
averaging proposal could be implemented with little modi­
fication. Any desired deduction for long-term capital gains 
could be included in arriving at taxable income, as in the 
present system.
Compared to the present income tax system, the modi­
fied cumulative averaging system would greatly reduce the 
value of altering the timing of the recognition of gains and 
losses because of tax considerations. Also, the lock-in 
effects from the avoidance at death provisions would be 
eliminated if constructive realization were retained in the 
modified proposal. The major remaining area of investor 
lock-in would be created by the holding period requirement. 
The holding period could remain at six months; and although 
the resulting lock-in is probably substantial, it is at 
least only temporary for each appreciated security. If a 
multiple holding period requirement, such as that discussed
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in Chapter VI, were adopted, some reduction in strength of 
investor lock-in from the holding period might be achieved.
It appears that a multiple holding period requirement would 
meet the objectives and would provide several advantages 
over the present six months requirement. Therefore, if the 
length of time an asset has been held is to be used in dis­
tinguishing those capital gains deserving preferential 
treatment, a multiple holding period requirement is recom­
mended .
Evaluation of the Proposal's Conformitv 
to the Principles of Taxation
Adequacy of Revenue 
The proposed reform should produce greater revenue 
than the present system of income taxation. The increase 
would result from taxation of the portion of long-term 
capital gains that are now deducted from income, the taxation 
of capital gains that are transferred untaxed at death in 
estates, and from an increase in the amount of gains re­
alized by reducing the lock-in effects of the tax. In fact, 
it would be likely that the increase in revenue would be 
substantial enough to allow considerable reduction in the 
present tax rates, if desired.
Equity
Many authorities argue that the present preferential 
treatment of capital gains violates the horizontal equity
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principle. Horizontal equity requires that taxpayers in 
similar economic circumstances be taxed equally. If capital 
gains are income, and if income is the measure of taxpaying 
capacity, then capital gains should be taxed in the same 
manner as income from other sources. The proposal's treat­
ment of capital gains and losses would seem to meet the 
criteria of horizontal equity.
Neutrality
A common interpretation of the neutrality principle 
is that a tax structure should exert a minimal influence 
on the choices and decisions of taxpayers. The proposal 
would be expected to reduce the lock-in effects of the 
system of taxation and eliminate a major "preference" form 
of income. To this extent, the proposal would conform to 
the principle of neutrality better than the present system.
Simplicity
The principle of simplicity connotes that a tax 
system should be designed to minimize the costs of collec­
tion, administration, and enforcement of income taxation.
As previously noted, the proposal would substantially reduce 
the VO luminosity and complexity of present tax laws, would 
simplify the computation of income taxes for the taxpayer, 
and would reduce administrative effort. The proposal would 
seem to meet the criteria of simplicity better than the 
present system.
16^
Siimmarv
This chapter contains a proposal for revision of the 
federal laws of income taxation concerning the taxation of 
capital gains and losses. The structure of the proposal 
was explained, its advantages and disadvantages were dis­
cussed, and the characteristics of the system were evaluated 
on the basis of conformity to the principles of taxation.
CHAPTER VIII
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
FURTHER RESEARCH
The provisions of federal income tax laws pertaining 
to capital gains and losses have been the subject of con­
siderable controversy and criticism over the years. One 
area of debate and disagreement concerns the existence and 
degree of influence exerted by lock-in effects of capital 
gains taxation on investors. A primary purpose of this 
study was to obtain, from a survey of selected investors, 
empirical evidence of the extent and significance of in­
vestor lock-in from capital gains taxation.
The term lock-in was defined in Chapter 1 as a situ­
ation that exists if a taxpayer is reluctant to dispose of 
a capital asset because of the federal income tax conse­
quences of the disposition. The hypothesis of the study was 
that federal income tax implications do influence investors 
to hold appreciated securities that might otherwise be sold, 
and therefore that lock-in exists.
The scope of the study was limited to individual 
taxpayers and their investments in stocks and bonds.
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Particular attention was directed toward persons employed 
in business or professional occupations with above average 
incomes, because of the economic significance of this group 
as investors.
A review of the relevant provisions of federal laws 
of income taxation was presented in Chapter II. The study 
was concerned with the lock-in effects of the laws as they 
existed prior to the tax reforms enacted in late 1969»
Three aspects of the laws allegedly create major lock-in 
effects on investors: the holding period, the imposition of
a tax on realization of a capital gain, and the provisions 
for complete avoidance of income t'.x by transfer of an ap­
preciated asset through an estate.
Some economic aspects of federal taxation of capital 
gains were discussed in Chapter III. The principles of tax­
ation were briefly explained, and it was noted that prefer­
ential treatment of capital gains conflicts with several of 
these principles. Some of the arguments that have been 
given as justification for preferential treatment of capital 
gains were presented. The arguments are based on considera­
tions that make capital gains doubtful elements of income, 
on technical difficulties of taxing capital gains at the 
point of realization, or on adverse economic consequences of 
taxing capital gains in the present tax structure. The unde­
sirable economic consequences resulting from the lock-in 
effects of capital gains tax were accentuation of stock
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market fluctuations and distortion of the functioning of the 
capital market.
Chapter IV contained a description of the methodology- 
utilized in the survey to obtain information from investors 
concerning the lock-in effects of capital gains taxation.
An evaluation of the extent and significance of in­
vestor lock-in created by each of the areas of the capital 
gains tax was made in Chapter V. The evaluation was based 
on analyses and conclusions of previous researchers and the 
results of the survey. An evaluation of the overall lock-in 
effects of the capital gains tax was then presented. Re­
sults of the investigation supported the hypothesis that 
investor lock-in does exist, and indicated that this 
lock-in may exert a substantial influence on the decisions 
of many investors.
Chapter VI contained a review of recommendations for 
tax reform that have been proposed to reduce or eliminate 
the lock-in effects of capital gains taxation. Modifica­
tions in the treatment of capital gains and losses resulting 
from the tax reform in 1969 were presented, and their prob­
able influence on lock-in effects of the income tax was 
discussed. The following chapter contained a proposal for 
tax reform that appears to provide a more satisfactory 
treatment of capital gains and losses than the present pro­
visions or the alternatives discussed in Chapter VI.
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Recommendations for Further Research 
There is a need for additional research and em­
pirical evidence concerning a number of areas involved in 
the investigation of this project. Among these areas are:
(1) the principles and concepts of taxation,
(2 ) the definition and measurement of income,
(3 ) the economic effects of investor lock-in,
(^) the economic effects of preferential treatment 
of capital gains,
(5) the extent and significance of investor lock-in,
(6 ) the construction of models of investor decision­
making and behavior,
(7 ) the effects of uncertainty on investment 
decision-making, and
(8 ) the various alternative systems of taxation.
Need for additional research and empirical evidence
is not the result of a lack of interest in the subjects but 
is probably due to the intractable nature of these areas. 
Perhaps as the tools of the quantitative and behavioral 
fields of the business and economics disciplines become more 
complete, the problems of measurement and analysis in these 
areas will be reduced.
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APPENDIX A
APPENDIX A 
LIMITATIONS OF THE SCOPE OF THE STUDY
As stated in Chapter I, the scope of this investi­
gation was limited to:
(1) individual taxpayers,
(2) investments in stocks and bonds, and
(3 ) the group surveyed included business and profes­
sional people and a disproportionately large number of high- 
income persons.
The purpose of this appendix is to explain the 
reasons for these constraints on the scope of the study.
Individual Taxravers
Any taxpayer may sustain a capital gain or loss on 
the sale or exchange of a capital asset. The term "tax­
payer" includes many different types of taxable entities. 
According to the Internal Revenue Code of 195^? "The term 
'taxpayer' means any person subject to any internal revenue 
tax."  ^ As defined in the Income Tax Regulations, which 
provide an official interpretation of the Code,
11nternal Revenue Code, Section 7701 (a) (l43.
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The term "person" includes an individual, a corpora­
tion, a partnership, a trust or estate, a joint-stock 
company, an association, or a syndicate, group, pool, 
joint venture, or other unincorporated organization or 
group. Such term also includes a guardian, committee, 
trustee, executor, administrator, trustee in bankruptcy, 
receiver, assignee for the benefit of creditors, con- _ 
servator or any person acting in a fiduciary capacity.
A comprehensive study of such a heterogeneous group 
of taxable entities was not considered to be feasible or 
desirable. The following considerations suggest that indi­
vidual taxpayers are logical and appropriate taxable 
entities for investigation.
(1) From the U.S. Treasury Department's Statistics 
of Income, published annually, it is apparent that indi­
viduals represent the largest number of taxpayers, and this 
group reports the largest number and amount of capital gains
(2) Research on national wealth, discussed in suc­
ceeding sections, indicates that individuals hold a sub­
stantial percentage of all capital assets owned domesti­
cally.
(3) The majority of the literature related to 
lock-in effects of capital gains taxation is related to 
individual investors.
(U-) Most individual taxpayers are subject to the 
same basic provisions of federal income tax laws.
(5) Individuals formulate decisions of other 
taxable entities.
^Regulations 301.7701-1 (a).
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(6) The collective judgments of individuals de­
termine the amount and direction of the flow of savings, in­
fluencing the allocation of resources.
The investigation concentrates on lock-in effects 
of capital gains taxation on individual taxpayers. Never­
theless, it is likely that many of the comments and con­
clusions regarding individuals are applicable to other 
types of taxpayers faced with decisions concerning capital 
assets.
Investments in Stocks and Bonds
The term "capital asset" is not positively defined; 
nor is an exhaustive list of such assets included in the 
Internal Revenue Code of 195^* The types of capital assets, 
about which data is provided in the Treasury Department's 
Statistics of Income--Sales of Capital Assets Reported on 
Individual Income Tax Returns. are corporate stocks, U.S. 
Government obligations, other bonds, notes and debentures, 
insurance and annuities, options to buy or sell, commodities, 
capital gains dividends, share of capital gains or loss from 
partnerships and fiduciaries, capital gains distributions 
from small business corporations, liquidation distributions, 
retirement plan distributions, livestock, timber and coal, 
oil and mineral interests, partnership interests, assets used 
in trade or business, property held for personal use, 
residences, non-business real estate subdivided, farmland
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with unharvested crops, other farmland, prior years' in­
stallment sales, and other type assets.^
Because of the large number and diversity of items 
that may be taxed as capital gains or losses, it seemed 
advisable to again limit the scope of the study.
Securities (specifically stocks and bonds) were 
chosen as appropriate capital assets for investigation for 
the following reasons.
(1) Ownership of securities involves frequent in­
vestment decisions because of the relatively liquid nature 
and ease of transfer of the assets.
(2) .Research on individual wealth indicates that 
stocks and bonds constitute the largest holding of capital 
assets in the personal sector and the largest dollar amount 
in annual sales of capital assets by individuals.
(3) The bulk of the literature on lock-in effects 
of capital gains taxation is concerned with stocks and 
bonds.
(4) Securities are instrumental in financing busi­
ness and government and in allocation of resources. Conse­
quently, stocks and bonds were the capital assets selected 
for investigation in the study. It is likely that a number 
of comments and conclusions regarding securities are appli­
cable to other types of capital assets.
3. . . 1962 Sales of Capital Assets, pp. 12-15*
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The Significance of High-Income Business 
and Professional People
The New York Stock Exchange Research Department 
estimates that 2 6 A  million persons owned shares in publicly 
held corporations as of January 1, 1969* This represents 
approximately one of every six persons in the adult popula­
tion,^ but the illusion of broad stock ownership that may 
result from considering numbers of shareholders is deceptive. 
In fact, there is considerable evidence that a very small 
number of investors owns a substantial amount of the se­
curities held by individuals.
High-Income Persons
Studies of the distribution of income and wealth 
in the United States provide convincing evidence that high- 
income persons, representing only a small percentage of the 
total population, hold a large percentage of the wealth and 
securities owned by individuals.
In his comprehensive investigation of wealth,
Robert J. Lampman found that:
Over 30 per cent of the assets and equities of 
the personal sector of the economy in 1953 are as­
signable to the top wealth-holders who were 1.6 per 
cent of the total adult population that year. The 
top group owned at least 80 per cent of the corporate 
stock . . .  in the personal sector in that year.5
^1969 Fact Book (New York: New York Stock Exchange,
1969), P.-ÇJ!
%obert J. Lampman, The Share of Ton Wealth-Holders 
in National Wealth. 1922-56. (Princeton: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1962), pp. 23- 2 k .
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Edwin Burk Cox reached similar conclusions about the 
concentration of stockholdings by high-income investors in 
his book, Trends in the Distribution of Stock Ownership.
The distribution of shares held beneficially by 
individuals or families according to the income of 
these individuals or families has been roughly ap­
proximated for recent years as follows: ranked ac­
cording to income, the 2 per cent of stockholders with 
the highest incomes hold 25 per cent of the shares;
5 per cent hold 35 per cent; 10 percent hold 45 per 
cent; 20 per cent hold 55 per cent; and 50 per cent 
hold 75 per cent. . . . these figures express a minimum 
estimate of the degree of concentration of stock owner­
ship by income levels of stockholders.°
Dorothy S. Projector and Gertrude Weiss, in Survey 
of Financial Characteristics of Consumers, reported the 
following observations.
Investment assets differ from other major forms . 
of wealth in that holdings are not widely diffused 
throughout the population. The lower half of the in­
come distribution held 16 per cent of the investment 
assets compared with 29 per cent of liquid assets and 
of home equities. Investment assets were similar to 
businesses as to concentration of holdings in the upper 
income groups. The top tenth of the income distri­
bution owned 56 per cent of the business equity and the 
same share of the investment assets. . . .
Holdings of marketable securities other than stock 
were most concentrated in the upper income brackets.
The top tenth of the income distribution of consumer 
units held more than 80 per cent of the total invest­
ment in such securities, compared with 45 per cent of 
total wealth. . . .
Although publicly traded stocks were more generally 
owned than were other marketable securities, they 
ranked next after other marketable securities with 
respect to concentration of holdings. The top income
^Edwin Burk Cox, Trends in the Distribution of Stock 
Ownership (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
1 9 6 3 ) ,  p .  199 .
tenth of consumer units owned 62 per cent of the 
equity in publicly traded stocks
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Table 1^ - was constructed from data presented in 
Survey of Financial Characteristics of Consumers. As shown in 
the table, consumer units in the study with incomes of 
$7)500 or more (approximately 30 percent of the consumer 
units) held some 83 percent of the publicly traded stock and 
some 89 percent of the marketable securities other than 
stock. Consumer units with incomes of $15)000 or more (ap­
proximately four percent of the consumer units) held some 
59 percent of the publicly traded stocks and 79 percent of 
the marketable securities other than stock.
According to the calculations of Jean Crockett and 
Irwin Friend, in I960 individuals owned $35^ billion of the 
approximately $500 billion total market value of foreign 
and domestic stocks held by residents of the United States. 
They estimated that:
(1) individuals with an adjusted gross income of 
$100,000 or more, representing about one-tenth percent of 
all families filing income tax returns, owned approximately 
one-fifth of the stock owned by individuals, and
(2) families with an adjusted gross income of 
$25,000 or more, (one percent of all individual taxpayers) 
held approximately one-half of the stock owned by
^Dorothy S. Projector and Gertrude S. Weiss, Survey 
of Financial Characteristics of Consumers (Washington, D.C.: 
Board of Goyernors of the Federal Reserye System, i960),
pp. 1 4 - 1 5 .
INCOME AND
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TABLE 14
DISTRIBUTION OF INVESTMENT 
(By Consumer Units)
ASSETS
1962 Percent Publicly
Marketable
Securities
Income of all Traded Other Than
(Dollars) Units Stock Stock
$ Negative + 3 +
$ 0-2,999 28 3 8
3,000-4,999 20 4 1
5,000-7,499 22 8 1
7 , 500- 9,999 15 11 6
10,000-14,999 11 13 4
15,000-24,999 3 10 8
25 , 000- 49,999 1 18 14
50, 000- 99,999 * 12 39
100,000 and Over * 19 18
TOTALS** 100 100 100
* Insignificant Amounts— Less than 1/2 of one percent. 
^Details may not add to totals because of rounding. 
Source: Projector and Weiss, Survey, pp. 136, 1^1.
individuals. In a discussion of the accuracy of these esti­
mates, they stated:
. . . the distribution of direct ownership of stock 
among different income classes is probably somewhat
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more concentrated than these estimates would sug­
gest. . .
The Projector-Weiss study, one of the most recent 
and comprehensive investigations of individual wealth, pro­
vides additional support for the conclusion that high-income 
individuals hold more wealth and investments (including 
stocks and bonds) than other persons.
Table 15 reported in the Federal Reserve Bulletin, 
presents the average amount of investment assets held by 
the families surveyed. The information in the table indi­
cates a wide variation in the average amount of investment 
assets held by families in different income classes.
Families with higher incomes held significantly more invest­
ment assets (including stocks and bonds) than those with 
lower incomes.
Table 16 displays information concerning the hold­
ings of publicly traded stock by income class. The data sug­
gest a strong relationship between income of the consumer 
unit and the amount of equity in publicly traded stock held 
by the unit. Eighty-four percent of all consumer units had 
no equity in publicly traded stocks, and only one percent had 
an equity of $50,000 or over. Consumer units with larger iit- 
comes tend to have larger amounts of equity. Eighty-eight 
percent of the consumer units with incomes of $100,000 and
O
Jean Crockett and Irwin Friend, "Characteristics 
of Stock Ownership," Proceedings of the Business and Eco­
nomic Statistics Section of The American Statistical As­
sociation (Washington, D.C., 19&3), P* I67.
TABLE 15
SELECTED COMPONENTS OF NET WORTH 
Mean amount of specified assets held by all families
In dollars
Business, 
profes­
sion
Liquid and investment assets
Group
Characteristic
Investment assets
(farm
and
nonfarm) All
Liquid
assets All Stocks
Market­
able
bonds Other
All families..... . 3,913 9,642 2,579 7,063 4,072 456 2,535
1962 income:
0-42,999..........
$3,000-4,999.....
$5,000-7,499.....
$7 ,500-9,999.....
$10,000-14,999___
$15,000-24,999---
$25,000-49,999---
$50,000-99,999---
$100,000 and over.
1,418
1,902
2,050
:
9,088
. 66,144
. 251,977 
. 288,915
3,458
4,663
5,426
7,500 
11,202 
39,880 
111,761 
387,573
1,058,672
1,330
1,738
1,716
2,722
4,233
9,241
19,098
4l ,845 
54,426
2,128
2,925
T^710
4,779
6,969
30,638
92,663
345,728
1,004,246
1 ,480 
818 
2,365
1,476
3,761
18,733
58,111
204,665
758,253
201
19
18
44
316
1
4,742
71,971
121,985
hka
2,088
3Î258
29,810
69,092
124,008
Source: "Survey of Financial Characteristics of Consumers," Federal Reserve
Bulletin. Board of Governors, The Federal Reserve System (Washington, B.C. 
March, 196^), p. 293.
TABLE 16
INCOME AND SIZE OF EQUITY IN PUBLICLY TRADED STOCK 
(Percentage distribution of consumer units)
Group
Characteristic
œ
-p 0) ON ON
•H > ON ON
•H ON J"
1
ON
ON 1
0} 0 T— 0 0
1—1 bO fH 1 0 0
r-l 0) 0) T— CM ITN
<1; is; N
ON ON ON
ON
ON
CTN
ON
ON
ON
ON
ON
ON
U
0
>
0
ON CJN ON 0 «N
ON ON C3N ON d
CM
1
o5
1— j- ON 1 1
1 1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0
0 IfN IfN 0
CM ICN CM UN
2 3 2 1 1 1 1All units............ 100
1962 income :
0-$2,999........... 100
$3,000-^,999....... 100
$5,000-7,>+99....... 100
$7,500-9,999....... 100
$ 1 0 ,0 0 0 -1 4 ,9 9 9 ...........100
$ 1 5 ,0 0 0 -2 4 ,9 9 9 ...........100
$25,000-49,999......100
$50,000-9 9 ,9 9 9.....100
$100,000 and over..100
*
*
*
*
*
1
*
*
84
93
92
68
48
17
12
3
1
1
3 
2
4
3
+
*
*
1
2
4
2 
*
3 
1 
*
1
1
2
2
3
5
5
*
1
*
3
2
I
7
1
*
1
2
1
4 
6 
9 
11 
22 
1
1
1
1
1
6
2
1
1
*
1
5
5
*
1
1
2 
*
1
6
10
4
*
1
1
*
2
6
12
17
7
*
*
1
1
2
4
25
æ
VOva
*Less than 1/2 of one percent.
Source: Projector and Weiss, Survey, p. 104,
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over had an equity of $50,000 or more, and 95 percent of 
these units had an equity of $25,000 or more in publicly 
traded stocks.
Table 17 provides an estimate of the distribution of 
income among consumer units in 1962. Approximately 15 per­
cent of the consumer units had an income of $10,000 or more, 
and approximately four percent had an income of $15,000 or 
more.
TABLE 17 
INCOME OF CONSUMER UNITS
1962 Income 
Negative . .
$ 0-2,999 . .
$ 3,000-^,999 
$ 5,000-7,^99 
$ 7,500-9,999 
$ 10,000-1^,999 
$ 15,000-2^,999 
$ 25,000-^9,999 
$ 50,000-99,999
$ 100,000 and over
Percent of 
all Units
*
28^
20
22
15
11
3
1
*
*
1
Insignificant Amounts— Less than 
1/2 of one percent.
Source: Projector and Weiss, Survey,
p. I8l .
Table 18 presents a comparison of the distribution 
of investment assets by income class and in conjunction with 
Table 17 indicates the degree of concentration of securities 
in portfolios of high-income persons. Consumer units with 
incomes of $7 ,500 or more (about one-third of the total
TABLE 18
INCOME AND DISTRIBUTION OF INVESTMENT ASSETS 
(Percentage of total dollars of equity in specified assets held
by consumer units)
Portfolio of liquid and investment assets
Investment assets
Group
Characteristic
ic! CO
o 0) "d
o o •H 0
•H -P bO
w  a CO •H (0
w  Fh u ^
(D nJ 'd p Ü CO
4-4 4-4 Q) Ü  o -p a
o  0 'd Q) -P CD
r - i o -P (0 CO CO CO p
A  0 Q) f4 CO 0 o
CO -p 0) d
1—1 TO
cO P d
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m  a CO >> 0 P Wm (Ü cO -P bO CO CO P
<D 'd o -p cO 0 0  -H
Ü  a ■H •H 0) F4 bO d  d
•H A rH M  (I) -P rH
W  flj 1-■i A rH A A CO CO
S i ;  5
 ^ "H
Î < (S
eg -p 
S  o
0
Pi
All units................
1962 income:
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Negative .............. ____  1 1 * 2 3 * * 2 *
0-#2,999 .............. 8 15 5 3 8 9 5 10
$3,000-^,999........... 10 13 9 4 1 15 12 29
$5,000-7,^99........... 10 15 8 8 1 6 12 8
$7 ,500-9,999................  9 14 16 13 11 6 27 18 9
$10,000-14,999........ ____  12 14 18 12 13 4 12 13 10
$15,000-24,999.............  9 12 12 12 10 8 16 14 12
$25,000-49,999........ ....  15 13 7 16 18 14 4 18 12
$50,000-99,999........ ____  20 9 4 11 12 39 10 3 7
$100,000 and over..... ....  5 9 2 12 19 18 2 2 3
*Less than 1/2 of one percent.
Source: Projector and Weiss, Survev. p. 136.
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number of consumer units) held some 83 percent of the 
publicly traded stock and 89 percent of the marketable se­
curities other than stock. Consumer units with an income 
of $15^000 or more (about four percent of the total number) 
held some 51 percent of the publicly traded stock and 79 
percent of the marketable securities other than stock.
Business and Professional People 
The research also indicates that persons in business 
or professional occupations tend to have above average 
amounts of income and security holdings. Table 19, from 
the 1967 Survev of Consumer Finances, indicates that persons 
employed in business and professional occupations have aver­
age incomes substantially above other occupations.
Table 20, from Share Ownership in the United States, 
displays a connection between share ownership and occupation. 
Almost ^5 percent of the administrative executives, about 
19 percent of the operating supervisory officials, and about 
13 percent of the professionals owned stock. It would appear 
that business and professional people are, therefore, more 
likely to own stock than other occupational groups.
Most research on asset ownership also indicates that 
the business and professional group owns a very large pro­
portion of the securities held by individuals. Table 21 
was extracted from A Study of Savings in the United States.
TABLE 19
MEAN AND MEDIAN FAMILY INCOME--BY OCCUPATION 
Percentage distribution of families
VO
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Occupation oÜ 1
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1 1 o O
•H P o o o o O dH o o p o O cd
a (d t/3 o o UN •H(d •p W •N O o UN 'Oo 0 ro IfN 1— 0S en P s
Professional, technical $12,310 100 3 5 17 20 32 23 $10,690
Managers, officials 12,940 100 1 3 15 21 37 23 11,390
Self-employed business­
14,260 18men, artisans 100 9 10 16 22 25 9,530
Clerical, sales 8,580 100 5 15 26 23 21 10 7,930
Craftsmen, foremen 9,310 100 3 10 21 26 31 9 9,060
Operatives 7 , ^ 0 100 8 17 28 25 20 2 7,290
Laborers, service workers 5,310 100 27 24 25 15 8 1 4,900
Farmers 7,060 100 21 19 27 14 13 6 5,760
Miscellaneous groups 8,130 100 31 18 23 12 8 8 5,160
Retired 3,630 100 57 21 10 6 4 2 2,620
\o
\o
Source: George Katona, James N. Morgan, Jay Schmiedeskamp, John A. Sunquist, 1967
Survev of Consumer Finances. Survey Research Center, Institute of Social 
Research (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1968), p. 70.
200
TABLE 20
INDIVIDUAL SHARE OWNERS OF PUBLICLY OWNED STOCKS 
DISTRIBUTED BY OCCUPATIONAL GROUPS
Occupation
Number
in
Population
Individual 
Share Owners 
(As a percent 
of total)
Administrative executives 670,000 44.8
Operating supervisory officials 3 ,190,000 19.4
Professional persons— personal
service®- 2 ,980,000 12.4
Professional persons--technical
fields^ 2 ,270,000 13.2
Sales personnel^ 1,780,000 11.2
Merchants^ 2,360,000 10.6
Clerical and kindred workers 7 ,790,000 7.6
Farmers 4 ,700,000 6.8
Skilled workers--foremen 9 ,310,000 4.4
Public service workers 1,180,000 3.4
Semiskilled workers 15,090,000 1 .4
Unskilled workers 5,640,000 0.2
Members of armed forces® 1,820,000 1 .1
Employed--occupation f
unidentified 390,000
Non-employed adults 2 ,250,000 1.3
Non-employed— retired, dependent 6 ,180,000 9.1
Housewives--non-employed 35,600,000 6.0
Students and preschool age 52,320,000 0.2
Total 155,520,000 4.2
Includes professional persons who render direct 
personal service such as doctors, lawyers, dentists, edu­
cators, clergymen, and the like.
^Includes persons engaged in technical professions 
such as architects, engineers, chemists, and auditors.
^^Representatives of wholesalers and manufacturers.
^Includes wholesale.
^Includes only those members of the armed forces who 
are members of family groups.
^Less than 10,000 share owners in the group.
Source: Lewis H. Kimmel, Share Ownership in the United
States (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institu­
tion, 1952), p. 98.
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TABLE 21
DISTRIBUTION OF STOCK HOLDINGS BY OCCUPATIONAL GROUP
Stock Holdings* 
Occupational Group (Percent of Total)
Professional and Semi-Professional . 18
Managerial ..........................  5
Self-employed........................  35
Clerical and S a l e s .................. *+
Skilled and Semi-Skilled ...........  2
Unskilled and Service...............  1
Farm O p e r a t o r ......................  2
Retired............................... 2k
All Other............................   2
All Cases............................. 100
*
Includes closely held corporations.
Source: Raymond W. Goldsmith and Dorothy S. Brady
and Horst Menderhausen, A Study of Savings 
in the United States (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1956),
Vol. Ill, p. 127.
According to the estimates presented in Table 21 , 
people in managerial and professional occupations, and 
self-employed persons held about 58 percent of the stock 
owned by individuals. This percentage would probably be in­
creased by inclusion of retired persons who had been members 
of these occupational groups prior to retirement.
Jean Crockett and Irwin Friend concluded that busi­
ness and professional people own a majority of stock held by 
individuals. Table 22 summarizes some of their findings.
The occupations of 25 percent of the individuals included in 
Table 22 were not determinable. However, as shown by the 
table, business and professional people owned 5^ percent of
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TABLE 22
DISTRIBUTION OF MARKET VALUE OF INDIVIDUALS' 
STOCKHOLDINGS BY OCCUPATION
Occupation
Total
(Percent)
Total of Known 
Occupations*** 
(Percent)
Managers, officials and 
proprietors* 25.9 3^.6
Professionals* 1>+. 1 18.9
Clerical 3.0 1+.I
Sales ^.9 6.6
Farmers 2.h 3.2
Other employees (including 
armed forces) ^.9 6.5
Retired 13.6 18.1
Others not gainfully employed 6.2 8.3
Not known 25.2 --
Totals** 100.0 100.0
Both salaried and self-employed.
+ *
Columns may not add to totals because of rounding,
Calculated from preceding column.
Source: Crockett and Friend, "Characteristics of Stock
Ownership," p. 157*
the stock held by persons whose occupations were known.
This percentage would probably be considerably higher if the 
retired persons who had been in business or professional oc­
cupations prior to retirement were included.
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In their conclusions, Crockett and Friend noted that,
The two occupational groups which show an out­
standing propensity to hold stocks are the managerial 
group and those in the p r o f e s s i o n s .9
Thomas Atkinson reported similar findings in The 
Pattern of Financial Asset Ownership. In his words.
There are significant differences among occupa­
tional groups in the types of financial assets held, 
both as to frequency of ownership and as to shares 
of the total dollar value of each type of asset.
Most striking is the large proportion of corporate 
stock held by managerial and self-employed persons.
In summary, the preceding discussions indicate that 
high-income business and professional people are a highly 
significant group of investors, and because of this, the 
survey included individuals in business or professional oc­
cupations and a disproportionately large number of high- 
income persons.
^Crockett and Friend, "Characteristics of Stock 
Ownership," p. I67.
^'^Thomas R. Atkinson, The Pattern of Financial 
Asset Owner shin--Wisconsin Individuals. 19M-9. A Study by 
the National Bureau of Economic Research, New York 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1956), p. 106.
APPENDIX B
COLLEGE O F BUSINESS ADM INISTRATION 
D EPA R T M E N T OF A CCOUNTING
THE U N I V E R S I T Y  OF O K L A H O M A
N O R M A N ,  O K L A H O M A ,  73069
Dear Sir:
As a part of the requirements for a Ph.D. degree, I am 
writing a doctoral dissertation concerned with investor attitudes 
toward the capital gains tax. My research design is such that I 
must obtain from a select group of high-income individuals, such 
as yourself, the information necessary to establish my hypothesis.
Your response is essential to the successful completion 
of the research, and it will be kept strictly confidential. It 
is not necessary and, in fact, not possible for me to identify 
any particular respondent. You will note that the questionnaire 
has been designed so that only about twenty minutes of your time 
will be required to complete and return it.
Since my research must be completed by January 1, 1970, 
would you please take a few minutes and complete the questionnaire 
now?
Thank you very much for your generous and invaluable 
assistance to my educational endeavor.
Sincerely,
Donald R. Nichols
DRN/pas
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CONFIDENTIAL QUESTIONNAIRE
1. Are you married? Q  yes Q  no. How many children do you have?_
2. What is your present age in years?  What is your sex? Q  male Q  female
3. What is the approximate current market value of your and your immediate family's investments in
stocks and bonds? .  .......................................................$___________________
4. What percent of the dollar amount of stocks and bonds in the answer to question 3 do you manage
personally? (make buy, sell, hold, etc., decisions).......................  °L
5. Are any of these securities worth considerably more now than when you got them? Q  yes Q  no
If What are your primary reasons for holding, rather than selling these appreciated securities?
yes (May require more than one answer for several securities held or several reasons for holding.)
Q  Have never considered selling them Q  Tax considerations
Q  Rarely, or never sell appreciated securities Q  Difficult to sell, or not marketable
Q  No better investment available Q  Other reasons____________________________
□  Expectation of further appreciation_____________ __________________________________________
The influence of Federal taxes on your decisions to hold, rather than sell any of these appre­
ciated securities has been;
□  A dominant influence □  Of little influence
O  A significant, but not dominant influence □  Of no influence
If you have been influenced at all by federal taxes, which aspects (may be more than one) of
taxation have affected your decisions to hold, rather than sell these appreciated securities?
□  Had not held the security for six months
□  Desire to postpone the tax that will have to be paid when the security is sold 
O  Desire to completely avoid the tax on the appreciation by including the security in my
estate at death
D Other_______________________________________________________________________________________
6. A taxpayer may completely avoid federal income taxes on capital gains from securities which are 
included in his estate at death. Were you aware of this fact? □  yes Q  no
If Has this fact influenced any of your decisions to hold, rather than sell any appreciated
yes securities? 0  yes Q  no Q  no appreciated securities
The influence which this fact has had on your decisions to hold, rather than sell these
appreciated securities has been;
O  A dominant influence 0  Of little Influence
O  A significant, but not dominant influence O  Of no influence
7. If you had received one more dollar of ordinary income in 1968, what percentage of that dollar
would you have had to pay in federal income taxes? ESTIMATE ONLY ___________________________ °k
8. If you had received one more dollar of long-term capital gains income in 1968, what percentage
of that dollar would you have had to pay in federal income taxes? ESTIMATE ONLY _____________ X
9. Do you generally try to hold your securities at least six months? 0  yes 0  no
If I The influence of the capital gains tax on your desire to hold securities at least six months
yes I has been;
I O  A dominant influence O  Of little influence
• O  A significant, but not dominant influence 0  Of no influence
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10. Do you expect a change in your future income which will affect the rate at which your income is 
taxed? (Ignore tax rate variations due to the surcharge or possible modifications of the pre­
sent income tax structure.) O yes O no
If
yes
Has this expected change in your tax rate had an influence on any of your decisions concern­
ing your security portfolio? D yes □  no
If yes, what change do you expect in the rate at which your income is taxed?
D A substantial increase in tax rate Q  A moderate decrease in tax rate
0 A moderate incrtase in tax rate □  A substantial decrease in tax rate
D No change in tax rate 0 Other____________________________________
Has this expected change in your tax rate influenced you to:
O  Hold a security which has increased in price since you got it
O  Sell a secur:f • which has increased in price since you got it
D Hold a se i _^y which has decreased in price since you got it
Q  Sell a security which has decreased in price since you got it
□  Other_____________________________
The answers to the following four questions should be obtained from your 1968 federal income tax 
return.
11. What was the amount of your 1968 "adjusted gross income" (gross income less business deductions 
--found on page 1, line 9 of Form 1040)?......................................$________________
12. What was the amount of your 1968 "taxable income" (income after all exemptions and deductions 
are subtracted--found on page 1, line lid of Form 1040)?..................... $________________
13. As defined by your 1968 federal income tax return ("Your Filing Status") were you:
D  Single n  Unmarried Head of Household
O  Married filing joint return □  Surviving Widow(er) with dependent child
D Married filing separately
14. The answer to the four questions above were Q  obtained from your 1968 return, or O  estimated?
15. Have you ever made a gift of an appreciated asset (other than a charitable contribution) to mini­
mize or reduce your income or estate taxes? D y e s  O  no. Do you plan to make such a gift in 
the future? D  yes □  no
16. Do you presently own any security which you would sell if there were no capital gains tax?
O  yes D  no. If yes, this statement is true of approximately what percent of the total 
market value of your security portfolio? __________ %
The following question is concerned with a hypothetical investment decision. You are to assune that 
the only difference between stocks in the question is the difference in expected price increases.
The returns (dividends and appreciation) are exact and certain to occur. There is no risk in either.
17. You own Stock "A" which has a current market value of $100 and is certain to pay no dividends, 
but is certain to increase in price at the rate of 10 per cent annually for the next ten years. 
You are considering the sale of Stock "A" and the reinvestment of all the after-tax proceeds 
($82.50) in Stock "B," which is certain to pay no dividends in the next ten years. You must 
assume that the performance of both stocks will be equal after 10 years.
QUESTION: Indicate the minimum annual percentage increase in the price of Stock "B" which would
make the sale of Stock "A" and the purchase of Stock "B" profitable.
□  10% □  11% □  12% □  13% □  14% □  15% □  16% □  17% □  18% □  19% O  20% or over
O l a m  unable to compute D Other_________________________________________________________
18. Please indicate any additional comments, suggestions or ideas which might be helpful to me in 
this study._______________________________________________________________________________________
THANK YOU VERY MUCH.
